HKI OD
P.S./FUS
SIR E NORNIS
SIR D WATSON
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 150280Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13/1
TOP COPY
EH 3301
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 52 OF 15 JANUARY, 1973.
MY DESPATCH OF 11 JANUARY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
PARA 27 PENULTIMATE SENTENCE: FOR 25 PLEASE SUBSTITUTE 26.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
HKIOD
FED
CONFIDENTIAL
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香港總督府
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
{
9873/300/1
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Summary
1.
It would be unsafe to assume that the C P G will
make the development of Anglo-Chinese commercial relations dependent on
our accession to their request for official representation in Hong Kong:
the precedents point the other way (paragraphs 3-5).
2.
The Chinese justification for their proposal contained a number of
inaccuracies; their specific threats related to matters of little
importance to Hong Kong. There is still no evidence that they are aiming
for a break on this issue (paragraphs 6-9).
3.
This is unlikely to be the last Chinese demand upon us (paragraph 10).
4.
The serious psychological and practical (e.g. for the mass transit
scheme) implications of acceding to this Chinese request. Refusal would
be reversible: acceptance would not (paragraphs 11-15).
5.
We should maintain our refusal until we are convinced
that the disadvantages of doing so would outweigh the advantages. We
should then negotiate as suggested by Sir J. Addis, recognising that
these negotiations will be long and difficult (paragraphs 16-19).
6.
There are various ways in which the present unofficial CPG
Representation can be given more prestige and brought into closer
contact with the Hong Kong Government and thus move towards the Chinese
position. The Governor has already made
/some..
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2.
some moves in the direction which have been well received (paragraphs
20-22).
7.
We have made, and hope to continue with, steady progress in the release
of confrontation prisoners. Peking will notice a steady improvement on
this front (paragraph 23).
8.
Our relations with the local C P G hierarchy on
practical matters have never been better: the recent exchange on
Kuomintang letter bombs was well received. Chinese delegations have
recently visited us on water, building and
telecommunications, and there have been reciprocal visits to Canton
(paragraph 24).
9.
The Executive Council are profoundly convinced of
the dangers inherent in the Chinese proposal and will only agree that it
is right to accept when it is manifestly true that the dangers of
refusal outweigh the dangers of acceptance (paragraph 25).
10.
The best course of action is to maintain the status
quo as long as possible. Changes in the world situation and in China
itself might improve the prospects for settlement. The arrival of an
official Chinese Representative would be
seen as the penultimate stage before handing over the Colony to China
and might precipitate confrontation (paragraphs 26-27).
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香港總督府
HONG KONG DESPATCH 14
Sir,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
11th January 1973
I have read H.M. Ambassador's despatch
3/56 of 18th December 1972 about Chinese official representation in Hong
Kong in the light of your visit to Peking, and I have discussed further
with my advisers and senior Unofficials. My views on this problem were
set out in my despatch of 5th May of last year and my telegram No. 31 to
Peking of 26th April. The question is to what extent has the plan of
action proposed in that despatch and then accepted by the Office been
invalidated by what was said to you and Sir Denis Greenhill in Peking.
2.
To make sure that the situation on the ground here is understood, I have
annexed a description of the CPG organs in Hong Kong, and of how they
are co- ordinated and directed under the leadership of Mr. Leung
Wai-lam, and what the present method is of dealing with official
business about Hong Kong.
3.
Are Sino/British commercial and political relations at stake?
I do not think we should start from an assumption that the CPG have
already decided that their whole political and commercial relationship
with Great Britain and, a fortiori Hong Kong, depends upon major
political adjustments in Hong Kong being made now, and strictly in
accordance with the proposals they have made. The Chinese have proved
themselves singularly hard-headed in their dealings with Vestern
capitalist States. I think, therefore, that we should be chary of an
assumption that if they wish to be in the sort of relationship with HMG
that will enable them to assist in maintaining a firm front to the
Russians in Europe, or if they want foreign exchange from Hong Kong to
buy British Tridents or American Boeings, or to give them leverage in
Africa or the Middle East, they are going suddenly to throw all this out
of the window for the sake of Mr. Leung Wai-lam being called the
Official Representative instead of the head of the N.C.N.A. They might
of course do this (I would be the last to deny it), but it seems to me
to be still too questionable a hypothesis to be worth accepting serious
disadvantages to meet at this stage. At the worst, even if they are
going to insist, they are likely to apply the pressure by slow degrees,
so as not to interfere with their overall policy.
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
/over
SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, KT, MP
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4.
2.
We are naturally very anxious to maximise our exports to China, and
anything that is likely to interfere with this should rightly be
carefully scrutinised. But although in the past 15 or 20 years there are
plenty of instances of the Chinese talking to foreign capitalist
exporters as if political considerations (such as our consulate in
Taiwan or confrontation prisoners) would affect purchasing policy, I do
not believe that there are any significant instances of it actually
happening. I recently checked this impression with Sir John Keswick. The
classic examples of Chinese capacity for differentiating between
economic policy and political relations are Japan and West Germany. more
recent example is France which commercially got virtually nothing out of
her dramatic switch of recognition. If therefore the Chinese do or do
not decide to buy VC 10s, I suggest price, delivery and perhaps
non-super-power origin, not our acceptance of a Chinese representative
in Hong Kong are likely to be the dominant factors.
The exchanges in Peking
A
5.
We must also face the fact that in putting their case to you in Peking
the Chinese leaders were either disingenuous or at least underbriefed.
For example, it was untrue to say that CPG had no control over the
Leftists who created the troubles of 1967 in Hong Kong, and that the
presence of a Chinese official representative would have prevented them.
The fact is that in 1967, the Communist Party in China was in turmoil,
and without instructions, the local Party cadres headed by Leung
Wai-lam, let the disturbances take their course until instructed to stop
them, which they were able to do. The absence of an official
representative was quite irrelevant to the situation. Mr. Leung has not
even been re-called or moved elsewhere: still less beźng disowned or
demoted.
6.
It was also untrue to suggest that with such a large co-ordinating
organisation already in existence in the Colony (as described in the
Annex), there was a practical need for a formal co-ordinator; just as it
was to claim that the CPG's objective was merely to facilitate visas and
communications and other practical matters: these are being adequately
dealt with at present; and, given the will, need no new machinery to
deal even with a large increase over the present traffic.
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7.
With this element of evident inaccuracy
in what Chi and Chou said on this subject, I think it would be prudent
not to accept too literally the assurances that they gave at the same
time.
The Chinese made some threats.
In the
This
8. first place to students of Chinese minatory practice an extensive
field of study what was said was exceptionally mild and far removed from
what is normally said before action is imminent. Secondly insofar as the
threats were against Hong Kong they related to things of little profit
to Hong Kong, but of convenience to the Chinese, notably improved air
and rail communications. I think H.M. Ambassador is under a
misapprehension that Hong Kong has a strong interest in such
developments as through trains and direct air links with Canton. is not
so. Our interest is only to respond to any proposals for such
developments that the CPG make, and to let them know that we stand ready
to do so. BOAC may be anxious to secure rights into China via Hong Kong,
but these would bring in little immediate profit. And, despite what
Chang Wen-chiu said to Sir Denis Greenhill, the talks on air services
are as likely to fail for other reasons (e.g. differing views on
sovereignty over Hong Kong) as over the narrow issue of official
representation.
To sum up what passed in Peking
9.
Before the visit one could plausibly claim that the Chinese demand was
being made against any of the following three scenarios: (a) for the
record; (b) because they wanted to get it but not at the expense of a
break; (c) because they wanted to get it, if necessary at the expense of
a break.
As a result of your visit I think we can downgrade the plausibility of
scenario (a), but it did not establish the validity of scenario (c) or
even that it is more probable than scenario (b). In coming to this view
I am strongly influenced firstly by the general considerations in
paragraphs 3 and 4 but secondly, and perhaps more, by the apparent
absence of any preparation of the local hierarchy for a tougher
attitude, and of the absence for some time of any signs even of special
interest in the proposal on the latter's part.
We have had intelligence from several sources suggesting that in private
Chinese cadres are much less certain of the
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4.
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need for or desirability of representation than Chinese Ministers and
officials have appeared to be when discussing the matter on the record
with British visitors.
Can we escape from the Past?
10.
I have much sympathy with the point of view that we should take any
chance that offers of escaping from the legacy of the past and stepping
out in a new relationship with China. But unfortunately we cannot escape
from that legacy so long as we hold the Colony at all. Moreover, I think
we should be wary of assuming that somehow this demand is a last demand
that would free us from this legacy. This has an all too familiar ring.
The remaining things between us and friendship with China used to be our
vote in the U.N. first on substance then on procedure, and our consulate
in Taiwan; then at the last minute it was our doctrine on the
undetermined status of Taiwan; now it is representative in Hong Kong. I
do not think there is any assurance that his precedence, say, or our
reaction to any demand he made - such for instance as communist
representation in the Legislative and Executive Councils would not
equally be presented as the only thing that stood between the U.K. and
smiles, confidences and contracts.
The consequences of accepting a Representative
11.
On the other side of the coin it would be equally foolish to assert that
catastrophe would follow the arrival of a C.P.G. representative in Hong
Kong as the night follows day. Probably for a little - the first months
or year if not years all would continue to be sweetness and light.
Moreover, though the arrival of the representative would release the new
and divisive pressures and uncertainties and intrigues in the population
and business world that we foresee, we would also be exerting ourselves
to keep things on an even keel. Barring bad luck, or a change in C.P.G.
leadership or policy, and I am afraid one or the other is likely enough,
we might succeed for a bit. But in bowing to this Chinese demand that we
have successfully resisted for so long, it is the overwhelming advice of
those here who should know, that we would seriously shake the confidence
of the population and business world and
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start ourselves on a very slippery slope. If we then attempted to claw
our way back, as we might be forced to do, it would be difficult not to
precipitate just that confrontation to avoid which we had accepted a
Representative.
In these circumstances the confrontation would be with the official
representative of China, and the standing of the CPG would be much more
directly involved than in similar confrontations in the past.
12.
To give an example of a practical implication; with such an additional
element of uncertainty the Executive Council would certainly wish to
reconsider the proposal for a mass transit system, and foreign
financiers would similarly wish to re- examine the terms they were
offering. I would of course urge that in such circumstances to hold back
would be to court complete loss of confidence, and I think my view would
prevail. But the same sort of re-
examination would be precipitated right across the whole field of
private investment.
Chinese demands and their implications
13.
Against the background of these rather
negative points, my analysis is:
(a) The CPG would like to have an official
representative in Hong Kong for a variety of reasons. One probability is
that they feel the lack of one inconsistent with their new international
status. Another one is probably the increased prestige and leverage it
would give them in political and cultural work amongst the population of
the Colony which they may feel is steadily drifting further from Maoist
principles ("....explain the policies of the Chinese Government to the
Chinese people in Hong Kong
...). It would also carry with it an option on more direct political
intervention with the Hong Kong Government. Their over-all objective
probably is to combine the maximum economic advantage from the status
quo with the minimum limitation on their political and representational
activities in the Colony. No doubt in their present mood they realise
that the latter would have to be pursued with
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discretion if they were to enjoy the former. But the role envisaged,
while including practical day-to-day affairs, is clearly ly both
political and interventionist (".. to help the authorities in Hong Kong
to administer Hong Kong well so that there would be no trouble to
relations between China and Britain ...."). Such an over- all role and
objective are completely understandable. But while Chi and Chou were at
pains to assure that the role would not be abused, it is not at all the
conventional role of a normal foreign representative, and their
assurances should be viewed with circumspection.
(b) The CPG have said they are not in a hurry,
but that there will be trouble though not serious trouble, if we refuse,
and that in particular air and rail communications between Hong Kong and
China are regarded as related issues. They have said that it is an issue
to which they attach importance and that if we do not respond the
responsibility for the consequences will be ours. I am nevertheless
still doubtful about what they are really prepared to do about it.
The
(c) We see in such an appointment the seeds of
conflict and confrontation. There are three basic problems. The first is
the jolt to the public confidence that accession to these Chinese
demands would produce and the forces that would thus be set in motion.
second is that a public movement could get out of hand and force the
representative into a situation contrary to that intended by Peking. The
third is that sooner or later the CPG would be likely to take a
completely different view to us of what activities were appropriate for
their Representative. This difference would stem from the fact that they
cannot admit that the territory is not Chinese or that 99% of the
population are not Chinese subjects, and that the ir eventual aim is its
reincorporation in China.
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These prospects are too alarming to be worth accepting unless we are
clearly confronted with something worse.
(d) We have to decide our course against the
political background of wishing to improve relations with the CPG.
14.
It is as bewildering as any other Chinese puzzle. Generally speaking, I
think that the trouble that the appointment might be expected to create
in Hong Kong sooner or later is more certain at this stage, than the
disadvantages of refusal. The latter may be as great as H.M. Ambassador
suggests, but at this stage there is wide room for doubt as to whether
the advantages of acceptance or the penalties of refusal are as
inevitable or as great as stated.
15.
A further and perhaps overriding consideration is that while we could,
at any time, and very quickly, reverse our refusal, acceptance would be
irrevocable. It would be an illusion to believe that we could expel or
significantly restrict a Chinese representative once appointed.
Proposals for response in Peking and London
16.
Since we are on such uncertain ground the balance of advantage seems to
me to lie in favour of staying put, and maintaining our present line of
courteous refusal without changing our reasons for doing SO. But we
should do this warily, and with out ear close to the ground to hear any
signs of impending trouble.
17.
If we do this, and do this consistently without giving the Chinese any
ground for hope that we are about to reconsider, one of two things will
eventually happen; the Chinese will subside into nagging, or they
While I will proceed by slow degrees to retaliation. doubt if what they
say to us will be much guide as to whether the light is green, amber or
red, I think we can assume both that if they do something it will be
done gradually, and that in any case we will have good intelligence of
it. If and when we get a red signal, we can decide quickly whether the
balance of disadvantage lies in giving in or facing the music. A
prerequisite for such a plan of action is of course good nerves and a
refusal to be outfaced.
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18.
If at some point we decided that refusal was becoming untenable I think
we should then attempt to negotiate along the lines proposed by H.M.
Ambassador in paragraphs 11-13 of his despatch. However we should
recognise that this would be something of an exercise for the record;
that once the negotiations were started it would be very hard to
terminate them; that once a representative was sur place there really
would be very little we could do to restrict him; and that there would
be nothing at all we could do if through a change in leadership or a
change in over-all policy the CPG was no longer as well disposed as it
is now.
reasons that H.M. Ambassador's proposal does not seem to me to offer
sufficient safeguards to be a satisfactory alternative to the more
cautious plan of action I have proposed
19.
+
Moreover I think that the sort of negotiation he has in mind would raise
in many different ways the question of what the Chinese consider the
extent of their legitimate interests in Hong Kong to be, and, in
particular, would bring into the open the whole issue of sovereignty, on
which so far we have agreed politely to differ. In consequence they
would be long and difficult and would tend to focus attention on Hong
Kong as a key issue in Anglo-Chinese relations, whereas our object
should be to throw it into the background.
And at the end of the road we would have an agreement whose value would
always be doubtful owing to differences of interpretation, and the
difficulty of enforcement if policies or personalities changed.
Proposals for response in Hong Kong
20.
However, I am reluctant to leave things entirely on this negative basis.
I think we could do something to show, even if we cannot say, that we
accept that some adjustment to the CPG's position in Hong Kong is
desirable. We could do this by slowly and unilaterally, but without
anything said of the principle involved, advancing the degree of
official contact with the present representative. Over the last five
months I have myself already taken the first steps in this direction.
Hitherto no Governor has personally had any overt or direct contact with
the hierarchy of the CPG here. This position seemed to me unhealthily
rigid, and I have slowly accepted and made advances up to a point at
which I have twice now had short conversations with Leung Wai-lam and
photographs have appeared in the press of me talking to and shaking
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9.
hands with him. I have had to move very cautiously in this as the
confidence of the population and the establishment in me was very much
at stake. However, the heavens have not fallen, while the CPG for their
part, have noted these developments with approval.
21
I could continue this process and now tell him that if he would like to
talk, my door is always open. If he responds we could move on to
exchanging and accepting National Day invitations. At that point we
would be very near the position that the CPG has asked for with some
important exceptions. The representative's position would be
unacknowledged (and thus could be dropped at any time), and because it
was unacknowledged it would avoid posing the virtually impossible
question to answer of to what extent we accepted the representative's
standing vis-a-vis a population that he claims to be 99% Chinese
subjects, and a territory over which he does not recognise our
sovereignty. It would also avoid the same jolt to confidence that would
be caused by official recognition of a representative. Nevertheless it
would accord him a greatly increased prestige and influence. I could
move to this position in the course of the next year.
22. like as far as the Peking talks have suggested, nor wuld it allow us
the positive answer to Chou En-lai's request that I realise H.M.
Ambassador would understandably like to give. But the essence of our
position would have to be to continue to sign "No" with our diplomatic
right hand while gently signalling a qualified "Yes" with our
gubernatorial left. But I think it would be a tactic that the Chinese
would understand and might even to some extent respect. At the very
least it would take some heat out
assuming that there really is much heat in it and thus make reprisals
less likely I would of course ensure that this trend, of which the CPG
have already taken note, was fully discernible to them before Chi's
visit to London, and was well developed before the Prime Minister's
visit to Peking next autumn.
I
I realise this would not go anything
of the issue
-
-
hope it will be possible to agree to this cautious plan of action.
23.
I should perhaps add at this point that I am hopeful that it will have
been possible to release the remaining 4 confrontation prisoners by this
summer. As I indicated to Mr. Wilford we would do, we have taken the
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10.
temperature of the Board of Review, and it is distinctly encouraging. So
on this front Peking will also note
a steady improvement and this may help a little over our continuing
refusal of an official representative, in that at least it will make
them that much more reluctant to resort to reprisals.
Excellence of present relations in Hong Kong
24.
I should also make the point that in our practical contacts with the
local hierarchy relations have never been better. We were recently
thanked effusively by N.C.N.A. for the co-operation we volunteered over
the discovery of Kuomintang letter bombs in Hong Kong intended for
China. We have just concluded a new agreement for an expanded supply of
water, and this followed a most interesting week's tour by our engineers
of the Chinese water supply scheme in order to assess its capability for
expansion. The head Chinese engineer concerned has just accepted a
reverse invitation to inspect Hong Kong's water system. Problems over an
accumulation of Christmas mail for China have been satisfactorily
settled. Chinese delegations have visited Hong Kong to examine building
methods, and telecommunications and have done so in the most matter of
fact and from our point of view satisfactory way. A similar Hong Kong
delegation to Canton about telecommunications was equally satisfactory.
Special VIP flights between Hong Kong and China are becoming routine.
The more important items on this list succeeded the Secretary of State's
refusal of the Chinese request for representation in Peking for what
that is worth - just as the increased orders for Tridents and Concordes
succeeded Mr. Royles.
Attitude of Executive Council
-
25.
The above picture is very relevant to the attitude of the Executive
Council here. They are profoundly convinced of the dangers and
repercussions that would have to be accepted in acceding to the Chinese
request for an official representative. They see these dangers so
clearly that they would in no circumstances agree that it was right to
accept them, unless it was evident to them that a refusal would result
in other and even greater dangers. While I could point to them that it
was the view of HMG that such dangers would in fact eventually result,
they would reply that it would be prudent
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to wait and see if this assessment was correct, and would point
meanwhile to the relaxed and friendly atmosphere that is now so evident
in Hong Kong and which manifests itself in the sort of practical ways I
have described above. These men are realists, and faced with an evident
threat or with intelligence which they accepted was sound that it was
about to materialise, they would be willing to change their position.
But certainly not in the present circumstances on the basis only of what
was said in Peking. It is HMG's right to decide a matter of this sort
without their agreement, but they would be profoundly shocked and indeed
angered by
it. Some of them might wrongly suspect that Hong Kong's interests had
been sold out for some British commercial or other interest in China. It
would be a most unpleasant situation.
Long term strategy
26.
Finally I do not agree with H.M. Ambassador's thesis that we should aim
at a steady evolution of the CPG's position in Hong Kong over the next
25 years up to the expiry of the lease, and that the presence of an
official representative would help this process. I suggest that we
should rather aim to maintain the status quo for as long as possible and
until we can see what post-Mao/Chou China is going to be like. The
passage of time could make a lot of difference to the problems of a
settlement. There might be a regime prepared to accord Hong Kong some
special status that would safeguard some of our interests. Taiwan might
have provided a precedent for such an arrangement. Standards of living
in China might have risen and the oddities and severities of
administration might have softened to a point at which a future for the
inhabitants of Hong Kong even under direct Chinese rule might not unduly
disturb them or us, and thus cease to carry with it a prospect of
hundreds of thousands of more or less British Chinese refugees looking
for a home outside China.
27.
Because the population here would be likely to see the arrival of an
Official Chinese Representative as the penultimate stage before
rendition, and because this presence might precipitate a confrontation
from which the CPG could not retreat, I think our object should be to
try to postpone his arrival until a time at which we are
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12.
prepared to move rapidly forward to a negotiated
settlement. Of course if he is forced on us within the next few years,
our policy should be to try and hold the line until there was time for
the sort of things dexcribed in para. 26 to happen. But this would be
difficult to do.
28.
I am sending a copy of this despatch
to H.M. Ambassador, Peking.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
My
GOVERNOR
New Lehen
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ANNEX TO HONG KONG DESPATCH NO. 14
Organs of the Chinese People's
Government in Hong Kong
There is an extremely large network of Communist
interests in Hong Kong, official and commercial, over all of which there
exists the usual communist system of dual control, overt and Party.
2.
On the official side, the major units are:
NCNA (i.e. the Hong Kong Branch of the New
China News Agency)
Bank of China
China Resources Ltd
China Travel Service.
These include
To this must be added a variety of minor units, plus a host of
commercial and other organisations. newspapers (with a readership of
over a ‡ million), cinemas, film companies, shipping companies, sales
outlets, both wholesale and retail, banks and import/export agencies.
There are also considerable property interests.
3.
With the exception of NCNA the official units largely confine themselves
to their overt function of promoting particular aspects of the CP G's
Financial or commercial interests in Hong Kong. In carrying out their
tasks they may, as is the case with the Bank of China, have an extremely
important role in China's external relations. Their representational
function except in relation to their particular job is however minor.
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2.
4.
NCNA acts as the senior organisation, with
its staff playing a co-ordinating role over the activities of others.
Its director, Leung Wai-lam, who has never had anything to do with
journalism (he was formerly Director of Education of Kwangtung
province), is the senior C P G official in Hong Kong and, in a
representative role, it is he who for instance hosts the most
prestigious National Day reception.
5.
On the Party side, where real control lies, there is a series of
functional committees covering banking, trade, shipping, propaganda
etc., which report to a senior Party Committee, chaired by Leung
Wai-lam, which has overall responsibility for Hong Kong and Macau.
Although in recent months there has been a discernible trend towards
direct control by Peking, this Committee in turn reports to the
Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee and thence to Peking, where Hong
Kong affairs are subordinated to the West European department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This structure of party committees is
responsible for formulating and relaying policy to the other official
bodies in Hong Kong, the more important of which are represented on the
main Hong Kong and Macau Committee.
6.
Some idea of the extent of this co-ordinating role exercised by Leung
Wai-lam is given by the size of his staff. This alone amounts to about
200, almost all of whom are specially sent from China. He thus has under
him an organisation larger than most British Embassies and is in contact
with all activities in Hong Kong,
7.
Links with the Hong Kong Government are at two levels. On the political
side the normal channel is between the
/Assistant
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3.
Assistant Political Adviser in the Colonial Secretariat and N CNA staff
who belong to a Party Committee specifically charged to be in contact
with the Hong Kong Government, the Consular Corps and with influential
foreigners.
Along with some other of the NCNA's co-ordinating staff they are housed
avay from the functional (i.e. the journalistic) wing of N CNA in the
Bank of China Building. Contact is normally confined to practical
matters, and business is conducted by telephone. While for most tasks
this means of communication has proved sufficiently swift and effective,
NCNA staff do on occasion visit the Colonial Secretariat (e.g. recently
over the matter of postal bombs).
8.
At another level there are a frequent comprehensive range of contacts by
Government and quasi Government personnel on technical matters (post,
railways, water, commerce etc.) with their CPG counterparts in Hong Kong
and Kwangtung.
9.
Leung Wai-lam and his staff are thus able through the co-ordinating
staff of N C N A, and the interlocking committees of the Party,
comprehensively to control all activities of C P G units in Hong Kong.
The control is tight and pervasive, and is developed sufficiently to
allow the CP G to co-ordinate satisfactorily their activities in Hong
Kong; to provide an extensive reporting capability; and to make C P G
views known locally.
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