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CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
M. Wilford If you agree, I will put this
letter
to hard Bridges.
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that it com love
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
En L-ban
London S.W.1
af that
wether. 30 November, 1973
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LA
When you and Tom Brimelow spoke on 27 November about the issue of
Chinese official representation in Hong Kong, he undertook to let you
have a more detailed account of the views of the Governor of Hong Kong,
and of Sir John Addis.
I attach a paper which sets out at greater length the considerations
which MacLehose and Addis think important. These are based in the main
on two despatches from Peking and Hong Kong, copies of which are
enclosed in case you wish to have them for your own reference. I also
attach a minute from Mr. Royle to the Prime Minister.
You will see from paragraph 3 of the enclosed paper that our conclusion
is that the arguments put forward by MacLehose for rejecting the Chinese
proposal outweigh those put forward by Addis for accepting it.
The Lord Bridges,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL
{Syd) P. H. Graecar.
104
E
Prime Minister
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
As I mentioned to you on Tuesday evening when we spoke
about this, we are now providing you with further briefing.
This consists principally of a condensed summary of the
facts and arguments.
We have also sent despatches from
Sir John Addis in Peking and the Governor himself arguing
their sides of the case.
You may not have time to read the despatches
but I urge you to read the summary
I should be very glad to discuss this further with you,
if you should so wish.
A.R.
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30 November, 1973
Anthony Royle
4
1
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 944) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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4.
1
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·
CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. The Chinese have proposed that there should be an
official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. They believe
this to be a logical consequence of the exchange of Ambassador:.
An official representative could act as a link between the
Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government; and improve
relations by explaining Chinese Government policies to local
Chinese. They maintain there would be no intention to set
up a dual régime. They accept that Britain rules Hong Kong,
but maintain that all of it, ceded as well as leased territory,
is part of China.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR
2. The Governor is strongly opposed to the appointment of a
Representative. He believes the Chinese would like an
official representative in Hong Kong, but that they do not
attach overriding importance to it in the context of Sino-
British relations. The grounds for his objections are:
(a) It would not be interpreted as a routine, far less a
reassuring diplomatic move. Accession to the Chinese
demand would give a jolt to public confidence. The
population of Hong Kong would be likely to see the
arrival of an Official Chinese Representative as an
important act in the reassertion of Chinese control
over the Colony. It would set in motion new forces and
create new uncertainties at a critical time.
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1
CONFIDENTIAL
/ (b)
CONFIDENTIAL
(b)
(c)
Acceptance of the appointment would be tantamount to
establishing an alternative focus of loyalty in Hong Kong.
As such it would irrevocably undermine the authority of
Governor and lead towards a Macao type situation in the
Colony. Because of our need to retain control in and
over the Colony such a situation would be more likely to
lead to premature confrontation than to cement good
relations with Peking.
Such an appointment, whatever title its holder were given,
would carry enormous prestige and influence over the Chinese population
of the Colony (99). No matter whet
assurances the Chinese Government gave about the scope and nature of the
Representative's functions, these
would be open to conflicting interpretations. Moreover
given the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong it i very
difficult to guess what limits China would accent
on what it saw as its legitimate intereste. Large secti
of the Chinese community would inevitably look to him to intervene on
specific issues on their behalf. Although
such occasions might at first bo few, they could incresce
rapidly. This might become critical at times of stress,
e.g. a recurrence of communist-inspired violence in the
Colony. An official Representative (and through him the Chinese
Government) would face the choice of satisfyir-
those who sought his support or of losing face by refundne
it. The standing of the Chinese Government in Peking
/ would
2
CONFIDENTIAL
L
CONFIDENTIAL
(a)
(e)
would be directly involved.
While the present Governtent
in Peking might be prepared to risk a loss of face As
long as the situation in Hong Kong did not threaten to
get out of control - we cannot say how a future Chinese
Government would react.
The increased uncertainties rising from the presence of
an official Representative would damage business confidenc›
in Hong Kong. Investment would suffer severely and the
prosperity and the security of the Colony could be gravel:
endangered. The flow of funds from Government and private
sources abroad might dry up.
The decision to accept an official Representative once
taken would be irrevocable; but if we maintain our
refusal, we could quickly reverse our attitude if it
proved untenable.
Once an official Representative was
(1)
established we could do nothing to control his activitien,
far less expel him, without seeking the major con-
frontation with China which we wish to avoid. He would,
moreover, permanently be at risk and a most tempting
target for assassination by a KMT agent provocateur.
It is unlikely that the request for an official Repro-
sentative in Hong Kong would be the last major politiem?
demand the Chinese would make of us. To give my might
merely whet their appetite, and encourage them to main
demands in other fields.
1J
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CONFIDENTIAL
/ (g)
CONFIDENTIAL
(g) The majority of the non-communist Chinese press already
(h)
support the line on a Chinese representative taken up
till now by HNG. The Governor would find it impossible
in the light of this to persuade public opinion generally
that greater dangers than those already perceived in the
acceptance of an official Representative would be imminent
if our refusal were maintained. It would be argued that
we should wait and see.
There is no practical need for a change in the present
arrangements for Chinese representation in Hong Kong,
which work efficiently. The following organs of the
Chinese Government in Hong Kong are run, and to a large
extent staffed, by Chinese Government officials: the
New China News Agency (NCNA), The Bank of China, The China
Resources Co Ltd and the China Travel Service. Of thean
the NCNA already acts as a co-ordinating body; its
functions are closely akin to those of a Consulate-Gona"".
but it has of course no official cachet. It acts as the
established channel of communication on the political side
between the Hong Kong Government and the authorities in
Peking. Any need for change can be met by discreetly
advancing the degree of contact between the Governor and
the present "unoffical" representative (who is the Frað
of the New China News Agency).
- 4·
CONFIDENTIAL
9.
CONFIDENTIAL
ARGUMENTS OF HN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING
2. Sir John Addia believes that there is force in the
Chinese argument that the absence of an official Representative
in Hong Kong is an anomaly.
He believes that we should not
Instead we should, in
return a negative reply to the Chinese.
further discussions with the Chinese, seek to define as closely
as possible the functions and status of a Chinese official
Representative in Hong Kong and to dress up the appointment
in such a way that it can be presented to public opinion
without shaking confidence in the Colony. His argument is
based on the following considerations:-
(a) The absence of a Representative was comprehensible while
full diplomatic relations between the Chinese Governingt
and HMG did not exist. But our agreement to exchange Ambassadors and the
subsequent improvement in our relation
with Peking has brought about a new situation.
ê
(D)
We need
to make our voice heard in discussions of Asian affairs;
and so long as Chinese ambitions in this regard are not
fulfilled our relationship with the Chinese Government
and its political value will inevitably be somewhat
diminished.
To accept the Chinese proposal would, to some extent,
place a seal on the present status of Hong Kong and riva us some
assurance that the evolution of Hong Kong during the years ahead will
take place with the concurrence of
the Chinese Government. Our position in Hong Kong
5.
5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
/ itself
CONFIDENTIAL
itself depends on the Chinese Government's goodwill.
Our position cannot be static but must evolve with develop *
circumstances, particularly over the next quarter of a
century leading up to the end of the Lease of the New
Territories in 1997. We shall need the Chinese
Government's co-operation over each stage in this
evolving situation. The appointment of an official
Representative would have the double advantage of
facilitating this co-operation in the future and
formalising Chinese acquiescence in the present position
now.
(c) To the Chinese this is a question of principle.
If 19
continue to return a refusal, we can expect a steady
deterioration of bilateral relations on all fronta,
political as well as commercial. The Chinese might vell
steer important contracts towards our foreign commercial
competitors. They could also refuse to contemplate
progress on such matters as the signature of the Air
Services Agreement.
CONCLUSION
3. Our conclusion is that the arguments put forward by th
Governor of Hong Kong against accepting the Chinese proponial,
Pause they involve a serious risk of loss of confidence in t
Colony and thus severely affect its economic life, outweigh
6.
CONFIDENTIAL
/ those
1
CONFIDENT FAL
those put forward by H M Ambassador at Peking for accepting 11.
Our prime consideration must remain the security, stability ani
prosperity of Hong Kong. It would therefore be wrong to accept
an irreversible proposal which could put these factors at risk,
4. It should however be stressed that the Governor is well
aware, in the context of relations between HMG and the Chinese
Government in general, of the need to improve working contacts
with Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong. Hitherto no
Governor has had direct contact with employees of the Chinone
Government in the Colony. With our approval Sir Murray
MacLehose has embarked on a policy of encouraging such contacts.
There is evidence that the Chinese Government have noted, and
responded to, this development.
- 7 -
CONFIDENTIAL
3/14
H L1 Davies Esq
FED
FCO
CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH EMBASSY
PEKING
29 November 1973
(1031)
Fest
Hove
The Ivan's
Ihr Hervey
1. Squat thing
Jn.
Jean Hugh
My isan
CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
Enter
David Bonavia told me yesterday that, when discussing the question of
immigration into Hong Kong with Chang Tseng-tsu of the Information
Department of the MFA (Mr Ma's successor) Chang linked the problem
immediately with Chinese Representation in Hong Kong on lines similar to
Mr Wang Tung's kite-flying with Armbassad ov
2.
Bonavia also said that a former deputy head of NCNA in Hong Kong whom he
had known in Hong Kong had, unprompted, peddled the Chinese position on
representation in Hong Kong to him with some force, when they met by
chance not long ago.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
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1. The Chinese have proposed that there should be an
official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. They believe
this to be a logical consequence of the exchange of Ambassadors.
An official representative could act as a link between the
Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government; and improve
relations by explaining Chinese Government policies to local
Chinese. They maintain there would be no intention to set
up a dual régime. They accept that Britain rules Hong Kong,
but maintain that all of it, ceded as well as leased territory,
is part of China.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR
2.
The Governor is strongly opposed to the appointment of a
Representative. He believes the Chinese would like an
official representative in Hong Kong, but that they do not
attach overriding importance to it in the context of Sino-
British relations. The grounds for his objections are:
(a) It would not be interpreted as a routine, far less a
Accession to the Chinese
reassuring diplomatic move.
demand would give a jolt to public confidence. The
population of Hong Kong would be likely to see the
arrival of an Official Chinese Representative as an
important act in the reassertion of Chinese control
over the Colony. It would set in motion new forces and
create new uncertainties at a critical time.
1
CONFIDENTIAL
/ (b)
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Acceptance of the appointment would be tantamount to
ê
establishing an alternative focus of loyalty in Hong Kong.
As such it would irrevocably undermine the authority of the
Governor and lead towards a Macao type situation in the
Colony. Because of our need to retain control in and
over the Colony such a situation would be more likely to
lead to premature confrontation than to cement good
relations with Peking.
(c) Such an appointment, whatever title its holder were given,
Large sections
would carry enormous prestige and influence over the
Chinese population of the Colony (99%). No matter what
assurances the Chinese Government gave about the scope
and nature of the Representative's functions, these
would be open to conflicting interpretations, Koreover
given the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong it is
very difficult to guess what limits China would accept
on what it saw as its legitimate interests.
of the Chinese community would inevitably look to him to
intervene on specific issues on their behalf. Although
such occasions might at first be few, they could increase
rapidly. This might become critical at times of atress,
e.g. a recurrence of communist-inspired violence in the
Colony. An official Representative (and through him the
Chinese Government) would face the choice of satisfying
those who sought his support or of losing face by refusing
it. The standing of the Chinese Government in Peking
/ would
2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a)
would be directly involved.
While the present Government
in Peking might be prepared to risk a loss of face
-
long as the situation in Hong Kong did not threaten to
get out of control
-
白您
we cannot say how a future Chinese
Government would react.
The increased uncertainties rising from the presence of
an official Representative would damage business confidence
in Hong Kong. Investment would suffer severely and the
prosperity and the security of the Colony could be gravely
endangered. The flow of funds from Government and private
sources abroad might dry up.
(e) The decision to accept an official Representative once
taken would be irrevocable; but if we maintain our
refusal, we could quickly reverse our attitude if it
proved untenable. Once an official Representative was
established we could do nothing to control his activities,
far less expel him, without seeking the major con-
frontation with China which we wish to avoid. He would,
moreover, permanently be at risk and a most tempting
target for assassination by a KMT agent provocateur.
(f)
It is unlikely that the request for an official Repre-
sentative in Hong Kong would be the last major political
demand the Chinese would make of us. To give way might
merely whet their appetite, and encourage them to make
demands in other fields.
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL
/ (8)
CONFIDENTIAL
(g) The majority of the non-communist Chinese press already
support the line on a Chinese representative taken up
till now by HMG.
in the light of this to persuade public opinion generally
that greater dangers than those already perceived in the
acceptance of an official Representative would be imminent
if our refusal were maintained, It would be argued that
The Governor would find it impossible
we should wait and see.
(h) There is no practical need for a change in the present
arrangements for Chinese representation in Hong Kong,
which work efficiently. The following organe of the
Chinese Government in Hong Kong are run, and to a large
extent staffed, by Chinese Government officials: the
New China News Agency (NCNA), The Bank of China, The China
Resources Co Ltd and the China Travel Service. Of these
the NONA already acts as a co-ordinating body; ite
functions are closely akin to those of a Consulate-General,
but it has of course no official cachet. It acts as the
established channel of communication on the political aide
between the Hong Kong Government and the authorities: in
Peking. Any need for change can be met by discreetly
advancing the degree of contact between the Governor and
the present "unoffical" representative (who is the Read
of the New China News Agency).
- 4
CONFIDENTIAL
/ 2.
-
CONFIDENTIAL
ARGUMENTS OF HM AMBASSADOR IN PEKING
2. Sir John Addis believes that there is force in the
Chinese argument that the absence of an official Representative
in Hong Kong is an anomaly. He believes that we should not
return a negative reply to the Chinese. Instead we should, in
further discussions with the Chinese, seek to define as closely
as possible the functions and status of a Chinese offical
Representative in Hong Kong and to dress up the appointment
in such a way that it can be presented to public opinion
without shaking confidence in the Colony. His argument is
based on the following considerations:-
(a) The absence of a Representative was comprehensible while
full diplomatic relations between the Chinese Government
and HMG did not exist. But our agreement to exchange
Ambassadors and the subsequent improvement in our relations
with Peking has brought about a new situation. We need
to make our voice heard in discussions of Asian affairs;
and so long as Chinese ambitions in this regard are not
fulfilled our relationship with the Chinese Government
and its political value will inevitably be somewhat
diminished.
(b) To accept the Chinese proposal would, to some extent,
place a seal on the present status of Hong Kong and give
us some assurance that the evolution of Hong Kong during
the years ahead will take place with the concurrence of
the Chinese Government.
Our position in Hong Kong
-
- 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
/ite f
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