Yi-chun, the Head of the section in Western European
Quite Department of the M F A which deals with the United Kingdom.
unprompted Chang asked me whether we (1 e the Hong Kong Government)
found that NCNA in Hong Kong was an adequate channel of communi -
cation, I said that the range of topics on which the Hong Kong
Government was in a position to have dealings with the Chinese
Government was limited, and that within this range we found NC NA quite
satisfactory. Chang dragged the conversation back to representation by
saying that Chiao Kuan-hua himself was not happy about using NCNA in the
present improved state of Anglo/Chime se relations. Accordingly the
Chinese Government have proposed that
The Chinese an official representative be posted to Hong Kong.
Government thought that it would be helpful to all concerned to have
such a representative. What did I think? I said that the subject
had been discussed between Foreign Ministers and there was really
nothing that I could add. Chang peral sted however, emphasising the
Accord- goodwill of the Chinese Government in making the proposal. ingly
I went over the points made by the Secretary of State at his meetings
with Ch'i Pang-rei.
2. Michael Richardson, sitting opposite, had a parallel, but less
lengthy, conversation with another sestern European Department officiai,
Li Pao-cheng. Li also emphasised the goodwill behind the Chinese
proposal and said they had reached the a one husion that the posting ɗ a
representative would be convenient for all concerned after a close
analysis of the situation. To
To this Michael replied that the British Government had also analysed
the situation, but reached different conclusions.
3. After some further general conversation the halled City was antioned
by another guest, and I confirmed that Kowloon City was accorded a
slight ly separate status under the Convention of Peking, and that this
was sometimes a nuisance in dealing with problems. Chang Yi-chun then
said that in his personal view the separate status of Kowloon City was
"rather stupid", and went on jokingly to say that one thing was certain:
"When we take over Hong Kong, we shall not allow any special status for
Kowloon City".
-
1 -
CONFIDENTIAL
/4.
C (NFIDENT IAL
1
raisinstation, C
I not take particularly in the any initiative in raising these topics,
but a dficial representation, Chang came with a clear intention to
probe. The dinner guesté, incidentally, apart from Chang and his
colleague, were from the British Embassy and he felt able to speak
openly.
5. The only controversial issue which I raised (in discussing the role
of N C N A) was legal immigration into Hong Kong, and I con- firmed that
I had spoken to N C N A about this subject. Chang said that he had had a
report but I did not pursue the topic.
Copy to:
HL Davies Esq
Far Eastern Departme ot FCO
T JB Gear ge
2.
CONFIDENTIAL
¦
181
1 COPY
i
HOFEØCK/RT
RR PEKTRO
.GES. 75
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 2184257
RESTRICTED
News & me.
Il Stack, 2649
EiR
The George must be about to wint
Sandy ^
TO ROUTINE FEKING TELC 143 OF 21 SEPTEMBER.
FOR BOYD FROM GEORGE, YOUR TELEGRAF 02.
+
win't Pelang
HKLOD
Reputations only
MANY THANKS. I HAVE NOW SENT PASSPORT TO CHINA TRAVEL SERVICE
FLY ENTRY OF VISA.
2. ALTHOUGH I WILL SPEAK TO CTS AND OTHERS, TX ADVISED BY FTC FROM
EXPERIENCE THAT IT WOULD HELP IF YOU WERE TO ASK FOR PROGRAMIZ TO BE
ARRANGED FOR ME 11. CANTON. I HAVE NO VERY FIRK IDEAS, BUT HAD THOUGHT
TO SEE A COMMUNE IN THE CANTON AREA PLUS AT LEAST ONE FACTORY.
3. GRATEFLL FOR ALL "ILP.
MACLE SC
SEVŰ AL 21/04997-81
AT
( Radouted as requested i
+
I
·
+
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
DTE Roberts CBE QC
Colonial Secretariat HONG KONG
Telephone 01-
Your ref
Our reference
Date
FER 3/2/1
File
(800)
20 September 1973
Dear Darys,
CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES
1.
When you were on leave we discussed the possibility that ad hoc
arrangements for consular representatives in Gibraltar and neighbouring
areas of Spain might provide some sort of precedent for similar
arrangements in Canton and Hong Kong.
2.
Our Research people have looked into the Spanish situation. It is true
that until the closure of the border in 1969 we had a British
Vice-Consulate in La Linea on the Spanish side. This looked after
affairs arising from Gibraltar but it was not in any sense controlled
from the Gibraltar side. The Vice-Consul came under the superintendence
of the Consulate-General at Seville. A Hong Kong representative in
Canton would therefore be in a different category.
3. On the reciprocal aide the Spanish Government did have a Consulate
(later a Consulate-General) in Gibraltar from the 19th century until
1954, when it was closed at the time of The Queen's visit to Gibraltar
during Her Coronation tour. The decision to close it originated with the
Spanish Government. They said it was because of a wish to avoid any
discourtesy to Her Majesty but the underlying motive was undoubtedly
political and part of the campaign for the return of the Rock. The
existence of this Consulate-General was in no sense related to our
Vice-Consulate in La Linea. Indeed, when the Consulate-General closed,
our Vice-Consulate took over some of the work relating to Spanish
workers which had originally passed through the Spanish office in
Gibraltar
4. From all this it looks as if, in the Spanish case, we diû not have
reciprocal quasi Consulate arrangements across the boundaries of
disputed territory. So I fear this does not help very much in
considering what to do in Hong Kong.
Yours curat,
Adaw
A O Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department
FERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
í
1
E
SECRET
180
MREVANS
LE
•9819
Mi Clark
ur Davies. m: Entre 28/4
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE
GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON
FRIDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1973
066.
R.E. 2719
I enclose extracts from the record covering those parts
of the conversation which will be of interest to you.
27 September 1973
BECRET
7.6. Come
R B Crovивоп
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department
FGH
3/1
SECRET
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG
17.
Sir Murray MacLehose said that the Secretary of State had handled the
question with the Chinese Government in exactly the right way. The
Chinese would continue to raise the subject but it seemed clear there
would be no question of confrontation. indications that we had won this
round.
There were ample
SECRET
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Group. FCO
FCQ....
21
Class.
Piece..
1137....
Following document(s) retained in the
Department of origin under Section 3 (4)
of the Public Records Act, 1958
FONO W80 (I PAGE OF MINUTES
(IPAGE INUTES)
THE TIMES
'15 OCT 107%
FÉ
H
Pustiz
cutting dated
Peking pressing for diplomatic post in Hongkong
From Our Own Correspondent Peking, Oct 14
China is standing by its de mand for a diplomatic represen- tetive in
Hongkong, although Britain has still not reacted favourably to the
proposa), according to an official source
The source said there were many matters which needed dis cussion and the
present channels -the New China news agency's link with the political
adviser to the Hongkong Government--- were inadequate. There was no
question of opening Chinese consulate in Hongkong.
Britain his resisted the Chinese proposal for formal representation in
Hongkong for fear that it would undermine the authority of the Hongkong
Government
Peking is expected to press its demand when Mr Heath visits China early
next year.
19
HK
7/10
17
Miyou dem Minisford. Mi Dari 10
R.E.
FCH
17/10
布政司署
港下亞
畢道
**** Our Ref.:TS 2/1126/50
*** Your REF.:
CONFIDENTIAL
793
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KON
29 August 1973.
R. B. R. Hervey, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department, F.C.O.
Dear Logen,
FEH
Circuleied
separately)
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATZÓN IN HONG KONG
Especially in view of the complications surrounding his arrival in Hong
Kong (see exchanges ending with Michael Wilford's telegram to the
Governor, No 305, of 19 March) you may be interested to see the enclosed
extract from "The Hong Kong Standard" of 26 August about the alleged
appointment of Li Chu-sang as Head of the New China News Agency in Hong
Kong. I was not in fact asked by Stewart, when he eventually got through
to me on the telephone on 24 August, about the level of diplomatic
exchanges between the Hong Kong Government and the NCNA, but about the
significance I attached to the appointment of a diplomatist. My reply
was more or less as quoted.
2. I do not know what has given rise this highly speculative piece about
Li Chu-sang, who, as the article mentions, has as far as we know been
away from Hong Kong since I waved him on to the special aircraft that
took back Chang Shih-chao's ashes from Hong Kong. But it will give the
consular corps something to talk about.
Tans cons Dich.
R. J. Stratton,
Political Adviser.
c.c. J. D. I. Boyd, Esq.,
Peking.
CS. 41A
CONFIDENTIAL
Eveno
Акалод
Exter
R.E.
319.
Love
зля
Mr. Gark.
~ Davies
R.E.
xtract from The Hong Kong Stand: "l dated 26.8.73
319.
Peking posts diplomat in Hongkong
BY PETER STEWART and BILL WONG
A DIPLOMAT has been appointed to head the New China News Agency
operations in Hongkong.
-
has led to
ment confsets. According to this theory, Mẹ Li has been operating as
Chinese "consul" in Hongkong.
A left-wing source who described Mr Li as
H
-
a man with widespread speculation
comment to make and that it was a matter we should discuss with the
NCNA,
The hush-hush appointment of Mr Li Chu-sang considerable diplomatic
experience in diplomatic and left-wing circles.
It is believed to be the first time a bona-fide diplomat has headed the
NCNA office here though it is an open secret that the gathering and
dissemination of news is only a small part of the organisation's
function and its members travel on diplomatic passports.
Mtr le m'a former change d'affaico at the Chinese embassy in Jakarta.
The man he has replaced officially only tempuranly has a military
background.
The speculation among diplomats and China-watches akes two forms.
THE FIRST is that Me "Ľ hạ bien sent istir to host the controvertial
Chinese representative office that Peking wants to open in the Colony,
#f London agrees lu
ach time.
THE SECOND is that in view of oppostles from the Hongkong Gowcument to
the idea of à representative office operating openly hers perhaps being
viewed as a "second Government House"
-
and
a secret deal has been arrived at under which a consular style offer has
already opened to facilitate governament‐to-go Velti
strongarm man" said he was now outside the Colony, apparently to attend
the high-level meetings now bebeved to be taking place in Peking either
in preparation for, of at part of, the Nunth Party Congress,
Officially the 62-year-old Mr the number two man at the NCNA; but since
the Director, Mr Liang Wei-lin, has been ill for several months and
shant from the Colony, Sir Li has been in effective control.
His official title is believed to be "First Deputy Director in churge of
Chincie Affairs",
one diplomat commented to the Hongkong Standard last week: "That sounds
like a description of a consul to me."
In view of government reluctance to discuss the malter, it is hard to
tell which
of either of the two theories concoming Mr LP' presence here is correct.
Asked if he was willing to discuss the question, the Blangkong
Government's political idylser, Mr R.J. Strition, said that he had no
Asked directly whether! there had been any change la the level of
diplomatic exchanges between the! Hongkong Government and the 1 NCNA
since Mr Li's arrival, Mr Station said:
"I have absolutely no comment to make on that at all." Then he repeated:
"This is a nulter for the NCNA"
An NCKA officud contacted onofficially by the Standard claimed he did
not know why Mr II was here.
But he confirmed bin diplomatic background.
• H
was appointed consul-generat in Jakarta in 1957. later becoming consul
and charge d'affaires ad interim, an important post in China's
diplomatic corps chat time.
He remained in Indonesia until 1963, two years before the
Communist-backed revolution there,
Mr Li first pul in an eppestande in Hongkong in May the year, a month
after the dewa was leaked from London that Peking had renewed its
17-year-old request for diplomatic representacion here,
The exzet date of his arrival is not known but that was the
t
•
Concern
over
role of
NCNA
top man
month when a Trident fetliner of the Chinesa Civil Aviation Authority
captured the headlines by arriving at Kultak. unannounced bearing the
agning, Mr Cháng Shi-chu.
A number of other men were in the party, that arrived on the plane from
Peking.
Whether or not Mr Li was among them, his arrival in the Colony that
month was overaliadowcl by the dramatic appearance of the 92-year-old Mr
Chang, who was a member
P
+
of the Standing Committee of the National People's CongrEKS.
There were widespread rumours then that it was Mir Chang who had come
here to set up the representative office, But the elder statesman died,
in Hongkong, on July 1.
China has had no official diplomat stationed here since Britain first
recognised the Peking regime in 1950, when the Nationalist special
Commissioner for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Mt T.W. Kwok, who was stationed
here, left for Brazil.
ק.
Earlier this year unoccupied mansion in Barker Road, owned by the
Chinese Goverment, was redecorated and there was speculation that It was
being prepared for use by the Chinese mission to Hongkong.
Other sources suggested that If there were to be a Chinese mission in
Hongkong, the Government would prefer it to be less centrally lomted,
and so less likely to become a centre for protests and demonstra- tlons.
Londra has been officially "considering the renewed Chinese request for
an office in Hongkong for five months.
Generally there appears to be enthusiasm for the plan in Britain on the
grounds that is would Increase contacts between Hongkong and China, s
ease visa and trade restrictions" and boost confidence in the Colony by
showing that China was ready to continue accepting is present status. It
is
Peking's man in Hongkong
FROM PAGE 1
also clear that since the thaw In Sino-British relations and the
increase in trade between the two countries, London is eager to
accommodate the Chinese as far as is reasonable.
On the other hand, considerable concem has been į voiced in some
influential quarters in Hongkong who feel that even if as Peking claims
J
there is no intention to install a "Chinese governor of Hongkong", the
mission would inevitably become a focal point for protests against the
British authorities.
Since the question of the mission was mised in April, information leaked
from London has given varying impressions of the progress of the Briuth
Government's "consideration" of the proposal, ranging from the headline
in the South China Morning Post on Apr 26: "A China office in Hongkong a
certainty", to the Chlña Mai's headline of June 2: "Doors close on
China's HK office".
It is known, however, that the matter was discussed by the British and
Chinese Foreign Ministers, Sir Aléc Douglas-Home and Mr Chi! Peng-fel,
at talks in London on June 6. What was agreed at those tiks is not
known, Mr Anthony Royl + + Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, was hier quoted as saying the two sides had agreed
the talks should remain
"absolutely confidential".
But one diplomatic source 10% the Standard last week; "The Chinese
Government bas not sent a man of Mr Li's experience to Hongkong and kept
him here for four tenths
·without good tesson,
-
א
"
MR LI CHU-SANG, China's new top man in Hongkong.
L
[
TS 2/1126/50 II
SECRET
PERSONAL
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
79A
K. M. Wilford, Esq., CMG.,
F.C.O.
Dear Michael,
!
! FEH 3/2
18th August, 1973.
FED
TIB
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
In paragraph 4 of his letter to you of 16 August the Acting Governor
suggested that the Chinese may now be disposed to acquiesce in our
reaffirmed refusal to accede to their request for an official
representative in Hong Kong.!
Yours eva,
Dich.
R. J. Stratton, Political Adviser
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 9(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968
CS. JIA
SECRET
PROSONA!
·
=
... ...
....
+
L
I
+
L
CHINA QUARTERLY : JULY/SEPT 1972 (79
Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy,
955-60
Gary Catron
[Innese official
Very useful
Enter
Rep
in H.K
cho1412 Mr Hervey The Cloth Gl
8412
back to me
The argument presented here is that Hong Kong was sometimes, but not
always, an exception to the overall pattern of Chinese foreign policy in
the second half of the 1950s. This discrepancy existed because to China,
Hong Kong was so many things - a British colony and as such an exten-
sion of the West, an Asian neighbour, and a territory to be someday
reunited with the mainland. By reacting to Hong Kong in different ways
the Chinese were using more discrimination than simply applying their
grand strategy to each specific case.
The years 1955-60 are especially useful for comparative purposes because
of the dramatic shifts in Peking's general line during those years The
usual formulation is that there were three distinct kinds of policy
adopted by Peking towards the non-Communist world from 1955-60. From the
near-universal benevolence symbolized by the Bandung Con- ference,
Peking moved to a harder line towards both the West and many Afro-Asian
neutrals in 1957-8. The climax of this new posture was the Taiwan
Straits crisis of 1958, after which China, increasingly preoccupied with
internal economic and political problems and its differences with the
U.S.S.R. tentatively and gradually evolved a third type of foreign
policy stressing better relations with most neutrals without, in
contrast to the Bandung era, new approaches to the United States. The
ups and downs of China's Hong Kong policy can be examined in the con-
text of these shifts and crises in the C.P.R.'s general foreign policy.
Harmony Between Friends, 1955-6
I
**Is it not beneficial to all concerned if there is friendship between
Kwangtung and Hong Kong and Macao, which are adjacent to the province?"
The advocate in this instance of peaceful co-existence be- tween China
and the colonialists was Tao Chu, speaking in April 1956 to the Hong
Kong and Macao members of the Kwangtung session of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference. However, there was more to China's
desire for co-operation than the simple spirit of friend-
1. Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1966), Ch. 2, summarizes the literature up to 1966. Although
arguments can be raised about Hinton's analysis of cause and effect, the
periodization is adequate for the purposes of this article.
FEH
3/3.!
+
406
The China Quarterly
ship between neighbours. The suggestion that concrete ways should be
found in which the province and colony could work together was made,
according to T'ao, in view of the casing of the international
situation."
The most dramatic event signalling the start of China's moderate foreign
policy phase was the Bandung Conference of April 1955. Hong Kong was
involved in a diplomatic incident preceding the conference, and the
Chinese reaction to this was an indication that the colony was to be
included in the era of good will. The Kashmir Princess, an Air India
plane chartered by the Chinese to go to Bandung, exploded after taking
off from Hong Kong, and 16 men were killed. Later investigation showed
that the explosion had been caused by a time bomb planted by a Hong Kong
airport employee who had fled to Taiwan with U.S. $100,000 of KMT money
and could not be extradited. Chou En-lai, who was supposed to be passing
through the colony, was probably the target. The actual victims belonged
to the delegation of Chinese journalists assigned to cover the
conference, including the director of the Hong Kong branch of the New
China News Agency.
Peking's reaction to the sabotage was surprisingly mild, especially
considering its charges in 1952 of active collusion between British and
KMT agents. The People's Daily emphasized that the bombing was only one
of many criminal activities by KMT and U.S. agents in Hong Kong, and the
British were at fault only to the extent that they had not been diligent
enough in suppressing espionage. No suggestion of British co- operation
with KMT agents was made; on the contrary, examples of the Hong Kong
police seizing arms caches were cited. On a more concrete level, Peking
passed along to the Hong Kong Government some of its information about
the KMT network, information which, according to Governor Grantham,
might have enabled the local police to have pre- vented the bomb
planting if it had been communicated before the event." The Foreign
Ministry did not press the matter diplomatically, and Gran- tham was
invited to Peking later in 1955. Instead of a British connexion with the
KMT, the local Communist press later emphasized that Hong Kong and China
had a common interest against Chiang because KMT planes had bombed
British ships during the 1949-50 blockade of the Chinese coast. The
Chinese, then, almost certainly believed the British version of the
incident and their lack of responsibility for the sabotage. For a year
and a half after Bandung, the Chinese and British made a series of
goodwill gestures and took tentative steps towards co-operation
2. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong edition unless otherwise noted), 7 April 1956,
in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 1266, 12 April 1956,
pp. 29-31.
3. Colonial office statement in Tiger Standard (Hong Kong), 12 January
1956. 4. People's Daily, 17 April 1955, in SCMP, No. 1034, 26 April
1955, pp. 18-20. 5. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: Hong Kong to Hong
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1965), p. 181.
6. Ta Kung Pao, 4 September 1955 in Review of the Hong Kong Chinese
Press (RHKCP) (U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong), No. 165/55, p. 4.
Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60
on a number of issues. "Cultural diplomacy" in particular flourished.
group of 24 Hong Kong University teachers was given an expenses- id tour
of China, and in return the colonial authorities allowed a Chinese dance
team, with its heavily political programme, to perform in Hong Kong.
Even cultural exchanges, however, could not avoid some mutual suspicion
and restrictions. The goodwill trip led to a heated public exchange
between one of the teachers critical of life under socialism and local
leftists,' and the dance troupe was carefully confined to the theatre
and prevented by the Hong Kong Government from having unscheduled
contact with the populace.
On the official level, negotiations were started early in 1955 between
Chinese and British railway officials in Canton in an attempt to restore
a through passenger service between Canton and Kowloon. Since 1949
passengers going in either direction had had to get off the train on one
side of the border, walk across the bridge, pass through customs and
immigration, and board another train before continuing their journey. An
agreement had been reached in 1950 on technical matters concerning the
use and exchange of rolling stock, but Hong Kong insisted on its right
to return "undesirables" to China within seven days.* China, of course,
refused to agree to accept such an arrangement; to have done so would
have negated the basic contention that any Chinese has an unqualified
right to live in Hong Kong because Hong Kong is Chinese territory. For
the first time since 1949, however, both sides were willing to see if an
acceptable compromise could be reached, and talks continued until 1957.
The basic issue of the railway difficulty, the Chinese claim for unre
stricted entry and the British refusal to recognize the claim, involved
entry rights at all points on the border, not just at railway crossings.
Despite C.P.R. opposition, in 1950 the British had closed the border to
Chinese not holding re-entry permits issued by the Hong Kong Govern-
ment. In 1955 China complained again about the restrictions, and local
leftists joined in.' It was argued that the British were wrong not only
in principle, but in the reasoning behind the 1950 restrictions, i.e.,
the fear that the constant stream of refugees, if unchecked, would make
life in the colony impossible by swamping housing, the employment
market, and public services. According to the Chinese, that prediction
was as wrong in 1955 as it had been in 1950, because it was unthinkable
that so many people would want to leave New China. Instead, lifting of
restrictions would ease the population problem in Hong Kong because the
Chinese in the colony would have a better chance to see first-hand the
superiority of Canton with its low cost of living, fine parks, etc.
Emigration to
7. Tiger Standard, I January 1956.
8. Grantham, Via Ports, pp. 189-90.
9. New China News Agency (NCNA), Canton, 29 June 1955, in SCMP, No.
1080, 30 June 1955, p. 32. A survey of Hong Kong leftist complaints is
in Hsing Tao Jih-pao, 28 July 1955, in RHKCP, No. 144/55, p. 3.
407
:
E
408
The China Quarterly
China would take place, and Hong Kong would only have its natural
population increase to deal with.
The British responded to the pressure to relax restrictions, but without
consulting China first. In February 1956, the quota system (arrivals
limited to the number of departures the previous day, plus a token
number, usually 50, in excess) was dropped, and any Chinese who had a
re-entry permit from the mainland authorities was admitted to Hong Kong.
This was apparently done not only to remove an inconvenience but also to
respond to reasonable requests from the Chinese, yet it would have been
impracticable without the British expectation that conditions had
returned to "normal" in the Kwangtung countryside so that the flow in
and out of Hong Kong would balance naturally, as it had after previous
wars and revolutions.'
However, no such balance occurred. In six months, between February and
September 1956, 56,000 more Chinese entered Hong Kong from China than
left the colony for the mainland. Since these 56,000 people all had
re-entry permits that quickly expired, they became permanent residents
in an already overcrowded city. The Hong Kong authorities sent a note
through the British chargé in Peking to the Kwangtung pro- vincial
government asking that the number of exit permits be limited. There was
no reply." After the Chinese refusal to act, the Hong Kong Government
re-imposed the old quota system. The British preferred to have
co-operation and settlement by quiet administrative action on China's
part, but were willing to accept the consequences of unilateral action.
Chinese displeasure was inevitable. Chou En-lai, during a press con-
ference in August at Hong Kong airport, said that interference in inter-
national traffic should not be permitted. The Canton-Kowloon railway,
like the Suez Canal, should be open for the traffic of all nations.
After the quota was re-imposed, the Chinese repeated their arguments
con- cerning the traditional rights of Hong Kong residents and added
that the birth rate, not immigration, was responsible for the increase
in the colony's population. Appeals were made to the colony's
self-interest; restrictions, it was claimed, would hurt trade and
inconvenience local residents as well as mainland Chinese. The Chinese
also warned that negotiations on a through train service, then in
progress, were futile if the quota was maintained."
Since the train service negotiations were already deadlocked, this was a
mild threat supported by mild rhetoric. The appeal to self-interest,
international usage, and customary rights was considerably different
from the warnings after the 1952 riot of the wrath of the Chinese people
in both Hong Kong and the mainland. Violent pressure on the British
10. Hong Kong Government, Government Information Service, Daily Informa-
tion Bulletin, 31 August 1956.
11. Ibid.
12. NCNA Canton, 4 September 1956, in SCMP, No. 1365, 7 September 1956,
pp. 30-1.
+
I
Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60
from Hong Kong residents was explicitly rejected by Peking as an instru-
ment of policy. Ta Kung Pao interpreted Peking's instructions to Over-
eas Chinese and Hong Kong and Macao compatriots as meaning that "while
maintaining their own legitimate rights and interests they must not take
part in the political strife of the countries of their domicile, but
must respect the local customs and laws." 1a
Official Representation and the Lessons of Macao
China also attempted to "normalize" relations with Hong Kong by a
proposal in 1955 for the stationing of an official diplomatic
representative of the People's Republic in the colony. The British
chargé in Peking con- sidered the proposal a good one; implementation