to the Hong Kong communist hierarchy to avoid
confrontation with the government both in general
and also in specific issues. Moreover it is a
reasonable deduction that the principal reason the
CPG have not taken over Macau is reluctance to
force a confrontation over Hong Kong or check
confidence in it.
F
7.
5.
So we can take it that the CPG believes
it to be to its advantage to retain the status
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Chou-En-
of the colony in the immediate future
lai even hinted to Malcolm Macdonald that this would
hold until the lease ran out. For the purpose
of this despatch it is not necessary to spell out what this advantage is
but merely to note that
the present leadership of the CPG believes it to
exist. It is probably principally commercial and
financial, but economic factors have never been
conclusive for the CPG - even 1/3 of their foreign
exchange earnings and we should bear in mind
that we do not really know what the Chinese
reasoning is, and that there might be other factors.
These might include such ideas the CPG has about the
role Great Britain should play in China's external
policy, and the deterrent effect still exercised
by the CPG's view of the Anglo/US relationship.
8.
So I think we can assume that, other
things being equal, (i.e. that we do not in some
way outrage Chinese national pride or interests),
the CPG would wish to change a course that was
bringing them into collision with us over Hong Kong, and that this is
because in the final analysis
at present they wish to preserve the status quo.
This gives us a card, particularly if we play 2.
with Finesse.
SECHEL ECLIPSE
6.
Chinese policy in Hong Kong and the counter to it
9.
There is ample evidence that Chinese
policy towards Hong Kong is to produce a Macau-like
situation. This is a tacit understanding that in
exchange for continuing sovereignty, peace and
quiet and the exercise of administrative functions,
the CPG has the right to veto administrative
actions which are unfavourable to the CPG or the ir
supporters, and to pursue the organisation of an
unchallengeable power-base in the trades unions,
schools, trading organisations, etc., while
drawing full financial and other benefits from the
Colony's British status. This is an old and
perfectly comprehensible policy, and of course
carries with it an option on a more or less
peaceful take-over at any time. It has had
little success in Hong Kong so far. Its failure
has depended on the public s confidence in
Government's determination to resist encroachment.
The Hong Kong Government s sense of success (and
L
HMG's steady backing has of course contributed
to this success) has produced a well-tried and
rather Berlin-like policy of viewing all concessions
with the gravest misgiving. Whatever one's views
―
on the merits of this and I personally think them
considerable,
one has to remember that the
population of Hong Kong, including the communi.
bigrarchy, have. gro... ́
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SECRET ECLIPSE
7.
The new situation
10.
The policy may be old and well-tried,
but the present situation is new in two main respects:-
a) the CPG's new status in the world
b) the CPG's new relationship with the UK.
The new relationship between the US and the CPG has greatly altered its
international standing.
Mr.
Dulles put the black spot on the CPG and it stuck. now the CPG is
respectable and wooed, a member of the Security Council, treated on more
or less equal terms,
whether as friend or enemy, by both Super-powers.
This is a new situation in which the CPG may feel entitled to a new
status and new and more normal and
direct channels of communication everywhere.
It is
also a situation in which the old deterrent of US
But
power operatés, if at all in respect of Hong Kong, to a
The CPG must feel significantly lesser extent.
that if it wanted to it could get away with doing a
Pondicherry on Hong Kong, if not perhaps a Goa.
11.
The new relationship with the UK does
not in theory alter much of substance, though the CPG may (or ought to)
feel they owe us a good turn
for our new formula on Taiwan. But in exchanging
Ambassadors we accepted the opening of a dialogue
to settle outstanding problems, and both sides are blowing the dust from
old files id quoting from their
cont
· ·
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8.
normalcy which has grown up over the last 6 months
or year in Peking, Hong Kong and London and which is
highly desirable. But while on the one hand this
spirit must not lightly be lost through sounding a
19
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needlessly sour note, on the other it is too early to say.
what real prospect it offers of settling outstanding
issues by give and take and not just by give on our
part.
12.
So far as China is concerned Hong Kong
is the issue outstanding which looms largest in form,
if perhaps not in practice, and in the initial stage
of the dialogue China has asked for both the release
of confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong, and the
appointment of an official Chinese representative.
I assume that our objective should be as in para. 5,
to gain 10 or 15 years in which Hong Kong can have
time to grow and prosper in confidence, suppress its
warts and wrinkles, and become as hard for China to
absorb as possible, and in which post Mao/Chou China
can emerge and show its credentials as a negotiating
partner. The problem therefore is how to respond
to the demands already made about Hong Kong, and to
anything more that comes up, in a way that will help and not hinder us
in our objective of gaining time.
Confrontation Prisoners.
13.
The confrontation prisoners are nos
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9.
changes the mood of the Prisons Board of Review.
The question is only how or when to make the
concession.
I consider we should decide this not
in isolation, but in relation to what we decide to do
about Chinese Representation, and indeed to the
totality of the situation as it is eventually disclosed.
For the time being therefore this is a card we should
hold in our hand.
Chinese Representation
14.
On Chinese Representation in Hong Kong
I will not set out again here the difficulties we
believe such a representative would produce
-
they
were described in the 'Guidelines for the Governor-
designate' agreed in the Department, and in my
telegram No. 31 to Peking on 26th April. The main point
is that with the best will in the world (and I doubt
if we could count on that such an appointment would
be more likely to precipitate a loss of confidence
in the colony and a confrontation with the CPG and
consequently to a worsening of Anglo/Chinese relations,
than to buy for us long goodwill, prosperity, confidence
and time.
15.
Of course if the Chinese Representative
were to conduct himself like any other representative here, keep out of
local affairs, refrain froE
anipulating the levers wi Ch 1.^' ozca ..
€ 30
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SECRET
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ECLIPSE
10.
Hong Kong Government, he would be a positive asset in many
practical and political ways.
But I don't see how he
possible could. So long as the official position of the CPG is that Hong
Kong is Chinese territory and its Chinese residents are 'compatriots' in
whom they have a special interest, there would be virtually no limit to
the field in which a representative could claim competence, or in which
he could refuse to respond to appeals for help . It might work out for a
year or two, but sooner or later the crunch would come. We might try to
present such an appointment as CPG recognition of the status quo, but it
would be in fact the first step in re-assertion of Chinese control.
population, investors, and industrialists alike would know this and
would conclude that the appointment signalled the beginning of the last
act. This is a situation in which agreement is likely to lose so much
that the dangers of refusal must be very clear and immediate to be worth
considering.
16.
There appear to me to be three possible
groups of scenarios for this proposal having been made in this way at
this stage which is all the more baffling because not yet defined:-
a) It is made for the record and invites
or expects a refusal which will be accepted
(with a good or bad grace).
b) Peking is either unaware of the
difficult.cs, or is aware
as faving
The
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SECRET ECLIPSE
11.
17.
a new position in Hong Kong, but in any
of these events does not consider the
objective of sufficient immediate importance
to be worth a confrontation that risked
whatever advantage she sees in the status
quo
4
c) For one reason or another Peking is
determined to establish official representation
in Hong Kong and assert a new position in the
Colony at the risk even of upsetting the
status quo. If so they have started off
But if there very gently indeed.
really is a mailed fist behind the velvet
it is most unlikely in present circumstances
that it would be abruptly flourished in our
faces. If and when we suspect its existence
room for we could reconsider and use such/manoeuvre
-
BS we have though as I have already
indicated such a situation would leave us
precious little.
So as I see it, the dangers of making
the concession proposed are so obvious, the advantages so speculative,
the degree of Chinese interest in it
still so uncertain, the possibility of the Chinese
changing their policy to Hong Kong abruptly in the
immediate future so remote, that at the very leas.
.) sho..la pony
hi
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7.
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12.
18.
Nevertheless I am conscious of the
desirability in the circumstances described in paras.
10 & 1 of making some small change in local
practice or arrangements which would not disturb
either the balance of power in the Colony or public
confidence, but would represent a genuflexion in
the direction of the CPG's new status and allow
Peking to drop the proposal with a good grace.
Desirable as such a tactic would be, I must confess
that ever since I was appointed I have racked
my brains to think of something that would fit this
bill, but so far without success. If and when the
Chinese show more of their hand it may suggest to us
some safe but significant action that could be taken
here which would get us off the hook without
precipitating a slide to confrontation and loss of
confidence. I do not know if something of this
sort will prove either necessary or possible, but
I do not think in any case it could have the desired
effect if we attempted to negotiate it in Peking
or London, If raised in principle it would be bound to
fail. I envisage it rather as some change in our manner of dealing with
the local hierarchy that might be introduced unilaterally and without
explanation to sweeten very slightly a refusal of the principal
proposal.
19.
2a sendin
this desth
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DELALI
ECLIPSE
13.
the first instance only to H.M. Ambassador Peking.
Since any leakage of its contents could be
damaging, perhaps the Department would itself
consider what further distribution should be given.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
Mr... Ma Schn
т
GOVERNOR
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, K.T., M.P.
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RIORITY
TR/OAT A
HONG KONG 090425Z
SECRET
R-CEIVED IN R-CEIVERSCHIED
REGISTRY No. 12
- 9 MAY 1972
FEAT 3/1
TOP COPY
TO FRIORITY F C O TELNO 398 OF 9TH MAY 1972. INFO ROUTINE
PEKING.
24
PEKING TELNO 4011 CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
*
I'M AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW
WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMMITMENT, THE CHINESE MAY
BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS CATHERING
WAY. VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR DE PREPARED TO
LET THEM SAIL OVER US.
2.
FOR REASONS CIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 TO PEXING AND DESP- 4TCH OF 5
MAY I HOPE THE DECISION VILL PE FOR THE FORMER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE
TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY, ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S AIBASSADOR, PEKING,
COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR MY PART 1 SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT
BE MADE :-
(A) WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS
TIME. OUR DESISE IS. FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE
IS THEIRS, BUT THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE
THEREFORE FEEL OBLIGED TO SPEAK FRANKLY.
(B) MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF MR, KWOK,
THE KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FPO" 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAR'' FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH
SIDES, OR DEHOUSTRATING THE HEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AY
EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS WHICH HMG HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED.
(C)
A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE
HAD AN OFFICE IN SHANCHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NONE ON
BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE POSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL.
SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU E:-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR.
DENSON
HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW
THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WIEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. ́NOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH DEEN CLOSED,
AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A
SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.
SECRET
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SECRET
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3.
(E)
MR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTIC GROUNDS. BUT
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN
THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE,
CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTERS. THEY ARE NOT
HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY WAY, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE
THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET WHOM THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND
LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THEM HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS
AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA, THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL
NEED FOR FURTHER
REPRESENTATION.
THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES. HITHERTO A BALANCE. HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THAT
IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLOGY. THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT MIGHT DISTURB
THAT BALANCE. AVY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE
EFFECT IN THE COLONY AND THUS ON ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS. SINCE THE
CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF MO PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO EITHER THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT
WOULD HAVE ON OUR
RELATIONS.
IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON WHETHER ALL OF THIS COULD PROPERLY BE
SAID, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT AT THIS POINT, WHATEVER
I CHINESE INTENTIONS TURN OUT TO BE, WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY CLARITY AND
MUCH TO LOSE BY RISKING MISUNDERSTANDING THROUGH RELUCTANCE TO MAKE OUR
OBJECTION CLEAR.
4.
I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN
GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL. ONCE
THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. I
THEREFORE HOPE THAT UNTIL NEW INSTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF
CHANG'S DEMARCHE H.M. AMBASSADOR WILL FEEL ABLE TO SAY, IF TACKLED, THAT
PENDING INSTRUCTIONS HE CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.
MACLEHOSE
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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
| COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST)
7
FILES
FED
HAIOD NAM D
PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
COPIES TO:
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE
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