CONFIDENTIAL
itself depends on the Chinese Government's goodwill.
Our position cannot be static but must evolve with developing
circumstances, particularly over the next quarter of a
century leading up to the end of the Lease of the New
Territories in 1997. We shall need the Chinese
Government's co-operation over each stage in this
evolving situation. The appointment of an official
Representative would have the double advantage of
facilitating this co-operation in the future and
formalising Chinese acquiescence in the present position
now.
(c) To the Chinese this is a question of principle.
If we
continue to return a refusal, we can expect a steady
deterioration of bilateral relations on all fronts,
political as well as commercial. The Chinese might well
steer important contracts towards our foreign commercial
competitors. They could also refuse to contemplate
progress on such matters as the signature of the Air
Services Agreement.
CONCLUSION
3. Our conclusion is that the arguments put forward by the
Governor of Hong Kong against accepting the Chinese proposal,
because they involve a serious risk of loss of confidence in the
Colony and thus severely affect its economic life, outweigh
- 6-
CONFIDENTIAL
/ those
CONFIDENTIAL
those put forward by HM Ambassador at Peking for accepting it.
Our prime consideration must remain the security, stability and
prosperity of Hong Kong. It would therefore be wrong to accept
an irreversible proposal which could put these factors at risk.
4. It should however be stressed that the Governor is well
aware, in the context of relations between HMG and the Chinese
Government in general, of the need to improve working contacts
with Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong. Hitherto no
Governor has had direct contact with employees of the Chinese
Government in the Colony. With our approval Sir Murray
MacLehose has embarked on a policy of encouraging such contacts.
There is evidence that the Chinese Government have noted, and
responded to, this development.
- 7 -
CONFIDENTIAL
+
CPS 138
DESKEY 300189Z
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM FCO 291508Z
DEDIP
SECRET
DESKBY 362165Z
V
SECRET
(T+1)
Adlacion
TOP COPY
702
20
Suggest entering FED
(HK)
FEM 3/5./1
灿
Yes. Des
ра
1973
TO IMMEDIATE PEXING TELNO 1219 OF 29 NOVEMBER INFO PERSONAL
OOVERNOR HONG KONG
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1337 AND HONG KONG TELNO. 1364:
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. WE HAVE NOW PREPARED A PAPER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, CAREFULLY
SUMMARI SING YOUR VIEWS AND THE ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR HONG KONG
EUT EXPANDING ON MATERIAL WHICH HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SEEN. THIS IS
DRAWN FROM THE TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES ON THIS SUBJECT. THE PRIME
MINISTER WILL DE CONSIDERING TH13 PAPER OVER THE WEEKEND.
2. THEREAFTER WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LET YOU KNOW WHETHER IT WILL
DE NECESSARY TO ASK YOU TO RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
HD HK I OD
HD FED
TRIVATE SECRETARY PS/PUS
FS/MR ROYLE
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]
COPIES TO
SIR J HUNT, CABINET OFFICE
-
SECRET
GRS 270
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C O 271820Z
SECRET.
SECRET
TO IMEDIATE HONG KONG TEL:0 1219 OF 27 NOVEMBER.1473 PERSO!IAL FOR
COVERNOR FROM PUS.
YOUR TELEGRAM HO 1364: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
195
1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR DIFFICULTY AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH MR
ROYLE AID LORD BRIDGES.
(Fe
101
2. WE SHALL NOW PREPARE A FURTHER PAPER CAREFULLY MARSHALL ING THE
ARGUMENTS YOU HAVE MADE IN YOUR TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES ON THIS
SUBJECT, AND DRAWING IN ADDITION ON CERTAIN INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED
OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE CHINESE MAY HANDLE THIS QUESTION DURING THE
PRIME ISTE'S VISIT. OUR HOPE 15 THAT THE PRIME FINISTER VILL BE ABLE TO
CONSIDER THIS PAPER CAREFULLY OVER THE WECKEND. HE WILL SCARCELY BE ABLE
TO GIVE IT ATTENTION BEFORE
THEN.
3. THE PAPER WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO INCLUDE A SHORT PASSAGE
SUMMARISING THE VIEUS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY SIR JOHN ADDIS
ON THIS SUBJECT.
4. THE ONE DISCUSSION WE HAVE HAD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS OF A
PRELIMINARY NATURE, AND WHEN HE HAS GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE PAPER
WHICH WE ARE LOW PREPARING, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO
DISPENSE WITH VISITS BY SIR JOH: ADDIS AND YOURSELF. OUR CONCERN HAS
BEEN THAT OUR POLICY ON CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENT- STION IN HONG KONG
SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT THE FULLEST PERSONAL CONSIDERATION BY THE
PRIME MINISTER OF YOUR VIEWS. IF YOU ARE CONTENT TO LET THE CASE REST ON
THE ARGUMENTS WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED IN CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS
SUBJECT, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DISPENSE WITH PERSONAL CONSULTATION, AND
WE RECOGNISE THE WEIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATIONS PUT FORWARD IN YOUR
TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE.
5. DO YOU SEE ANY OBJECTION TO THE REPETITION TO PEKING OF YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE AND THIS REPLY?
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FEO
AKIA Ps
rsj Pus.
PSJ MR ROY LE
SIRDWATSON. ANWILFORð MRY INDE
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10
SENT TO NO 10 DOLNING ST.)
Copies To
SECRET'
SIR I. HUNT CABINET OFFICE
[
NIMEDIATE
HER/CAT A
.3 200
SECRET
RECEIVED IN REGISTATN
FM HONG KONG 285702Z
29 KOY 1973
друга
1100
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1369 OF 28 NOVEMBER. 1973
PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOVERNOR.
YOUR TELEGRAM 1219. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
TO AVOID PUBLICITY I AM SURE IT IS BETTER THAT AT THIS STAGE THE
ARGUMENTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LINE SHOULD BE DEPLOYED BY THE
OFFICE.
1
2. IF A SITUATION WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TO EMERGE IN WHICH YOU EITHER BEGAN
TO DOUBT THE VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT OR SAW A CHANCE OF BEING
OVERBORNE, AND IN WHICH THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF
THE PRIME MINISTER IN PEKING INITIATING A NEW COURSE OF ACTION OVER
HONG KONG, I WOULD BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS HERE.
IN THIS CASE IN SPITE OF THE PUBLICITY ! SHOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION.
3. 1 HOPE SUCH A POINT IS NOT REACHED, BUT IF IT IS PUBLICITY COULD
BE LESSENED IF MY VISIT DID NOT COINCIDE WITH ADDIS AND IF IT
COULD APPEAR AS CONNECTED WITH CHRISTMAS LEAVE, BUT THESE
PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS WOULD BE SECONDARY TO THE MEED TO SETTLE
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE.
NACLEHOSE
FILES
FED
HKTOD
NEWS D
PS
PS/HR ROYLE
/PUS
MR WILFORD
YOUDE SIR D VATSON
SECRET
COPIES TO:
PU/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
SECRET
99
Mr Youde
Mr Wilford
FET 3/2.
A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG
1.
17. Crown
then PlA
As
створит Mi baby, FED
تمام
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srubriques
nurushing).
It seems that we may be nearing an impasse with the Prime
Minister, which he is liable to resolve at a stroke in the wrong
direction.
2.
He clearly wants something other than a straight negative
brief. We believe that even a "maybe" would be dangerous.
We may
need a fall-back. I wonder whether in these circumstances we should
not reconsider the offer of a Consul-General.
3.
We would have to make it plain to the Prime Minister that
the Chinese had already turned this down in answer to Mr Royle's
feelers. But in fact the proposal could be presented to the Chinese
in quite a positive way.
4.
He could say in effect: "I accept that it is anomalous, in
the current good state of our relations, that your country should be
formally unrepresented in Hong Kong. I agree that the presence of a
Representative would help in many practical ways to keep things on
an even keel. I believe your assurance that a Representative would
not meddle in Hong Kong's internal affairs.
5.
But there is a substantial problem, which affects you as
well as us. The interest of both of us is the stability of Hong
Kong. This depends on confidence. The people of Hong Kong would be
bound to interpret the appointment of a Representative as a sign of
/imminent
SECRET
SECRET
imminent political change. This would itself promote instability.
In times of stress, whether created by the appointment of a
Representative or otherwise, they would be bound to begin to treat
him as an alternative Governor, even against his will. We would
thus end up with a situation that neither of us want.
6.
The need is to find a solution which leaves no-one in any
doubt that the Governor remains in sole control. We take different
views of the constitutional position of Hong Kong. This is
inescapable, but does not affect our relations.
But on one thing
we are both agreed, that Britain is in de facto control.
We are
both strong supporters of the law. It is perfectly possible in
International Law to have formal diplomatic and consular relations
with a de facto régime, while continuing to withhold de jure
recognition. Thus it would be possible in law for China to send
a Consul-General to Hong Kong while abating nothing of their formal
claim that Hong Kong is part of China. A Consul-General would
therefore involve no more than the acceptance that Britain is in
de facto control and that any change would be by agreement.
AB
we understand it, this is precisely the position of the Chinese
Government.
7.
I appreciate that you have already given this preliminary
thought and have turned it down. But it is a proposal which meets
both the legal and the practical realities. I make it as a genuine
attempt to meet our shared needs without creating unacceptable
difficulties for either. I hope you can accept it."
SECRET
/8....
SECRET
8.
I offer this à toutes fins utiles, in the attempt to find
something that could satisfy the Prime Minister; that would give
us the initiative and put the ball firmly back in the Chinese
court; and that could, if perchance it was accepted, in fact
stabilise the situation in Hong Kong.
cc
Mr Hervey, FED
ACSO
AC Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept.
I do not think that it is a foregone
conclusion that the A.M. will roll against
present position. To offer
the question of "of
the
Good Several rmed mise
Commissioner: laymen don't know the difference
I think it wish
at least yet. My
nat
(moul Several, why not a
to aut off down this road.
helay
is that the least
dawaging representative would be a "representators
of
the
Canton Sort - who could be treated as a
sant of Comm agent. But for the premat
think me should continue to
anyone
the case for
І адна
Hold m
LSACRED
for a while
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agues. Hold
resentations at all.
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Thank-you
CONFIDENTIAL
наход
2.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
R.E.
4/12
The Prime Minister's worries are fourfold:
Pla
(a) his objective is to maintain confidence in Hong Kong
and he says to achieve this the people of Hong Kong
want to have good relations with the Government of
China. The way to achieve this is to satisfy Paking's
demand to have a permanent representative in Hong Kong. He does not
believe unofficial opinion to be repre-
sentative of public opinion in Hong Kong.
(b) the right time to achieve a settlement of this question
with Peking is when relations are good
(0)
-
not when they
are bad; therefore the time to act is now.
if the matter is negotiated now the functions of the
Chinese representative can be closely determined and
set out in an agreement: if he transgresses then we
have legitimate grievance to address to the Chinese
Government.
(d) what is he to do if Chou En-lai ties the appointment of
a Chinese representative to conclusion of a multi-
million pound agreement on the sale of British aerospace equipment to
China (or some other major trade deal)?
The answers to the Prime Minister's points in my view are: (a) While the
people of Hong Kong are of course glad to see the
གུ
improved relations between Britain and China they would draw
the line at any step which had the effect of damaging
/confidence
1
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
confidence in Britain's continued ability to administer the
Colony. In the view of the Governor and opinion in Hong
Kong as expressed in the non-Communist Chinese press, to
permit the appointment of a Chinese representative would
be just such a step.
(b) If it is inevitable that a Chinese representative will have
to be conceded one day there is much force in the argument
that it is better to consider it at a time of good relations
than when relations are bad. But the argument at (a)
above still applies. Moreover the Chinese community could
be expected to argue that Britain was taking a step in her
own, or in what she conceived (wrongly) to be Hong Kong's,
interest which was in reality against the interest of Hong
Kong.
(c) A perfectly satisfactory definition of the Chinese
representative's functions could probably be negotiated
and it might hold up for a while. But Communist
Governments are not famous for confining their staffa to
legitimate functions, and conditions could change in China
with the consequence of revised instructions to the Chinese
representative from Peking. But a much greater hazard
would be the unwillingness of the Chinese people of Hong:
Kong to be circumscribed by whatever rules might have been
/ drawn
- 2
-
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1
CONFIDENTIAL
drawn up.
If they had grievances against the Government
they would press them on the Chinese representative who
would be in a less strong position to tell them that
it was no business of his than would an unofficial repre-
sentative such as exists today. The fact that in the
view of the Chinese Government all but a tiny fraction of
the population of Hong Kong are Chinese citizens highlights
the danger. Gradually the risk is that a Macao type situatio
Moreover to expel a Chinese representative
would arise.
who misbehaved would simply not be possible.
(a) The likelihood of the Chinese so acting is not great. They want our
aerospace equipment and they want peace
in Hong Kong. They have never in the past made propaganda
publicity on the Chinese representation issue. They are
likely to play the hand carefully. Moreover there is no
guarantee at all that the Spey deal will have reached final
stages of negotiation by the time the Prime Minister roes
to China. If, however, the Chinese should try blackmail
by threatening either disorders in Hong Kong or a flood
of immigrants the Prime Minister could answer that the
resulting lack of confidence within Hong Kong will be neither to the
interest of China or Britain (or Hong Kong). If he were to be threatened
with a refusal to consumate
a Rolls Royce agreement because of our refusal to agree
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL
/ to
CONFIDENTIAL
to Chinese representation he could surely say that this
was a new situation which he would wish to discuss with
his colleagues.
K M Wilford
28 November 1973
- 4-
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+
{
Mr Youde
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. As requested by Mr Wilford on 27 November I submit a draft letter to
Lord Bridges at No 10 Downing Street. It covers a revised paper setting
out in greater detail the views of Sir Murray MacLehose. It also gives
an account of Sir John Addis's views.
2.
HK & IOD concur.
te
Mr Stuart HK & IOD
28 November 1973
R Hervey
Far Eastern Dept
97
FLAG B
FLAL E:
(attached).
minute
fine M. Rale to be te he contents of
Mr Wilford
M Royle was
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Private Secretary
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which have been
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M. Acland's letter. MiRoyle her herefore
amendment
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The latter.
1. I think that there would be advantage also in sendin
sending? Lord Bridges copies of the two main papers - the desperade mal
-
from Peking dated 18 December 1972 and Hong Kong's reply of 11 January
1973. I have amended the draft letter to Lord Bridges accordingly.
2. Mr Royle may also wish to see the paper which is now being sent to
No. 10.
30/
agreem
CONFIDENTIAL
Loude
CM: Youde a Depre
Mi
Kim Willow 25/1
28 November 1973 Revited i
HOFO885/28′′
% PEKING
00 F C O
GRPS 530
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 280230Z
SECRET
124
-
+
FED
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELNO 191 OF 28TH NOVEMBER, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE F C
0.
(95
THROUGH A CLERICAL ERROR MY TELEGRAM NO. 1364 TO F.C.O. WAS
NOT REPEATED TO YOU: TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINS.
PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOVERNOR.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1211 : CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
I WOULD HAVE LIKED THIS BUT SEE NO WAY OF DOING IT WITHOUT
UNACCEPTABLE SPECULATION.
2. IF ADDIS RETURNS FOR CONSULTATIONS THIS WOULD CAUSE NO REMARK
HERE. BUT IF I 60 TOO AT ANY TIME BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S
VISIT, AND PARTICULARLY IF I COINCIDE WITH ADDIS, THIS WOULD CAUSE GREAT
SPECULATION HERE, WHICH I SUSPECT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE ENGLISH
PRESS. SINCE THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SHORT VISIT TO
HONG KONG THAT COULD REQUIRE MY PRIOR RETURN, THE PUBBLIC WOULD ASSUME
THE SUBJECT TO BE CHINA/HONG KONG RELATIONS, THAT ESTABLISHED POLICIES
WERE BEING RECONSIDERED, AND THAT THERE WAS CONFLICT BETWEEN ADDIS'S
ADVICE AND MINE.
I CANNOT THINK OF ANYTHING I COULD SAY THAT WOULD DEFLECT THE PRESS
HERE FROM SUCH AN OBVIOUS DEDUCTION.
96
3. THERE IS OF COURSE BOUND TO BE SOME SPECULATION HERE BETWEEN NOW AND
THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, BUT I AM AFRAID THE JOINT CONSULTATION
PROPOSED WOULD GREATLY INCREASE AND DRAMATISE IT. THIS WOULD CARRY THE
DANGER OF CONDITIONING THE PRESS TO SEE HONG KONG AS THE LEAD STORY IN
THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, WHICH WOULD BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WE WANT
AND EVEN OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN
IN PEKING.
4. I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT I DISCOVER IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR THE GOVERNOR
TO BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION.
5.
THE ARGUEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS QUESTION ARE WELL DOCUMENTE IN
TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES, AND THERE ARE THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE
S. OF S, AND MR. ROYLE TO DRAW ON. NOR HAS ANYTHING TRANSPIRED TO
INVALIDATE THE REASONING ON WHICH THE S. OF S. BASED HIS LINE. IN VIEW
OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS OF MY RETURN, IF THERE IS ANY NEW POINT ON
WHICH MY ADVICE IS WANTED COULD NOT THIS BE DEALT WITH BY TELEGRAM? OF
COURSE IF THE PRIME MINISTER STAGES THROUGH HONG KONG ON THE INWARD
JOURNEY TO CHINA, WE COULD
HAVE A TALK AT THE AIRPORT.
6. 1 DO NOT KNOW IF YOU WILL WISH TO INSIST ON THIS PROPOSAL