6.
Britain
Mr Royle said that he understood that the Chinese were a little
concerned that there was no Chinese representation in Dublin. Our
understanding was that Ireland recognised the Chinese People's Republic
as the sole legal government of China and that this was tantamount to
having diplomatic relations. He hoped this explanation would help
resolve their doubts. Chi P'eng-fei said that he did not think that
Ireland was any longer a problem. They had been in contact with the
Irish and had received the same explanation.
7. There were some problems in trade relations, however. Restrictions
were imposed by the "Paris Co-ordinating Committee", Some relaxation had
taken place recently since Sir Alec's visit to Peking, but difficulties
continue, There was also the question of high tariffs. He wanted to know
how these were fixed. Mr Royle said that Mr Chi might discuss details of
this kind with Mr Davies.
/In practice
2
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CONFIDENTIAL
In practice, ordinary trade continued on a bilateral basis between each
member of the Nine and third countries, but tariff negotiations
This was why we suggested were now in the hands of the Commission.
Sir Denis
the Chinese should have a link with the Commission. Greenhill pointed
out that COCOM had nothing to do with the European Community. It was
concerned with a narrow range of strategic goods; its arrangements were
totally outside the Community framework and ante-dated it. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home said that he would ask Mr Davies to give the Chinese
Foreign Minister an aide-memoire with the answers to his questions. As
he understood the situation, existing bilateral trade agreements would
continue as at present
COCOM unless tariffs were involved, when the Commission came in. was a
separate body. He could let the Chinese Foreign Minister have a note on
that too. The Chinese should not worry about tariffs; the common
external tariff of the Community was on average lower than the United
Kingdom tariff. During the transitional period our tariff would
gradually move towards the level of the common external tariff.
8.
Chi P'eng-fei said that was one question on which the Chinese had not
been clear. There was a second question: the Common Market
There was a textile apparently had relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
agreement which would expire in 1973. Sir Alec Douglas-Hone said that
this was negotiated before Britain was a member of the
He Community. The Chinese should ask Mr Davies about this too. wanted to
assure the Chinese that he had been watching developments in the
Community very closely. Whatever had happened at the beginning, it was
now a very outward-looking organisation and British influence was thrown
on that side. It was also a very powerful body in trading terms,
covering 41% of world trade. would be well worthwhile for the Chinese to
establish relations with it. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese were
considering this question seriously; they were asking questions because
there were certain issues which had to be clarified before they could
make a decision.
It
9. Chi P'eng-fei then said he wished to say a few words about Hong Kong,
even though he accepted that Sir Alec had given his decision. During Sir
Alec's visit to Peking, both he and the Chinese Prime Minister had
argued in favour of an official Chinese representative. At that time,
Sir Alec had expressed doubts about the possibility of a double régime
growing up. The Chinese had made it clear that it was not their
intention to establish such a régime. They had also made clear their
full respect for the present authorities in Hong Kong. Their starting
point was that their policy towards Hong Kong should be in conformity
with the development of Anglo-Chinese relations and aimed at enabling
the prosperity of Hong Kong to continue. They thought that they ought
The title of the to have a representative to deal with Hong Kong.
representative might be a subject for discussion. In the past, the KMT
had sent a Special Commissioner of Kwangtung and Kwangs Provinces. The
Chinese did not insist on calling their representative a Commissioner.
There was also room for further discussion about his possible functions.
These should be carefully defined.
:
/10.
;
3
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The
10. Chi P'eng-fei continued that there were many issues under discussion
at present related to Hong Kong: an air link, a direct traia service to
China, shipping arrangements and so on. Chinese Government felt that, if
there were no one to deal with these problems in Hong Kong, this would
not be fitting in relation to the excellent developments which were
taking place in Anglo- Chinese relations. There are many possibilities
which could be considered: the representative could be a Representative
of Kwangtung, or he could be a Representative of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The Chinese were also willing to consider reciprocal
representation of the Hong Kong authorities in Canton. If such issues
were not settled, this would not assist Hong Kong. The status of Hong
Kong was not in question. That was a matter for the future. The Chinese
regarded the appointment of an official representative in Hong Kong as
an aspect of the development of their relations between the United
Kingdom and China. Premier Chou En-lai had raised it because of the KMT
Special Commissioner of Kwangtung and Kwangs Province in Hong Kong. He
could not see why the Chinese People's Government could not send a
Commissioner, especially now that relations were so good, if the KMT had
been able to send one. The Chinese Government did not share the fears of
the British Government. They thought the problem could be settled
favourably. The functions of any representative could be carefully
defined so that he knew what he should do and what not. Chi P'eng-fei
added that, although Sir Alec had told him of his decision and given
an aide memoire, the problem would certainly come up again when Prime
Minister Heath visited China. He thought both sides should consider it
further in the meantime. The Chinese side certainly did not wish to
establish a separate régime in Hong Kong.
11.
The question of an air link between the United Kingdom and China passing
through Hong Kong was also under discussion in Peking at present. Whilst
the representation issue was unsettled, it was difficult to deal with
the other question. Yet flights between Hong Kong and Peking would be
advantageous to British air companies; it would give them.wider scope
for their activities. The Chinese Government therefore hoped that
Britain would adopt a new approach, or rather re-adopt their clder
approach. He would in any case report to Premier Chou En-lai, who would
take the question up with the Prime Minister.
I
12. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he accepted the Chinese purpose was
not to establish a double régime; he also accepted their respect for the
Hong Kong authorities. He pointed out that in their two meetings he and
the Chinese Foreign Minister had established very good relations. But
this had been in a very short time. Hong Kong was a very speciel case,
and more time as nooded. The KMT precedent had not in practice been a
happy one. We would wish to follow a different pattern if we were ever
to act on the Chinese proposal. In the present instance, he had
considered very carefully what the Chinese leaders had said to him with
the Governor of Hong Kong (who was a very good Governor) and his
conclusion was that the time was not yet ripe and he hoped that the
Chinese would not press their proposal. If Premier Chou En-lai raised it
with the Prime Minister, they could of course discuss it.
/He hoped
4
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CONFIDENTIAL
He hoped that our answer would not have repercussions on an air services
agreement between the United Kingdom and China; if it had, thai was too
bad.
13. Sir Alec Douglas-Home then asked whether there were any other
bilateral issues to discuss. The issue of the British detainees and the
"confrontation prisoners" in Hong Kong was now satisfactorily over.
14. After a brief discussion in which Chi P'eng-fei made it clear that
he did not wish to fly in Concorde, the conversation turned to Western
Germany and the recent visit by Mr Brezhnev to Bonn. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home said that he believed that nothing of the essential
security of the West had been sacrificed. Mr Brandt had been Mayor of
Berlin in the most dangerous years. He had no illusions about the Soviet
Union. The Germans had now completed their Ostpolitik. They were now
turning to their Westpolitik, in other words the consolidation of
Western Europe. He had a slight worry about the role of East Germany in
these matters, but he believed that the tendency would be for East
Germany to gravitate towards the West rather than the other way round.
The reports in the press of German aid to the Soviet Union had been much
exaggerated, as was usual in these matters. Chi P'cng-fei commented that
in the Chinese opinion matters were not as easy as the Soviet-West
German communiqué implied. The boasts subsequently made by Mr Brezhnev
to have laid the basis for European peace were do much eyewash. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home said that the Soviet economy was in a bad way, but that the
Russians could still produce armaments in great quantities.
15. Sir Alec Douglas-Home then said that he saw no likelihood of a
solution to the Middle Eastern problem before the forthcoming Israeli
elections. After them, pressure from the United States might perhaps
work to make the Israelis more flexible. But for the moment there was
deadlock. Britain had talked with the Egyptians and had even given them
defensive arms. Our only hope was that Dr Jarring, or perhaps the UN
Secretary General might make some progress at mediation. The Four Power
talks in New York had led nowhere, but they might be worth
re-establishing. The Chinese had not wanted to join in them last year,
and he wondered whether they would be willing to do so now.
16. Chi Pleng-fei said that the Middle Eastern question was a very
complex issue; he saw no present hope of progress. China was not in
favour of joining in Five Power talks. She did not think she had
a role to play there. Sir Alec Douglas-one said that our own role was
limited too, but we wished to put an end to this confrontation and we
were prepared to try. Chi P'eng-fei said that he thought that the
possibilities of United Nations mediation were very restricted. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home said that, in his opinion, the Israelis were being very
short-sighted. The Egyptians would like to have peace for many reasons;
given reasonable terms, they would settle. The Israelis, however,
thought that the best thing to do was to sit tight. They might be right
after all, but it did not promote a settlement. Perhaps after their
elections, there would be some movement. Chi P'eng-fei said that, if the
national rights of the Palestinian
|
5
/people
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CONFIDENTIAL
people were not restored, there was no hope of a lasting settlement. Sir
Alec Douglas-Home agreed that an overall settlement was needed, Which
must include the Palestinians. It would of course cost a lot of money.
But this was not an insuperable obstacle if the political will were
there. So far it was apparently lacking in Israel.
17. The meeting closed with the usual exchange of courtesies.
Distribution:
PS/PM
PS/CDL
1
I
Chanceries: (Canberra
(Wellington
Tokyo New Delhi Singapore Kuala Lumpur
J
·
Mr Cradock,
Cabinet Office
PS/Mr Amery
PS/Lady Tweedsmuir
PS/Mr Royle PS/PUS
Sir E Norris
Mr Wright
Mr Wilford Mr Reddaway
Mr Keeble Mr Robinson
FED TO ENTER
News Dept.
CED
TRD
EID
WED
M&TD
EESD
NENAD
Planning Staff
PS(2)
Chanceries:-
Peking
Governor, Hong Kong
UKREP Brussels
Dublin
Washington
Moscow
UKMIS New York
}
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RD(FE) PUSD IRD
CONFIDENTIAL
AIDE - MEMOIRE
CONFIDENTIAL
I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime Minister when I
visited China last autumn. I told the Prime
Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the matter and I
would get in touch with you in due course.
The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are
necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests
in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong
Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our
two countries. So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and
prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant;
it grows only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. share an interest in
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share
an interest in the preservation of confidence there.
If, as I believe, we
We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations between
Britain and China. So, we believe, do you. The situation in Hong Kong is
a factor of importance in these relations. It follows that we share an
interest in doing nothing in, or over Hong Kong, which might unsettle
these
relations.
I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke
to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In
the light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the
time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your
/representation
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CONFIDENTIAL
representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you nob
to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be
some time, before circumstances might change in such a way as
to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now
exist.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
7 June 1973
CONFIDENTIAL
iser
TS 2/1126/50 II
RM Evans Esq
FED F CO
CONFIDENTIAL
My I'm Richard,
ثنا
мене
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
20 June, 1973
73
I myself Tonkina The guide must have been briefed. I'm inclined to
wailure Mimorgan Las
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG commend
I enclose a copy of a minute by John Stern about persistent questioning
of him on this subject by his guide in Shanghai. This incident does seem
a little odd. The incompetence of the guide points to it being a put-up
job; though my own brief experience of Chinese guides earlier this year
suggests that this is not conclusive evidence.
2.
If it was not a put-up job, we must perhaps conclude that knowledge that
this was an issue between us is more videspread in China than we had
supposed. Although there has been plenty of publicity about it in Hong
Kong there has to our knowledge been no public reference to it in the
Chinese press. been mentioned in 'Reference News'.
Possibly it has
R.E.
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Wilfor
CA. 41A
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MW 28%.
CC MH Morgan Esq
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CONFIDENTIAL/6
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CONFIDENTIAL
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questioned by my guide on the Chinese representation issue.
resesentation in Hong Kong had been reached during CoI
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18.6.73
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Brewer (FES.R.2). Reference
Mrs, Munn (Research Department)
FEA
72
CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES
1. During the recent visit there were some discussions, though I believe
only on our side, about whether a low level consular exchange could take
place with a British representative/consul being based in Canton and a
similar regional Chinese representative in Hong Kong.
2. Mr Denys Roberts, the Colonial Secretary designate, Hong Kong has
suggested that there might be a parallel in the relations at the local
level between Gibraltar and the neighbouring area of Spain. He believes
that there was a British consul or vice-consul in Lalinga in Southern
Spain wh,although formally responsible to the Embassy in Madrid, was in
fact controlled from Gibraltar and accepted as such by the Spanish
authorities He is not sure whether any similar Spanish official was ever
located in Gibraltar but thinks it possible that this may have been so.
It would indeed be interesting to know whether the constitutional
impasse has ever in the past been avoided in this way at the local
level. Perhaps you and Southern European Section could look into the
question and let us know?
ACSE
AC Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department
Copy to:
Mr Bone
(Research Dept)
Mr. Bone, Westina Soucheen tropane feckin-RD). Room $ 86/3
в
Can you advise indin pon't pleas?.
Hemer
FES.RD.
22/6/73
CONFIDENTIA17793) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gg.863
CONFIDENTIAL
Far Eastern Department
CC
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department News Department
Sir E Norris
Sir D Watson
FEH 3/301/1
لا
BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
After my briefing of the representatives of the eight Embassies in
London I was asked whether there had been any mention of Chinese
representation in Hong Kong which I had not mentioned in my opening
statement. I said that the Secretary of State had brought the matter up
and that it would continue to be a matter for discussion between us. The
Irish representative then asked me whether the Chinese had developed
their position at all. To which I replied that they had said nothing
which altered the position which they had taken in the past. There were
no further questions.
MW
KM Wilford
11 June 1973
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CONFIDENTIAL
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1116
Editorial
For
OUR MAN IN HONGKONG
CHINA is continuing the process of establishing friendly bilateral
relations with the countries on its periphery, with the obvious
exception of the Soviet Union. It is hardly conceivable that in 12
months' time, China's relations with India and Rangladesh will be as
artificially strained as they are today. It is even possible that China
will close the circle. Just as Peking's vitriolic attacks on US
imperialisia rose to a climax prior to the arrival in China of Henry
Kissin- ger, so the level of abuse being directed against Mos- cow today
could conceivably presage an attempt to achieve a détente with the
"social imperialists."
The revival of the suggestion that China should set up a representative
government office in Hong- kong must be seen within the context of
China's general campaign to clear the decks of any obstacles that could
impede the smooth operation of its for eign relations and foreign trade.
Peking has given various verbal assurances to British ministers that the
question of Hongkong is of no particular mo- ment and can wait until the
problem of Taiwan has been settled. China's need to import sophisticated
foreign technology makes ilongkong's contribution to its foreign
reserves - now running at about £500 million (US$1,245 million) annually
an essential factor in China's economic equation, for the recent harvest
setbacks will ensure that Peking will go on importing cereals at least
for the next few years, while its generous foreign aid programme also
cats into the limited supply of hard cash. An official mission could
facilitate the now of trade and could guarantee that Hongkong would more
efficiently ex- pand its future role as a "shop window" for foreign
technology on China's doorstep, within a commu- nity offering no
political challenge to China which obviates the need to have foreign
sales representa- tives stationed permanently in Peking or Canton.
Counting tomorrows
T
At first glance, it would appear that the advan- tages to Hongkong would
be even greater than ihose accruing to China. By establishing such a
mission, Peking would come close to giving de jure recogni- tion to the
"separateness" of the enclave on its coast, thus conferring an even
longer term future on
■ community which has until recently been unable to count its tomorrows.
Nevertheless, Hongkong and Britain (which will be the final arbiter of
the response to Peking) are de- termined to look this gift home very
cautiously in the mouth. The colony's past experience of a Chi- nere
commissioner who represented the Nationalist Government until 1950 was
not a happy one. Less trusting souls recall the excesses of the 1967
vots and ask themsolves how much more embarrassed the
Is this on file
Hongkong Government would have been had there been a Peking
representative in the colony at that time.'
But even if China's foreign policies do not change dramatically yet
again, the head of any such mission would be an obvious target for
petitions from disgruntled elements in Hongkong's society, from striking
schoolteachers and evicted tenants to those resentful of increased Crown
rents and the landlords of opium divans and unregistered doctors
operating within the "Walled City." Presumably Hongkong will want a
fairly waterfight guarantee that the mission would not give Peking's
backing to such causes. If not, the Governor could vastly find himself
in the situation feared by one of his predi cessors, Sir Alexander
Grantham, who was against the proposal (when mooted in 1956) on the
ground that it woukl present him with a "rival" governor.
A question of face
On the other hand, Hongkong's colonial, prote-- colaire society does not
accord proper prestige to the Government of the People's Republic -
diplo matically or socially. It is widely recognised that the heads of
the New China News Agency, the Bank of China and of the other branches
of China's govern- ment in Hongkong are in every sense official re-
presentatives (a fact which in itself disposes of most of Hongkong's
worries about how the head of 2 P. · king mission would conduct
himself). Inadequate steps are taken to ensure that these distinguishe-l
men are accorded their proper importance within the life of the colony.
On balance, it would seem that the gains to Hongkong's status and the
other marginal advan- tages which would accrue from such a mission out-
weigh the possible disadvantages listed by the cau- tious. Another
factor which must now enter into the calculations is the loss of
goodwill that would result from a refusal by London to respond to
Peking's feelers.
There is one way of swinging the scales defini- tively in Hongkong's
favour. London could point out to Peking that Hongkong exists today by
virtue of certain 19th-century treaties denounced by China es "unequal"
and therefore invalid. If China is to establish an official mission in
Hongkong, London could justifiably ask China to take advantage of the
occasion to state in black and white that it was will- ing, of its own
volition and obviously under no duress, at least to let the New
Territories lease run its couse. It would be a fair request, and there
is no reason Cluna should remain enigmaftcally evasive en The issue.
With such a puarantee, Hongkong could welcome with open arms the unrival
of Peking's roan,
L
Bouch
CHINA MORNING HAY 22ND. 73
POST.
Britain still studying China's proposal
BY KEVIN SINCLAIR
The British Government has still got the question of an official Chinese
representative in Hongkong under close study, Me Anthony Royle said in a
cable to the S.C.M. Post yesterday.
Mr Royle Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
said the British Government's study of the Chinese proposal was not yet
completed."
In cable to me from Whitehall Mr Royle said: "As a resident of Hongkong,
you will know yourself that the proposal would give rise in vertain
problems and for this reason is is
most important that it should be carefully and comprehensively studied.
"Our study is not yet completed, and it would be wrong for me to
forecast its likely
outcome.
"I am sure you will understand."
The proposal to establish a representative of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Hongkong was first made by the Chinese Government in 1956,
and was rejected by the British Government two years later.
After the British Mission in Peking was raised to ambassadorial status
last year, the Chinese once again raised the matter of stationing a
representative in Hongkong. Mr
Royle's cable said.
--
Observers in Hongkong last night said Mr Royle's answer reflected the
"dilemma" facing Whitehall.
now
Ontheonchand, they pointed out, Britain and China we now enjoying
cordial relations, and this has been reflected in conditions in
Hongkong. The British Government do not want to offend China by giving a
flat "no" in answer to Peking's request.
But, on the other hand, the 'stationing of a senior Chinese
representative in the Colony is liable to lead in divided loyskies and
confusion among the people of Hongkong, the sources
"The request places Britain in a very difficult position and it is
unlikely that a decision will be made in the near future," one reliable
source said.
Since Lady Tweedsmuir told the House of Lords un May 9 that the British
Government ass still considering the Chinese proposal, there has been
little public development in the issue.
Behind the scenes, however, stalf of the Chinese Embassy in London are
known to have raised the maller several times in the course of routine
discussions with their contacts in the Brush Government.
HONG KONG STANDARD.
MAY 21ST.
73.
P
P
HONGKON
10-
Support for China office in Hongkong
Peking's man another Governor, says Ma
A CHINESE office in Hongkong would be beneficial to local citizens,
according to the Secretary of the United Nations Association, Mr Ma
Man-fai,
Answering a question at the first Hongkong people's forum held at
Victoria Park yesterday, Mr Ma said should China send an official
representative to Hongkong
it would be like having "two governors," he said.
Petitions could be sent to the Peking official, and the "colonial
government** might have to rectify the Issue Co avoid any unfavourable
reaction from Peking, Mr Ma told about 100 people,
At the forem, organied by the Liberty and Democracy Party of Liongkong,
Mr. Ma was called
man" by ons of
kua audience.
He also spoke on his pot subject: all-government · for Hongkong
"Hongkong is my home, The Governor cannot make thi nor can expatriato
civi
government EROL ted by us, nor do we invite
to come in. We mu't sel
to get out Wo have no
ve over 11," said Mr Ma.
He accused the present set of betrayin the omocratic principles
British Government. "What We kuwa here is false British gooda not the
real one,
+
the anti-crime campaign, Me ka mid it would not pluck
out the roots of evil.
"What should be done la to do away with all the [apıl setups that are
people to immoral behaviour," he said.
!
A
CONFIDENTIAL
VISIT OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER : 6 JUNE 10 JUNE
-
ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE BRIEF
70
STATUS OF HONG KONG
It is just conceivable, although unlikely, that during
the talks between the Secretary of State and Chi P'eng-fei,
Chi may make some remarks prejudicial to our view of the
status of Hong Kong. In this case, but only in this case
the Secretary of State will wish to put the record straight.
In doing so it is strongly recommended that he confine
himself to making the following two points:
1) If the Chinese continue to assert their view of
the status of Hong Kong, they should be in no doubt