COUNTRIES, SO FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERTED, STABILITY AND POSPERITY
DEPEND ON CONFILENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANT: IT GOV. "PLY SLOWLY,
BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, KE SHARE AN INTEREST. IN
THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, IT POLLO IS THAT E ALSO SHARE
AN 1.TEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF
CONFIDENCE THERE.
AS FAR AS RELATIONS LEWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE CAN BE
LO DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE. IF,
THEREFORE, E SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER,
HUNG SONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.
I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL.
NE DO KOT THINK THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO CONSIDER IT. I AM NOT A
PROPHET. I CANNOT FORETELL THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS MY JUDGEMENT
THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME A MATTER OF YEARS BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT
WARRANT A CHANGE IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR YOUR
REPRESENTATION IN HONG HONG.'*
4. 1
ENDS.
RECOMMENDING COURSE (B), WE SHALL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD BE
AUTHORISED TO MAKE THE MOVES IN HONG KONG WHICH ARE OUTLINED IN
PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21 OF YOUR DESPATCH. WE ARE MOST CRATEFUL FOR YOUR
OFFER. GIVEN THE A CUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE, WE DOUBT, HOWEVER WHETHER YOU
COULD MAKE ANY GESTURE WHICH WOULD REGISTER FIRMLY WITH THE CHINESE IN
PEKING BEFORE CHI P'ENG - FEI SETE JUT POR LORDON.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILE 3:
HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
FS/MR. ROYLE
SIR E. NORRIS
- 2
SECRET
20
PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A
SECRET
(FED)
लैं
FM FCO 261830Z
SECRET
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 105 OF 26 JANUARY. 1973.
FOLLOWING FOR WILFORD FROM NORRIS.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I HAVE SUBMITTED A PAPER TO MR ROYLE WHICH SETS OUT THE SIX OPTIONS
YOU DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED AT YOUR MEETING
ON 19 JANUARY.
2. ON THE SUBSTANCE, I HAVE DEALT CHIEFLY WITH THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
SECRETARY OF STATE GIVING CHI PENG-FEI A TEMPORISING REPLY. ON
PROCEDUPE, I HAVE SAID THAT WE AIM TO SUBMIT PAPERS TO THE SECRETARY OF
STATE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK. THESE MAY OR MAY NOT
INCLUDE THE DRAFT OF A PAPER FOR HIM TO PUT TO DOP.
3. PLEASE TELL THE GOVERNOR THAT WE SHALL LET HIM SEE THE DRAFT OF
THE BRIEF WE PREPARE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKLOD
SIR E NORRIS
SECRET
·
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Sir Eric Norris
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
3/21/
the draft of a minute for you to put to Mr Royle; and
1.
I submit:
(z)
(b)
2.
a draft telegram for you to send to Mr Wilford in Hong Kong-
Both, I hope, are self-explanatory.
R M
Divans
26 January 1973
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
SECRET
Sir Eric Norris
Yorris
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
Misinart. H Mi Heive.
нето
по себек дей
+ Devi
Enter.
I submit a draft personal telegram for you to send
to Sir Murray MacLehose. Mr Stuart concurs in its terms.
31/,
Y/2
R.E.
3*/1.
30 January 1973
CC
Mr Stuart
Mr Hervey
SECRET
R.M. Evans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
form
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M. Even
FLAG A
FLAG B
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SECRET Maclituse; vienos Поставте
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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Sis E. Ngeris.
5
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A.R123
paper which the Department have
1. I attach a copy of a
prepared on this subject. I also attach copies of the despatches
by Sir John Addis and Sir Murray MacLehose to which the paper
refers and of the records of the conversations which the
Secretary of State had on this subject with Chi P'eng-fei and
Chou En-lai during the course of his visit to China.
2.
I have talked to Mr Evans and Mr Stuart about both
substance and procedure.
On the substance, our view is that
course (b) in the paper is the one which has most to commend it.
The actual terms in which the Secretary of State might speak to
Chi P'eng-fei would of course have to be drafted with great
care. But the great merit of this course, as we see it, is
that it does not carry the risks and penalties which would be
entailed either in a fresh rejection of the Chinese proposal
or in a commitment to explore the proposal.
3.
We have serious reservations about course (f). Chou En-lai
told Mr Denson in February 1971 that the Chinese Government would
like to establish an official representative in Hong Kong. The
proposal was put again to Kr Addis by Chang Wen-chin in March
1972; once again to you at the beginning of June 1972; and
yet again to the Secretary of State at the beginning of November
1972. Although only four months will have elapsed between
the Secretary of State's visit to China and the time when he
meeta Chi P'eng-fel in London, we will have had the proposal
under consideration for very nearly two years.
Another
SECRET
/consideration
SECRET
-2-
consideration is that there is little advantage (and perhaps
some disadvantage) in buying time if we intend to maintain
our refusal to accept the Chinese proposal (or to maintain
this refusal in qualified form), The case for procrastination
only becomes stronger if we are seriously thinking about
entering into confidential discussions with the Chinese, which
we are almost certainly not. Thirdly, there is the factor
that it would be better to give the Chinese an answer before
the Prime Minister visits Peking, as he now hopes to do, in
the autumn. We must do our best to spare him an argument on
the subject.
On procedure, our aim is to submit papers to the Secretary
of State by the end of next week. Unless we do this, the
Department will not have enough time to draft any paper which
may need to be put to DOP. In any case, the Department will
need a certain amount of time in which to clear their draft
briefs on the subject for the Secretary of State with Sir
Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis.
5. I should welcome an opportunity of talking to you about
this early next week, if possible.
26 January 1973
hi. Naw
Eric N rris
O
Now see subsequeni minnies.
Copy to PUS
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R.E.3%.
1
SECRET
OFFICIAL CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Background
1.
During the Secretary of State's visit to Feking, both
the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister
asked him to reconsider his rejection of the Chinese proposal
to establish an official representative in Hong Kong. The
Secretary of State told Chou En-lai on 1 November that he would
like to think about the matter and would get in touch with
Chi Peng-fei in due course. On 29 December, the Fermanent
Under-Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador that the Secretary
of State was giving the matter his personal consideration but
that, because of the problems which the proposal raised for us,
consideration would have to be long and careful. The Chinese
Foreign Minister is to visit London from 22 February to
25 February. He is certain to bring up the subject.
The views of Sir John Addis and Sir Murray MacLebose
2. The views and recommendations of Sir John Addis are set
out in his despatch of 18 December (copy attached). The views
and recommendations of Sir Hurray MacLehose are set out in
his despatch of 11 January (copy also attached). The case
made by each is cogent. Our problem is to decide how to brief
the Secretary of State before his meetings with Chi P'eng-fei
at the end of February. We could brief him to adopt the
course recommended by Sir John Addis; or the course recommended
by Sir Murray MacLehose; or some other course (they do not
between them cover all the courses available).
1
SECRET
13.
F
Х
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Courses Available
3. The courses open to the Secretary of State are:
(a) to maintain our refusal to consider the Chinese proposal;
(b)
to say that we have given very careful consideration
to the Chinese proposal, but that we do not think the
time is ripe for the Chinese to pursue it;
(c) to say that we might be prepared to consider the
Chinese proposal on condition that the Chinese would be prepared to
designate their official representative
as a Consul General;
(a) to say that we are prepared to explore the implications
(e)
of the Chinese proposal in confidential bilateral
discussions;
to accept the Chinese proposal in principle as it
stands; and
(f) to say that we need further time to consider the Chinese
4.
proposal.
Course (a) is the course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose.
Course (b) is a variant. Courses (c) and (d) are distilled
from the course generally favoured by Sir John Addis.
5. The principal advantages and drawbacks of the six courses
are as follows:
(i) Course (a). The great advantage of this course is that
it is the course which would best seem to serve the
interests of Hong Kong. It could also have the advantage
of putting an end to a dialogue which is becoming somewhat embarrassing.
The great drawback is that it would
undoubtedly entail some penalty in terms of Anglo-Chinese
/relations.
- 2 -
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relations.
We cannot at the moment estimate the likely
Another disadvantage is
extent of any such penalty.
that it might mean forfeiting a chance to reach an
accommodation with the Chinese at a time when the climate
of Anglo-Chinese relations is good;
(ii) Course (b). This course is a variant of course (a).
Its advantage is that it would be less of a rebuff to the
Its disadvantage is that it would probably
Chinese.
encourage the Chinese to return to the charge within a
matter of a few years (or even less);
(iii)Course (c). The advantage of this course is that it
would entail putting the ball back into the Chinese court.
But this advantage could be very short-lived: Chi P'eng-
fei might well say that there could be no question of
China appointing a Consul General in territory which
she regards as belonging to her. He would almost
certainly go on to renew pressure for consideration of
the Chinese proposal;
(iv) Course (d). The great advantage of this course is that
it is the course which would best serve bilateral Anglo-
Chinese relations. But it has a hidden trap. If our
confidential discussions with the Chinese were to show
that no satisfactory agreement could be reached, we
should face the choice between breaking off the talks
and accepting an agreement which we did not like.
first alternative would be difficult to adopt and could
do more damage to Anglo-Chinese relations than either
course (a) or course (b);
The
- 3 -
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/(v)
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(v) Course (e). There is really no advantage in this
course. Its manifold disadvantages are set out with
great cogency in Sir Murray MacLehose's despatch;
(vi) Course (f). The advantage of this course is that it
would buy time. But the amount of time bought would
not be very great. It would be very difficult for the
Prime Minister to go on playing for time if, as now seems
probable, he were to visit China in the autumn.
6. Sir Murray MacLehose has suggested a number of limited,
but significant, concessions in the attitude of the Hong Kong
Government to the unofficial Chinese Communist establishment
in the Colony. These concessions might be combined with
course (a) or course (b) (and even with course (c) or course
(d), though with much less political advantage). The case
for asking Sir Murray MacLehose to make these concessions to
offset the effects of the adoption of course (a) or course
(b) on Anglo-Chinese relations is a strong one. But he would
need to act quickly if any impact were to be made before
Chi P'eng-fei visits London.
Far Eastern Department
26 January 1973
-
4
SECRET
Mr Evané
Sir Eric Norris
Copy No
3/31 0
TOK SECRET
Mi Davi Ender and X.
력
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. This issue was discussed at a meeting on 19 January at which
Mr Wilford took the chair and at which FED and HKIOD were
2.
represented.
setting out the options open to us, for eventual discussion at
an office meeting. Such a meeting might be taken by the Secretary
of State. Mr Royle, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Eric Norris
and the Heads of FED and HKIOD might also be asked to be present.
In the light of the conclusions reached at any office meeting,
a paper might have to be prepared for consideration by Ministers in DOP.
If a paper were to be taken in DOP, this would have to
be in the week beginning 12 February, given Mr Chi's arrival here on 22
February. A paper would have to be ready for circulation
to DOP by 9 February.
Mr Wilford asked the Department to prepare a paper,
3. I attach the first draft of a paper which you may wish to
discuss with Sir Eric Norris before arrangements are made for an
I Office meeting. Mr Stuart has seen the draft and concurs.
should add that Mr Wilford has asked that the paper should not at
TOP SECRET
/this
TO: SECRET
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this stage include recommendations but limit itself to setting
out the courses of action open to us. Nevertheless it was
agreed at his meeting that, of the options described in paragraph 5
of the paper, (a) offered the fewest disadvantages and (f) the
most. In other words the options are presented in order of
preference although this is not specifically stated. From our
point of view (and that of HKIOD) option (a), with (b) as a poor
fall-back, seems the only viable choice.
23 January 1973
R BR Harvey
Far Eastern Department
Cc:
Mr Stuart
Mr Clark
or
Mr Wilford or
1.
I have drastically shortened the draft paper and re-
arranged the options.
2. On procedure, I suggest that we should ask the Private
Secretary whether the Secretary of State would be prepared to
take a meeting on Wednesday or Thursday of next week. A
meeting then would allow the Department time to draft a brief
beforehand and (if necessary) a paper for submission to DOP
by 9 February afterwards. You will, I imagine, wish to have
/a meeting
TOEX SECRET
SECRET
a meeting with Mr Stuart and myself before any meeting under
the Chairmanship of a Minister is arranged. Tomorrow might
be a convenient day.
3.
There is one further point. I understand from Mr Stuart
that Mr Wilford has asked to get a telegram regarding our
preliminary views, on both substance and procedure, before he
leaves Hong Kong on 27 January. This reinforces the case for
your holding a meeting tomorrow.
25 January 1973
PS
R.M. Evans
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
I attach copies of the records of the Secretary of State's conversations
on this subject with Chi P'eng-fei and Chou En lại.
Sü
W.
Si Levic Nomis swominied the pope. intimal tomis M. Royle (under mincie
of his own).
R.EE.
29/1
SECRET
SECRET
3.
Mr Elliott
DAG
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Kat
十
سلام
3/2/1
The Permanent Under-Secretary will wish to see a copy of
Sir John Addis's despatch of 18 December. We are awaiting
Sir Murray MacLehose's despatch of comment. As soon as
this is received we shall be submitting on the whole subject.
16 January 1973
HL Davies
Far Eastern Department
FEA
SECRET
Copy retained.
M:
IMEDIATE.
CYPHER/CAT A
C
FM HONG KONG 121130Z
SECRET
SECRET
1973
FEH
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 58 OF 12 JANUARY INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.
(104) FEU 3/301/77
MY TELEGRAM 1252 (NOT TO PEKING) CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
KONG.
FOR WILFORD.
MY CONCLUSIONS WERE SENT BY DESPATCH YESTERDAY, BUT SINCE THIS MISSES
YOUR DEADLINE OF 10 JANUARY IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU TO HAVE AN
OUTLINE OF MY VIEWS BY TELEGRAM.
2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE FRIENDLY AND HELPFUL THINGS SAID IN FEKING,
BUT IN SPITE OF THEM I MYSELF, AS WELL AS THE UNOFFICIALS, REMAIN
CONVINCED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE BOUND TO GIVE RISE TO GREAT DIFFICULTIES
BECAUSE -
A) HERE IT WOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A ROUTINE, FAR LESS A REASSURING,
DIPLOMATIC MOVE, BUT AS THE PENULIMATE ACT IN THE REASSERTION OF CHINESE
CONTROL. IT WOULD THUS RELEASE NEW PRESSURES AND UNCERTAINTIES, NOT
LEAST AMONG GOVERNMENT SERVANTS, AND PROVIDE NEW AND TEMPTING LEVERAGE
FOR LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND FELLOW TRAVELLERS. BECAUSE OF OUR NEED TO
RETAIN CONTROL, THIS SITUATION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A
CONFRONTATION PREMATURELY THAN TO BUY TIME AND GOOD RELATIONS.
L
B) THE PRESTIGE AND DEFERENCE THAT WOULD ATTACH TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
SUCH A POWERFUL NEIGHBOUR AND CLAIMANT TO THE TERRITORY, AND THE EXTENT
TO WHICH HIS GOOD OFFICES WOULD BE SOLICITED, WOULD THROW OUT THE
PRESENT BALANCE OF POWER IN THE COLONY SOONER OR LATER IT WOULD ALSO
FORCE HIM INTO EITHER INTERVENING OR DISAPPOINTING HIS SUPPORTERS. IN
THE PRESENT MOOD IN PEKING HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RISK THE LATTER, BUT
NOT IF PERSONALITIES OR POLICIES CHANGED IN PEKING, OR IF IN SOME WAY
THE SITUATION GOT OUT OF HAND HERE.
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/C) SUCH
E
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C) SUCH AN INCREASED ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY WOULD CAUSE REVIEW OF ALL
CURRENT INVESTMENT, INCIDENTALLY INCLUDING THE MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY.
3. WE WOULD OF COURSE DO OUR UTMOST TO COUNTER ALL THESE REPERCUSSIONS
AND WITH LUCK WE MIGHT SUCCEED FOR A BIT, BUT IT WOULD BE AN INTENSELY
DIFFICULT SITUATION THAT MIGHT SOONER OR LATER
BECOME UNTENABLE.
4. H.M. AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THE ACTIVITIES OF
A REPRESENTATIVE AND DEFINE THEM BY NEGOTIATION SEEMS TO ME A GOOD
FALL-BACK POSTION, BUT ONLY AS THAT.
A) SUCH A NEGOTIATION WOULD BE LONG AND DIFFICULT AND WOULD RAISE, IN AN
ACUTE FORM, THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE CPG CONSIDERED THEIR STANDING
SHOULD BE IN A TERRITORY IN WHICH THEY CLAIM 98 PER CENT OF THE
POPULATION AS THEIR COMPATRIOTS, AND OVER WHICH THEY CANNOT RECOGNISE
OUR SOVEREIGNTY. I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF OUR RELATIONS EMERGED FROM
SUCH A NEGOTIATION IN ANY WAY IMPROVED.
B) EVEN IF OBTAINED, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY UNENFORCEABLE,
WE COULD DO LITTLE OR NOTHING TO CONTROL A
AT LEAST WITHOUT REPRESENTATIVE ONCE HERE, FAR LESS EXPELL HIM RISKING
THE CONFRONTATION WE HAD ACCEPTED HIM TO AVOID.
5. DIFFICULT THOUGH THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 MIGHT
BE, WE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT IT IF FACED WITH
THE ALTERNATIVE OF SOMETHING WORSE, BUT NOTHING OF THE SORT HAS YET
OCCURRED. THE CHINESE HAVE MADE SOME THREATS (FOR THEM QUITE MILD), BUT
IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THEY ARE PREPARED TO
CARRY THEM OUT INN RESPECT OF EITHER HONG KONG OR
THE U.K.
6. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S PRESENT GENERAL EXTERNAL FOLICY AND
ALSO THE STEADILY IMPROVING, AND SATISFACTORILY PRACTICAL, RELATIONS
WITH CPG OFFICIALS IN HONG KONG, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO
PERSUADE THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT GREATER DANGERS THAN THOSE THEY SEE
IN ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE IMMINENT IF WE CONTINUED TO REFUSE. THEY WOULD
REPLY THAT WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE.
-2-
SHORET
/7. EVEN
+
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AVEN IF THE CHINESE THREATS AND HM AMBASSADOR'S ANALYSIS CAN BE ACCEPTED
IN THEIR ENTIRETY, ONE CAN EXPECT THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE
PRESSURE WOULD BE APPLIED SLOWLY AND PROBABLY RELUCTANTLY, AND THAT
THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME FOR US TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION BEFORE
ANYTHING DISASTROUS OCCURRED.
8. WHEREAS TO ACCEPT A REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE AN IRREVOCABLE ACT, OUR
CURRENT REFUSAL COULD BE QUICKLY REVERSEDIF IT WERE PROVED UNTENABLE.
9. I MIGHT SEE THIS PROBLEM DIFFERENTLY IF I COULD BRING MYSELF TO
BELIEVE THAT BY THIS CONCESSION WE COULD IN SOME WAY ESCAPE FROM THE
LEGACY OF THE PAST AND STEP OUT IN A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. BUT
THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE LAST DEMAND, OR THAT THE
LEGACY WOULD NOT REMAIN AT LEAST AS LONG AS WE HOLD HONG KONG. MOREOVER,
THOUGH TEMPORARILY THIS CONCESSION MIGHT BUY A SHORT HONEYMOON FOR THE
UK, FOR THE REASONS IN PARA 1 IT CARRIES WITH IT THE EVENTUAL LIKELIHOOD
OF
WORSE AND NOT BETTER RELATIONS.
10. SINCE WE ARE ON SUCH UNCERTAIN GROUND I RECOMMEND THAT WE STAY PUT,
AND MAINTAIN OUR COURTEOUS REFUSAL. BUT BECAUSE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE
THAT THE CHINESE REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY HAVE SAID, AND THAT UNACCEPTABLE
REPERCUSSIONS MIGHT EVENTUATE, WE SHOULD KEEP A VERY SHARP LOOK OUT FOR
SIGNS OF MOVEMENT OR CHANGE, I THINK WE COULD COUNT ON DOING THIS ON THE
HONG KONG INTELLIGENCE NET.
11. IF EVENTS PROVE OUR REFUSAL TO BE UNTENABLE WE SHOULD ADOPT HM
AMBASSADOR'S PLAN OF NEGOTIATING THE BEST TERMS WE CAN FOR A
REPRESENTATIVE.
12. HOWEVER, TO KEEP THE TERMPERATURE DOWN AND THUS MAKE REPRISALS LESS
LIKELY I WILL IN ANY CASE:
+
A) RELEASE THE REMAINING CONFRONTATION PRISONERS BY THE SUMMER (WE HAVE
HAD A GOOD REACTION FROM THE BOARD OF REVIEW).
-3- SECRET
/B) STEADILY
SECRET
+
]
B) STEADILY ADVANCE SOCIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH THE PRESENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO A POINT FAIRLY SIMILAR TO THAT REQUESTED BY THE CPG
EXCEPT, AND THIS IS A VERY BIG EXCEPTION, THAT HE WOULD REMAIN
UNRECOGNISED. NEVERTHELESS HIS STANDING AND PRESTIGE WOULD BE ADVANCED
AND PEKING WOULD NOTE THIS MOVEMENT.
13. I HAVE STARTED THE PROCESS OF 12(B) DURING THE LAST 5 MONTHS, AND IN
ANY CASE PROPOSE CONTINUING IT AS A SENSIBLE PIECE OF REINSURANCE.
14. WHILE THE FOREGOING IS AN INDICATION OF MY VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF THE
DESPATCH I TRUST THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ON THE DESPATCH RATHER THAN
THIS TELEGRAM.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
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