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OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. The discussion on this subject between the Secretary of State and Chi
Peng-fci in June passed off reasonably well. Chi, accepted what the
Secretary of State had to say, but put us on notice that the subject
would come up again during the Prime Minister's visit to China.
2. We have consulted Peking and Hong Kong for their views on how we
should brief the Prime Minister. Mr Royle may wish to remind himself of
what Sir John Addis said in his letter of
6 August, and see Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's comments on that letter.
3. We have drafted a reply to Sir John Addis saying that we do not agree
with his recommendations that we should brief the Prime Minister to
probe Chinese intentions both on the
representation issue and on the future of Hong Kong.
Mr Roylu will wish to rensouro dir Murray MacLehose that we see no
reason to change our policy on this issue. He might ask how the
Governor's contacts are developing with the licad of NCNA and other
Chinese officials in Hong Kong
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department
7 September 1973
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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG we were,
A.R.718
1. Before we discuss Sir John Addis's letter to you of 16 August on this
subject, you will wish to see two other papers
which are relevant. They are:
A
76A
B
a) Mr Stratton's letter to Mr Hervey of 7 August; and
2. I have myself always tended to agree with Sir John Addis rather than
Sir Murray Maclehose over the interpretation of Sa I. Chinese purposes.
I am now inclined to accept his interpretation of the reasons why Chi
P'eng-fei put forward his suggestion about reciprocal representation
during his recent visit to this country. On the other hand, I have
always tended to agree with
1
THIS IS A COF/
944. OF THE PLUS TO PROG ACT 1968
THE ORIGINAL HIS IN THE BEHANI
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Sir Murray Maclehose rather than Sir John Addis over the likely
consequences of our either accepting or refusing the Chinese proposal. I
still do.
suggests to me that
the Chinese may indeed have given up hope of persuading us to accept the
proposal. Even if I an right, however, I do not think it follows that
Chou En-lai will abstain from pressing the Prime Minister to accept the
proposal when he goes to Peking. The Chinese would have nothing to lose
and (potentially) à good deal to gain by adopting such a course. In any
case it would not be in their nature to avoid the subject altogether
after warning us that we can expect it to be broached again.
15 August 1973
R.M. Evons
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
We shall be presend again by the Chrase whom the P.M. goos to China, but
I would not Impport Six J Addio' recommendati
about how the matter shoul
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SECRET
2.
1.
You will wish to see Mr Royle's minute.
2. I think that our next step should be to send Sir John
I think Addis a considered reply to his letter of 6 August. we owe it to
him to explain fairly fully why we do not think that the Prime Minister
should go beyond the formula which the Secretary of State used in
speaking to Chi P'eng-fei and also why we do not think it would be
prudent for the Prime Minister to broach the future of Hong Kong and its
relations with China with Chou En-lai. If you agree, I will prepare a
draft (for submission to you after clearance with Mr Stewart). I shall
refer to Mr Stratton's letter of 7 August
22 August 1973
R.in. Erons
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
Yea please so proceed
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16th August 1973
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77A
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
24/x
76 A
Addis's letter to you of 6 August comments on Hervey's letter of 23 July
to Stratton about Chinese representation in Hong Kong. We have already
sent our comments, on lines agreed by the Governor before he left, in
Stratton's letter to Hervey of 7 August
The Ambassador refers to Hong Kong without official Chinese
representation as an anomaly and an anachronism. I would say rather that
one can make out a case that it is the position of Hong Kong, with or
without a representative, which is the anomaly and the anachronism,
continuation of which for the foreseeable future is nevertheless in the
interests of all concerned. The present arrangements for conducting
relations between Hong Kong and China are adequate. And there are no
sources of friction which we can be sure that the appointment of a
representative would do anything to
remove.
3.
The appointment of a representative would give face to the CPG's
operations in Hong Kong, and perhaps infer some official acceptance of
their claim to sovereignty over this Colony. There would be a short term
gain for Hong Kong and HMG in terms of Chinese goodwill. But we have no
doubt that this would be heavily outweighed by the immediate loss of
confidence in Hong Kong and its future which would follow the
representative's appointment. And it would not be long before grave
embarrassment ensued caused both by his activities and by other
activities for which he would become a focus. We cannot have two
Governors of Hong Kong, which is what will occur. And while his appoint-
ment might give a temporary appearance of official approval of Hong
Kong's present status, I think it hazardous to argue from that to the
smooth evolution of Hong Kong towards 1997.
4.
The Ambassador's interpretation of Chinese silence, in paragraph 2 of
his letter of 6 August, may
K.M. Wilford Esq., CMG,
SECREI
SECRET
2.
77
well be correct; though his letter to you of 3 August suggests to me
that there may be another explanation. From the tone of Chi P'eng-fei's
most recent remarks it seems that the Chinese may be disposed to accept
that in saying, "No" HMG are serious, and that at this point the matter
is not worth a major row. Moreover, there is as yet no evidence that
HMG's refusal has so far had an adverse effect on Hong Kong's relations
with China, let alone those of the United Kingdom. the matter has been
taken quite calmly, and such expectation as there was of the
representative's arrival seems to have died away for the moment.
5.
Locally,
I am not sure that the appointment of an official representative from
China is necessarily relevant at this stage to the eventual negotiation
of the future for the Colony. His appointment would initially be seen
here as a first step towards the ending of Hong Kong's present status,
and I would prefer to keep the two issues separate. You will wish to
discuss with the Governor the Ambassador's suggestion that the Prime
Minister should discuss with Chou En-lai the future of Hong Kong and its
relation to China over the next few years. Subject to this views
however, this does not yet seem to me the right time for such a
Mdiscussion. We are unlikely to get firm assurances and,
even if we did, the undertakings would presumably not be written, and
could scarcely bind the successors to the present Chinese leaders.
вадже
6.
There must of course come a time when we shall wish to discuss the
future of Hong Kong. We hope that it will not be in this decade. The
point I want to make is that the moment which we would prefer for such
discussions is not likely to be the same as that which the Chinese would
like. As the years go by, Hong Kong and China are likely to develop in
ways which will make them progressively harder to integrate.
7.
Since it would help to ease their problem of absorbing the Colony - if
that is the solution they want or of negotiating some different
arrangement, the
SECRET
SECRET
3.
Chinese might welcome a rundown of Hong Kong, through lack of new
investment, long after HMG had decided that the moment was ripe to start
talking.
It seems unlikely that Mr. Heath would get anything but generalities
from Chou En-lai. But I suggest that it would be worth his while to
respond to any suggestion that the time was not ripe to discuss the
future of Hong Kong with a statement that this was so, but
that the time will come when HMG will, in all probability, wish to take
up the matter.
You's Sven
Hugh Momen wahre
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cc: Sir John Addis
SECRET
SOCIET
Minnie.
R.E.
1418
K.M. Wilford, us...., CMG,
Foreign & Commonwealth Ĉffice,
London, S.M.1.
Dean Michael
77A
BRITISH LABASSY,
PLKING.
6 August, 1973.
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OFFICIAL CHILLSL REP TEPENTANCK IN RUNG KONG
75
Hervey's letter to Stratton of 23 July asks us to begin considering the
brief on official Chinese representation in Hön, Kong for the Prime
Minister's visit in January. The letter asks in particular
hether the suggestion made by Chi F'eng-fei during his visit to London
in June for reciprocal represen- tation of the Hong Kong Goverment in
Canton affects or modifies our perce, tien of Chinese intentions. It do
for Murray MacLei.c.e to say whether this variant
the proposal any more attractive to him. So Tar cu Chiese intentions in
putting foward the Audur! are concerned, I should say it is most
L
L
a enuine attempt on their part to get round The ujections to their
proposal put forward first by Mr. nuyle and then by the Secretary of
State and to imes it up in a way that they think may be more palobulic
to us.
it I do not see how it can be construed as a sinister manoeuvre. The
variant
roposal of reciprocal representation in Canton is however aælatively
minor matter and the main question is how we recommend that the central
issue should be dealt with when the Frime Minister comes to Feking in
-
The rime Minister's discussion of this question with Chou On-lal will be
seen by the Chinese as the last court of appeal on the subject. On each
occasion that the Chinese proposal for official representation' has been
discussed substantively Mr. Royle's visit in May 1972, the Secretary of
State's visit in October last year and Chi F'eng-fei's vicit to London
ir. June the Chin..cive declined to accept our negative answer as final
and hu/C sked us to consider
-
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SECILT
4.
DOVIE 1
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The Chinese Laure fully beneleped Mas como ve
more thang want
the
Matter further. Chi me it cicar in Lon... Un he would have to refer the
Secretary of State's refusal to his Fremier and that he expected Chou
EL-lai to discuss the question with the Prime Minister when he cunc to
Fenis. Bet.cen the Secretary of State's visit or last Cetuber and Ghi's
visit to London in June no senior officiul in the Ministry or Foreign
Affairs raised the uestion of Chinese representation in Hong Kong with
me; and since my return from leave neither Ch'iao Kuan Hua nor Chang
Wen-chin nor Wang Tung, with all of whor. I have had extended
discussions, have referred to the
alter at all. I interpret this silences indic: ting their view that the
question is now firmly loded at a higher lev.l, first that of the two
Foreign Secretaries and now that of the two Frime Ministers, and is
therefore not for discussion between Vice Ministers and below and
myscif.
3.
As you know, I was not myself in favour of the negative reply to the
Chinese proposul which was returned first by Mr. Hoyle and then on the
two occasions by the secretary of stute. 1 considered that it would have
been more in the interests of HMG and of Hong Kong to have treated the
Chinese proposul re constructively, first by asking the Chinese to
xplain and define more precisely what they wish to chieve by their
proposal and secondly by being prepared to agree to a form of official
Chinese :upresentation in Hong Kong if we can secure reason-
bly acceptable assurances on how the new arrangement ..ould operate.
These views of mine on the central issue remain unchanged.
4. My recommendation must therefore be that when the Frime Minister
comes to Feking he should not simply repeat the refusal which has
already been given to the Chinese request for official representation in
Hong Kong. To be so entirely negative on this important question
affecting the relations between our two countries would not be
compatible with what we hope will be the tone of the meeting between the
two Frime Ministers. I think it would be right for the Frime Minister to
xplain once again the difficulties hich London and Hong Kong see in the
way of the Chinese proposal. But I hope that he would then go on to
/ ask
SECILT
7
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коприв
round.
This hrost
R.
^.
ask Chou En-lai, who is both the originator of the proposal and the
final authority on It, to explain as frankly and in as much detail as
possille, why the Chinese Goverment have put it forward, why they
continue to insist on it, and what they hope to achieve by it.
5. We know that both Mao Tse-tung and Chou in-lai have a hign regard for
Mr. Heati's view on the way in which the state of the world is evolving.
For tnis reason he is, I believe, in a better position than any other
statesman today to have a really deep and meaningful discussion with the
Chinese leaders on
orld affairs and to probe their views and intentions. ..e should not
miss this opportunity of trying to get a clearer view of Chinese
attitudes towards Hong Kong, both at the present time and in the future
I hope
erefore that in his discusions with Cou En-lai the Frime Minister will
not confine himself to the limited issue of Chinese representation in
Hong Kong but will o o to discuss with him. how the future of Hong Kong
and its relations with China are to evolve over the
At five or ten years and up to the end of the ...bury.
6.
L
Hong Kong cannot stay still but has to evolve. The stability of the
evolution will be greatly affected by the extent to hich it diverges
from the Chinese Government's views and intentions or is in conformity
ith them.. The present,osition of Hong Kong, without official Chinese
representation, is an anomaly
nd an whachronism. To accept the Chinese Government's
oposal or official representation has the advantage for us of placing to
some extent the seal of their orficial aproval on the present status of
Hong Kong and of Living us some assurance that the evolution of Hong
Kong over the next stage will be with the concurrence of the Chinese
Government. If, on the other hand, he Fre Minister were to reject the
Chinese propos 1 and the Chinese were to accept the rejection as final,
t! present state of relative dislocation in the relations between. Hong
Kong and China might be extended into an ever-widening breach which
would dame not only the interests of Hong Kong but also our relations
with China in a wider context.
7. The Chinese request for official representation in Hong Kong
therefore, as I see it, places us squarely
/ at
SLCIET
SECKET
+
H
at a cross-roads, and the Frime Minister's visit brings us to he moment
of decisive choice. In one direction there is the prospect, or at least
the possibility, of having the concurrence of the Chinese Government in
the evolution of the situation in Hong Kong up to and after the end of
the Lease. That concurrence will be an important factor affecting the
confidence of the busines com unity and the welfare of the inhabitants
of the territory. In the other direction there is
the expectation of a widening breach between the Chinese Goverment and
ourselves in our views on the evolution of Hong Kong. As that breach
cecomes increasingly apparent it will surely affect the all- important
factor or confidence and the climate of investment in Hong Kong. The
decision on how the Frime Minister is to handle the issue of Chinese
representation may therefore be quite crucial for the whole future of
Hong Kong.
Yours ever!
John Add's
(J.M. Addis)
Copy (personal) to: Sir Murray MacLe hose, KOMIC, LIBE,
Hone KonE.
SECRET
I
SECIT
77
BRITISH EMBASSY,
PEKING.
R.E.
1448.
3 August, 1973.
good.
FED
HATED MW%
PML 17/8
K.. wilford, Esq.
Foreign & Comm.or.wealth ffico,
London, S...i.
c.c. PS 143 3/8
PRAM: Rayle
Deen Michail,
CHILESE OFFICI.L FRESENTAZICI. IN HONG KONG
It is worth noting that in my hour and a half's talk with Ch'iao
Kuan-hua on 24 July he did not take the opportunity to revert to the
question of Chinese representation in Hon Kong. It is just possible that
right at the end he may have been thinking of Hong Kong when he said
that relations between Britain and China were now good. Some questions
remained, but these could be taken slowly. There was no need to be
uneasy about there being difficulties between
As things were we could open our hearts and discuss all question." But I
don't think so. feeling is rather that these words had a quite general
ahlication and expressed his view on the desirability of discussing
frankly any issues that come up between our two countries.
Lis.
Yours even,
My
John Addis
Surely not hose spoken in the term she did.
RE.
14/8.
(J... Addis)
Copy (personal) to: H.D. Sir Murray McLehose, KOLG
MBE,
HồNG KONG.
1418 50CD
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**** OUR REF.. TS/2/1126/50 II
**** Your Ref.:
CS. (A
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
764
R. B. R. Hervey, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department, F.C.O
Зем
Jem koga.
7th August, 1973.
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1418
R.E.
Clock
негод
15
FE.
2578
In paragraph 3 of your letter of 23rd July, you asked for our comments
on Chi P'eng-fei's suggestion that the Chinese Government would be
willing to consider reciprocal representation of the Hong Kong
Government in Canton, We see no advantage whatever in this suggestion,
which would be open to just the same objections and pose just the same
risks as vould an official representative from Peking. Indeed it would
be worse in as much as it would give the Chinese the substance of what
they want without the slight compensating advantage of a measure of
recognition of Hong Kong which the appointment of a representative from
Peking would bestov. The appointment of a representative from Kwangtung
might be taken to indicate that Hong Kong was merely a part of that
province, whereas a representative from Peking would at least show that
Hong Kong was taken seriously as a separate entity.
2.
Chi's proposal does not therefore in any way alter our view of Chinese
motives in putting forward their request for an official representative
here. We hope that the Prime Minister will be advised to reject all such
suggestions in the same terms, and for the same reasons, as were used by
the Secretary of State.
3. No doubt you will be discussing this brief with the Governor when he
is in London next month.
The us
eva,
You,
Jich
R. J. Stratton, Political Adviser
c.c. J. D. I. Boyd, Esq.,
Peking.
SECRET
3
Mr Larmour
Few of...
fie
SPAIN/GIBRALTAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG/CHINA OF NEW PROPOSALS
1. Mr Donohoe has told me that you would like an early view of the
implications, if any, on the relationship between Hong Kong and China of
the new proposals for Gibraltar. As I understand it, the proposal would
be that HMG would recognize Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, but that
the territory would continue to be administered by HMG under a perpetual
lease, terminable at the instance of the Gibraltarians, perhaps on the
basis of referenda at 10 year intervals. There would also be some kind
of Spanish representation in Gibraltar, though not connected with the
administration.
2. This is at least as much a matter for Far Eastern Department as it is
for us. I have discussed the question briefly with them, and what
follows is our joint first reaction. To produce a considered view would
take longer than the time I understand to be available at present.
3. The UK view of the constitutional position is as follows. Under the
Treaty of Nanking, 1842, Hong Kong Island was ceded by China to Britain
in perpetuity. Under the Convention of Peking, 1860, the Kowloon
Peninsular, together with certain islands, was similarly ceded. Under
the New Territories Lease of 1898, the New Territories (by far the
greater part of the land area) were leased by China to Britain for 99
years. The Chinese, however, do not necessarily accept the validity of
these treaties, which they consider to have been unequal ones imposed on
a weak and divided China by an imperialist power. They maintain that the
whole of Hong Kong is an integral part of China, temporarily under our
administration.
4. In the short term, the proposals for Gibraltar might have an adverse
effect on Hong Kong's position vis-à-vis China. Recognition of Spanish
sovereignty over Gibraltar might encourage the Chinese to press us to
accept their view that the whole of Hong Kong was an integral part of
China. Equally if not more important, if the Spaniards were allowed to
appoint a representative in Gibraltar, this might encourage the Chinese
to step up the pressure on us to agree to some form of official Chinese
representation in Hong Kong. They have been asking for this for some
time now, but have been told by the Secretary of State that we cannot
agree. The Hong Kong Government see grave objections to the proposal;
they think that a Chinese representative might be a form of second
Governor. These short term objections should be taken into account in
proposals over Gibraltar, but neither I nor FED think that, of
themselves, they need be a bar to them.
15.
SECRET
→
•
5.
In the longer term, the proposals, if implemented, might actually be
useful to us. As I expect you know, there exists a Top Secret Cabinet
Paper on the future of Hong Kong, which I cannot quote from here. But if
we did ever wish to try to negotiate an extension of the New Territories
Lease beyond 1997, a perpetual lease of Gibraltar from Spain could
provide a useful precedent.
6. I think we should tell the Governor of Hong Kong at an early stage of
the proposals about Gibraltar. He will be in the Office fleetingly on
Thursday, 9 August, and I might perhaps have an opportunity to consult
him then.
7 August 1973
cc:
Mr Goodison SED
Mr Clark FED
Mr Donohoe G & GD
SECRET
RB Crowson
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference......
Hr. A.C. Stuart, Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department
CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES
75A
1. There was a British Vice-Consulate in La Linea from 1912, which
came under the superintendence of the Consulate-Veneral at Seville.
There is no evidence that it was 'controlled' from Gibraltar although
no doubt most of its work stemmed from Gibraltar. This is borne out
by the fact that it was merged with the Consulate in Algeciras in
June 1970, following the closure of the border between Gibraltar and
Spain by the Spaniards in 1969.
2. A Spanish Consulate (later a Consulate-General) existed in Gib-
raltar from the nineteenth century until 1954, when it was closed at
the time of the Queen's visit to Gibraltar during her Coronation
tour. The Colonial Secretary was informed at the time by the Spanish
Consul-General in Vibraltar that the decision had been taken because
the Spaniards wished to avoid any discourtesy to "er Hajesty. Foreign
Office minutes at the time, however, point out that; "The Spanish
decision is undoubtedly political and part of the campaign for the
return of the Rock, although the Spanish authorities have sought to
justify the Consul-General's withdrawal by reference to the fact that
he discharges no proper consular functions, since there are no Spaniarda
resident in Gibraltar whom he wishes to protect".
3. If you are interested, we also have some information on how
this arrangement worked in practice.
27 July 1973
Denise will
Denise Mills,
Western & Southern European Section,
Research Department.
c. Mr. Brewer, Far Eastern Section, Research apartment.
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