commented:-
2.
"Let this letter go to Lord Bridges. I suspect that the Prime Minister
will want a discussion. The weakness of our position is obvious, that if
we want a reasonable settlement with the Chinese on Hong Kong's future
we ought to be starting to lay the foundations of closer cooperation
soon. The stumbling block is the adamant position taken by the Governor
which clearly reflects the opinion of the business Community.
ADH".
The Secretary of State has suggested an additional paragraph for the
brief enclosed with the letter. I think that this might go better in the
letter in the last main substantive paragraph. This might read,
incorporating the Secretary of State's language as follows:-
The
"I enclose a short memorandum which sets out the history of the problem,
the arguments used by the Chinese and our reasons for rejecting the
Chinese proposal. It remains the view of the Governor of Hong Kong which
Sir Alec Douglas-Home endorses that the balance of advantage lies in
continuing to reject the Chinese proposal. dangers inherent in it still
outweigh the advantages which might accrue in our relations with the
Chinese. The weakness in our position is that if we want eventually to
arrive at a tolerable future for Hong Kong we ought to be beginning to
lay the foundations for an agreement with the Chinese fairly soon. But
to agree now to the Chinese proposal would lead to a run-away loss of
confidence in the Hong Kong business
/Community
CONFIDENTIAL
894
CONFIDENTIAL
Community. Much more discussion, consultation and
persuasion would therefore be necessary before we could make such a
move".
3.
I should be grateful for comments.
Copied to:
PS/Mr. Royle
Mr. Youde
Mr. Stuart
Mr.
Evans
Prioratten
(P. H. Grattan) 15 November, 1973
fee
separate into to Soys
Mar 1"1/xi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
89
Private Secretary
Secretary if State Lit The Weller
surfact that "The Pl. will
Bridger - I spicct that
Want a bhiansion. The wackmen of the fcrition
in drsions (le) that if we want a recommable rellement
4
with the Clean Cre THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: OFFICIAL CHINESE
REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
bist
in Hong Konge eight I be starting to lay the funk dation of
clared
1. We are convinced that Chou Eh-lai will raise the question
Confection
of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, with the Prime Minister sour The
stably block in the donant function
January 1974. At a meeting
het
the
when the latter visits Peking in
held recently about the visit of
next weekend, the Prime Minister, in welcoming the new briefing
there addon ċ procedure, responded to a remark by Sir Denis Greenhill by
saying that he would like a discussion of Chinese representation
to be organised in which Her Majesty's Ambassador at Peking and
the Governor of Hong Kong would participate, though he recognised
the difficulty of arranging such a discussion inconspicuously.
2. The Department have considered this point. But neither
they nor Mr Royle, who has commented on the Prime Minister's
idea, think that to bring back Sir John Addis and Sir Murray
MacLehose is strictly necessary, or even necessarily wise,
unless a preliminary discussion of the merits of the case reveals
that the Prime Minister does not agree with the Secretary of
State's present policy. If he were to disagree, it would indeed
become essential to summon the Governor and the Ambassador here,
but we have no evidence that this is the case. We would there-
fore prefer that the matter should be put to No 10 on the lines
of the attached draft letter from the Private Secretary to
Lord Bridges. The letter covers a short memorandum on the
substance of the case.
Fresident Pompidou to Chequers of of the Cushion Con
13 November 1973
Mr Guest
cc Mr Wilford
R.M. Er
CONFIDENTIAL
RM Evans
S
Far Eastern Department
Mr Youde
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
In February 1956, the Chinese Government proposed that
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking
should be appointed in Hong Kong. In February 1958 the then
Foreign Secretary (Mr Selwyn Lloyd) told the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires in London that he could not accept the Chinese
proposal, arguing that the state of relations between the two
countries did not warrant its acceptance. The Chinese did not
react.
7872
2. The Chinese Government returned to the charge in March
1972, immediately after the conclusion of our agreement with
them to exchange Ambassadors. Mr Royle rejected their proposal
in May 1972; as did the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
when he visited Peking in November 1972 and when the Chinese
Foreign Minister visited this country in June 1973. On the
latter occasion, Sir Alec Douglas-Home gave Chi P'eng-fei an
aide mémoire explaining that we could not accept the proposal.
3. The Chinese argue that the establishment of an official
Chinese representative would be appropriate in the present state
of relations between China and the United Kingdom and that this
would be of practical advantage in resolving administrative
problems which arise Between China and Hong Kong, Chou En-lai
told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in November 1972
that it was not the Chinese intention to establish "a dual
régime" in Hong Kong. The British were ruling Hong Kong and
were responsible for it; the Chinese did not quarrel with that.
4. We have three principal reasons for rejecting the Chinese
proposal. The first is that its acceptance would tend to under-
mine the authority of the Governor and his administration, by
1
CONFIDENTIAL
/creating
X
CONFIDENTIAL
creating an alternative focus of loyalty in the colony. The
second is that its acceptance would tend to undermine business
confidence in Hong Kong. The third is that there is no practical
need for a change. Present procedures work perfectly well.
5.
Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave
Chi P'eng-fei no grounds for supposing that our position might
change, Chou En-lai is almost bound to bring the subject up.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office-
November 1973
+
for Ale
Fix be
Love want
ought
for
Rut
The wichten
eventually t
Arvive at a lotreble fortom for thong Kong Tibe beginney I lay the
foundation agrement will Men faile
fben
Chimere to gofioral would east L
dence cla
cary ters y confidence
bremen Commanity, this
by
Hong. Wh
dheit
تمتلك
Much more consultation a se auction
recency before
will be nec
fuck a move.
we come fol to be
- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
98
R.-FEx
-FEX 3/70.
Mir Youde
THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
OFFICIAL CHINESE
1. Mr Wilford, you and I had a word yesterday about planning
for the Prime Minister's visit to China and about the particular
problem of how we might elicit the Prime Minister's views on the
difficult subject of Chinese representation in Hong Kong.
2. I now submit a draft letter from the Private Secretary to
the Private Secretary at No 10, together with a draft memorandum
on the substance.
9 November 1973
R.M. Evens
2.
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
5/11
Separare mincie to Private secieiory.
R.E.
13/11.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
EXTRACT FROM A MEETING BETWEEN H M AMBASSADOR AND THE DIRECTOR OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, M FA, ON 8 NOVEMBER 1973
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
PEAT stali
1. Mr Wang Tung said he was still of the view that there could be prompt
and better solutions to problems of this sort [Hong Kong frontier
control] if we were to consider the proposal for the establishment of a
Chinese representative in Hong Kong.
The matter had been discussed in London between Sir Alec Douglas-Home
and Chi Peng-fel, and there had been informal talk about it after that
meeting. Once that question had been solved, it would be possible to go
on to find solutions to a series of other questions.
2. Sir John Addis replied that he could not add anything to what the
Secretary of State had said to Mr Chi P'eng-fei in June. Mr Wang Tung
said that in any case the Prime Minister was soon to visit China: his
(Wang's) wish was to see Sino/British relations develop. He hoped that
no other problems would be able to have any effect on this development.
To speak frankly, the Chinese were not thinking of making any trouble.
Both sides should have mutual confidence. It was then easier to solve
practical problems. He had said very frankly to Mr Royle in June that if
the Chinese had had the intention of making trouble, they would not have
raised the question of sending a representative to Hong Kong. It would
facilitate liaison over other questions such as the Sino/British Air
Services Agreement and communications generally. It would save much
trouble over discussing matters in Peking. Sir John Addis mentioned that
of course discussions took place in Hong Kong also under existing
arrangements.
3. Mr Wang Tung said that we could still discuss frankly the position of
such a representative and his duties. These had been touched upon in
London. Someone had asked whether it would do if the Chinese set up a
Consulate-General in Hong Kong. It would not. China's British friends
would understand why they could not send a Consul-General to Hong Kong.
4. Sir John Addis replied again that he could not go beyond the formila
used by the Secretary of State in June. Mr Wang Tung said that this was
understandable but that the question remained to be solved. (Mr Wang
Tung went on to discuss the eleven illegal immigrants.)
Copies to:
RM Evans Esq
Far Eastern Department
FCO
R JStratton Esq
Hong Kong
CONFIDENTIAL
-
+
GR 350
ZAMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
CONFIDENTI"!
FM PEKING Ø80859Z
CONFIDENTIAL
ام
12/11 TOP COPY
HE I
炒
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 1266 OF NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
FEN 4/1
ใบ
MY TELEGRAM H 1963 AND GEORGE'S LETTER TO STRAIGN OF 9 OCTOBER
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KO.G
1. TOWARDS THE END OF MY INTERVIEW WITH THE CIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT TODAY AHDWHICH WE DISCUSSED HONG KONG FRONTIER CONTROL WANG
TUNG SAID THAT HE WAS STILL OF THE VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE PROMPT AND
BETTER SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF THIS SORT IF WE WERE TO CONSIDER THE
PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG,
THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN LOYDON IN JUNE BETWEEN YOURSELF AND CHI
PENG-FEI, AND THERE HAD BEEN INFORMA. TALK ABOUT IT AFTER THAT MEETING.
ONCE THAT QUESTION HAD BEEN SOLVED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GO ON TO
FIND SOLUTIONS TO A SERIES OF OTHER QUESTIONS.
2. ! REPLIED THAT I COULD NOT ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT YOU HAD SAID TO CHI
PENG-FE1 11! JUNE. VANG SAID THAT IN ANY CASE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS
SOON TO VISIT CHINA: HIS (WANG'S) WISH WAS TO SEE SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS
DEVELOP. HE HOPED THAT NO OTHER PROBLEMS WOULD PE ABLE TO HAVE ANY
EFFECT ON THIS DEVELOPMENT. TO SPEAK FRANKLY, THE CHINESE WERE NOT
THINKING OF MAKING ANY TROUBLE. POTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE. IT WAS THEN EASY TO SOLVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. HE HAD SAID
VERY FRANKLY TO MR ROYLE IN JUNE THAT IF THE CHINESE HAD HAD THE
INTENTION OF MAKING
87
TROUBLE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF SENDING A
REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG, IT WOULD FACILITATE LIAISON OVER OTHER
QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE SINO/BRITISH AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT
AND
CONFIDENTIAL
+
+
CONFIDENTIAL
AND COMMUNICATIONS GENERALLY.. IT WOULD SAVE MUCH TROUBLE OVER DI
SUSSING MATTERS IN PEKING. I MENTIONED THAT OF COURSE
DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE IN HONG KONG ALSO UNDER EXISTING ARRANGE- MENTS.
WANG SAID THAT WE COULD STILL DISCUSS FRANKLY THE POSITION OF SUCH A
REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS DUTIES. THESE HAD BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN LONDON.
SOME ONE HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD DO IF THE CHINESE SET UP A
CONSULATE-GENERAL IN HONG KONG. IT WOULD NOT. CHINA'S BRITISH FRIENDS
WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY THEY COULD NOT SEND A CONSUL- GENERAL TO HONG KONG,
•
5. I REPLIED AGAIN THAT COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE FORMULA USED BY YJU IN
JUNE. WANG SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT THAT THE QUESTION
REMAINED TO BE SOLVED.
+
ADDIS
PA
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
CSNEULALDEPT.
PUSDO
NEUS DEPT
DESEARUI DEPT (BE SEC)
مع
CON. IDENTIL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
MINT
A/ copy
in
FEC 3/500/7
бас
WED
10 Downing Street Whitchull
1 November 197
cc RS
ps/AwRoyle
Pus
Shift Cirk/PS) 'Wilma'/PED HRIDD
Briefing arrangements for the Frime Ministre
This afternoon the Prime Minister held his firmi ... under the new
system of briefing arrangements (deseri în Sir John Hunt's letter of 23
October to Sir Denis Greenhill), in the context of the forthcoming visit
of President Pompidou. You will wish to know that . Heath said that he
auch
Mr. welcomed the now system of identifying the main topics
well in advance of the meeting, as suggested in paragraph: 3(b) of
Hunt's letter.
1
The Frime Minister asked that further work should be set in hend soon to
prepare for his meeting with the aut Minister of Denmark, and for his
vicit to China. Sir Denis Greenhill suggested that it might be useful if
H.H. Ambesat, for in Feking and the Governor på Hong Kong wore to return
to fla country so as to take part in a discussion with the Pri
inister about the difficult issue of Chinese representation in Hong
Kong; the Prime Minister, while recognising tet it might be difficult to
arrange this inconspicuously, said that he would like such a discussion
to ba rranged.
·
L
I am sending a copy of this letter to Brown (Deperiami of Trade and
Industry), Elliott (Foreign and Commonwen th Office), Wilson (H.H.
Treasury), and to Nairne (Cabinet Office).
Wooster, Jr.,
1
BRIDGES
Fen 3/2/1
From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
36
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.I
30 October, 1973
CC with Mr Dalyella
Letter +
may mainte 4 26 Bk.
હું રાધ Any Peking
Thank you for your letter of 16 October, enclosing a cutting from "The
Times" about the Chinese proposal for the establishment of an official
representative in Hong Kong.
Perhaps we could have a word about this
in the House some time.
Tam Dalyell, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons,
London, S.W.1.
Anthony Royle
·
Sir John Addis KCMG PEKING
I
SECRET
4
85
FEL 3/548/17
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
26 October 1973
London S.W.1
FEM 3/3.1-1
نا
1/
THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: HONG KONG
1. I am sorry that you have not had an early reply to your letter of 6
August about the way in which the Prime Kinister might speak to Chou
En-lai about Hong Kong when he visits China. We have, however, been
giving very careful thought to the suggestions which you made, in the
light both of the considerations which you put to us and of those
developed in Hugh Norman-Walker's letter TS2/1126/50 of 16 August.
/if,
2. Your suggestion that, in speaking about Chinese repre- sentation, the
Prime Minister should start by explaining the difficulties which we see
in the way of the Chinese proposal, but go on to ask Chou En-lai to
explain why the Chinese Government put it forward, why they continued to
insist on it and what they hope to achieve by it, seems to flow from
your views on the central issue (as set out in paragraph 3 of your
letter). We have thought again about the central issue, but have come to
the conclusion that it would be right to brier the Prime Minister not to
broach the subject himself and to stick to the line taken by the
Secretary of State with Chi P'eng-fei,/as seems inevitable, it is
brought up by Chou En-lai, Our reason, quite simply, is that our purpose
is still to persuade the Chinese to sheive their proposal for a matter
of years. We still think that it would be imprudent, and perhaps
dangerous, to give the Chinese any grounds for thinking that we might be
prepared to accept their proposal,
Our in its original or any modified form, at this time. principal
concerns are still to maintain the authority of the Governor and of his
administration and to preserve business confidence in and over Hong
Kong. As it is still the judgement of those concerned in Hong Kong that
both the authority of the Governor, and business confidence, would be
put at risk by accepting the Chinese proposal, we think that we must
continue to stand firm.
t
- 1
SECRET
13.
SECRET
3. We do, of course, set great store by doing nothing which might damage
relations between the United Kingdom and China or between Hong Kong and
China. It was because of this that the Secretary of State gave Chi
P'eng-fei a piece of paper which explained our worries and which sought
to show that the Chinese interest, as well as our own, would be damaged
if the Chinese continued to press their proposal. Although we think it
certain that Chou En-lai will broach the subject with the Prime
Minister, we do not think that he will be expecting the Prime Minister
to make any concession; and we judge that our relations with China, and
those of Hong Kong, would already have suffered if the Chinese had
really intended to make the issue into a test case.
4. We see dangers, too, in your suggestion that the Prime Minister
should not confine himself to the limited issue of Chinese
representation, but should go on to discuss with Chou En-lai how the
future of Hong Kong and its relations with China might evolve over the
next five or ten years and up to the end of the century. As Hugh
Norman-Walker said in his letter, the Prime Minister would be unlikely
to get firm assur- ances and, even if he did, the undertakings would
presumably not be written and could scarcely bind the successors to the
present Chinese leaders. Besides, our overall purpose is to do nothing
which might suggest to the Chinese that we are beginning to think about
the day when we shall have to leave Hong Kong. To do this would be to
give them a false impression.
5. So much said, I can assure you that we shall have two purposes very
much in our minds when the time comes to brief the Prime Minister. The
first is that his visit should make
and our relations with China even better than they are now; the second
is that his visit should provide the occasion for the really deep and
meaningful discussion with the Chinese on world affairs to which you
look forward. I do not think that we shall be prevented from achieving
these purposes by holding fast over Hong Kong.
cc
Bir Murray MacLehose
KCMG MBE
- 2
SECRET
Kи Wilford
30
10.
Mr Evand
CONFIDENTIAL
Münster
84
Mi quesi
MG:
367d.
LETTER FROM MR TAM DALYELL MP: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
(81A 7.
In his letter of 16 October Mr Dalyell enquires about a
recent report in "The Times" about continued Chinese interest in
the Representation issue. The Times report was clearly officially-
inspired in Peking.
2. Mr Dalyell is one of the most active MPs over questions
concerning our relations with China. Although he asks a great
number of Parliamentary Questions about China his attitude to our
efforts to develop good relations with China is generally helpful.
In these circumstances, and since Mr Royle has recently briefed
the members of the British-Chinese Parliamentary Group on the
subject, Mr Royle may wish to explain the problem orally to
Mr Dalyell. Mr Royle may, on the other hand, wish to write and
I submit a draft for this purpose.
3. HKIOD concur.
26 October 1973
cc HKIOD
H L1 Davies
Far Eastern Department
Rin. Evans
29 October, rq$3.
CONFIDENTIAL
Ref: A05306
CONFIDENTIAL
Q2 16/10
CABINET OFFICE
LONDON SWIA 2A5
4th October, 1973
83
4K100. for aft rep.pe
M: Stark of Copy to: P.S. Miteway cars. Mr Dave) 10
My dear Dawn's.
дел
Sind Walsen /th. Welford M. Youde
FED,
RE. 80.
Yay
پیکری بہار
For 3/2/1
In a minute of 20th September to the Prime Minister, your Secretary of
State said that he was concerned about the state of Hong Kong's
relations with us, and he mentioned a number of issues which had
affected those relations. He asked that in all matters relating to Hong
Kong the Departments directly concerned should remember that Her
Majesty's Government as a whole have a responsibility towards the Colony
and that we must try to reach agreement on a course which seeks to
balance the United Kingdom and the Hong Kong interest across the whole
field. Copies of the minute were sent to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Attorny General and the
Minister of Trade and Consumer Affairs.
The Prime Minister has said that the Defence and Oversea Policy
Committee should undertake a general review of our rleations with the
Colony and that we should seek to resolve any outstanding issues. Since
a number of Departments are concerned I think the best way of getting
this off the ground would be to set up a group at the official level in
the GEN series under Cabinet Office chairmanship which could prepare a
report for DOP to consider. I hope that you and the other recipients of
this letter will agree to this suggestion and that you will be prepared
to nominate someone to serve on the group. I would ask Howard Smith to
take the chair and we would provide the Secretariat.
This letter goes also to Douglas Allen, Arthur Peterson, Ned Dunnett,
Antony Part and Tony Hetherington.
Yours ever Упать
Sir Denis Greenhill, GCMG, OBE
Im H.
(John Hunt)
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SWIA OAA
@
Rec. and Ack. 22/10/73. FED.... Department FE⋅D
for draft reply please
no Rayle.
Dear Tony,
As you know, I have a sustained interest
in the question of our diplomatic relations with
China over Hong Kong. I would be grateful for
your comment on the enclosed.
With good wisher.
16/10/13
Yours sincerely,
Tam
Tam Dalyell, M.P.
+
U
↓
כ
1
Peking pressing for diplomatic post in Hongkong
From Our Own Correspondent Peking, Oct 14
China is standing, by its de mand for a diplomatic represen- tative In
Hongkong, although Britain had still not reacted favourably to the
proposal, | according to an official source here.
The source said there were many matters which needed dis cussion and the
present channels --the New China news agency's link with the political
adviser to the flonekoni Government-- were inadeguate. There was no
question of opening a Chinese consulate in Hongkong.
Britain lias resisted the Chinere proposal for formal representation in
Hongkong for fear that it would undermine the authority of the Hongkong
Government
Peking is expected to press its demand when Mr Death visits Chin early
next your.
J
.
+
+
CONFIDENTIAL
BR IT IS H EMBASSY
PEKING
+
82
IA
R J Stratton Eaq Political Advi ser Hong Kong
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
9 October 1973
R.E.
The Evans
10/10. 2. THE SHAHRID
3. Enter
The Chinese were not going
to musi
this opportunity of
reverting to thinne Requerentation
1. At dinner on 8 Cetober at John Boyd's flat I was seated next to Chang