CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON. I WOULD LIKE TO
DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR
OWN THESIS TO HIM, THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH,
2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO
BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRKS THE PROBLEMS THERE IN
FORESEEN IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN
INEVITABILITY OF THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER
THAN TO EASIER RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE
SITUATION.
3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC
HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE
COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND
THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE MUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY, I
FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS
APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)
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4.
MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND:
A)
THAT WE CAN SEE NO PRACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT
WAS PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS
NOT UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE
CPG WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE
PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NCNA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY
SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS
COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A
FAR LARGER SET-UP THAN VE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED
WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.
B) CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG,
5.
THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO
ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY
THE RIOTS OF 67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW. THIS
POLICY HAS BEE!! SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S BELIEF
THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT, HENCE THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC
LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS
AND CADRES.
YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF
SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED,
WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO
IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S
POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT
PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING,
WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE
REQUESTS. FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED
FROM MC, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND
OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.
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6.
ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS
VIEW. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW
SITUATION IN WHICH CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD
FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:
A)
B)
1)
THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.
THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR
LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT
DOES NOT TAKE US VERY
FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING.
RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING,
E.G.
THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:
THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED BY CHANG
WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : ITI) THE WAY
THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LA ON HONG KONG
TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVEN THE
CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.
C)
7.
THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO
WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO
SIT TIGHT ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON SHOULD NOW
BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK. POLITICAL TRICKS TO TAKE
ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CASE FOR GIVING THEM
REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST
OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE
IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE
OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED. HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL
FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
-3- SECRET
/8. SINCE
SECRET
8. SINCE THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER- BATE
RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IT
WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE ALSO
PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE UNLIKELY
TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT., AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM
OFF QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO
GRUMBLES. BUT THERE COULD BE REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO
GAIN MOMENTUM.
MACLEHOSE
(COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SR & mors
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SECRET
TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 393 OF 9TH BAY 1972. INFO ROUTINE
PEKING.
FCO
PEKING TELNO 461: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I AM AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW
WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMITMENT, THE CHIRESE MAY
BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS GATHERING
WAY, VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR BE PREPARED TO
LET THEM SAIL OVER US.
2.
HY
FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 TO PEKING AND DESP- ATCIL OF 5
MAY I HOPE THE DECISION VILL RE FOR THE FOPHER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE
TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY. ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S AYDASSADOR, PEKING,
COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR MY PART I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT
BE MADE :-
(A)
(B)
(C)
WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS TIME. OUR
DESIRE IS FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE IS THEIRS, BUT THIS
PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE THEREFORE FEEL OFLICED TO
SPEAK FRANKLY. MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF NR. KWOK,
THE KUOMISTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FROM 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAN'' FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH
SIDES, OR DEMONSTRATING THE NEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AN
EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS WHICH HMG HAS HO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED,
A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE
HAD AN OFFICE IN SHANGHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD HONE ON
BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE POSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL.
SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU EN-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR.
DEMSON
HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW
THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WHEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. NOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH DEEN CLOSED,
AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A
SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.
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(E)
3.
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HR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTICAL
GROUNDS. BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY
LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL
QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT
AND OTHER MATTESS. THEY ARE NOT HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY MAY,
AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET
VION THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THEM.
HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA.
THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR FURTHER
REPRESENTATION.
J
THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES, HITHERTO A BALANCE
HAS REEN MAINTAINED THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLONY. THE PROPOSED
APPOINTMENT NIGHT DISTURB THAT BALANCE.
ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE
EFFECT IN THE COLONY AND THUS ON MIGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS.
SINCE. THE CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT
TO EITHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK
THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OUR
RELATIONS.
IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON WHETHER ALL OF THIS COULD PROPERLY BE
SAID, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT AT THIS POINT, WHATEVER CHINESE INTENTIONS
TURN OUT TO BE, WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY CLARITY AND MUCH TO LOSE BY
RISKING MISUNDERSTANDING THROUGH RELUCTANCE TO MAKE OUR OBJECTION CLEAR.
4.
I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN
GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL, ONCE
THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL PE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. I
THEREFORE HOPE THAT UNTIL HEV MISTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF
CHANG'S DEMARCHE HIM, APBASSADOR VILL FEEL ABLE 10 SAY, IF TACNLED, THAT
PERCING I.STRUCTIGNS YE ;}
CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER "JRTHCK.
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小小
TOP COPY
Ask
TO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 265 OF 39-MARCH INFO
PEKING,
(
YOUR TELHO 272: CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN THE CHINESE COURT TO LET
US KNOW EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY ENVISAGE FOR THEIR 4 REPRESENTATION
(PEKING TELNO 245). WE WOULD NOT INTEND RAISING
RE THIS MATTER WITH THEM AND SHOULD DEFER DETAILED CONSIDERATION UNTIL
WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.
13
2. OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION IS THAT THE STRIKINGLY MORE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE IN GENERAL OF THE CHINESE WITH AR ADDIS ON 27 MARCH HAS CREATED
A NEW SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRIMARY, AND INDEED OVER-RIDING,
CONSIDERATION IN THIS HATTER MUST REMAIN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH REPRESENTATION IN THE COLONY (PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL
UNDER REFERENCE).
DOUGLAS-HOME
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
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SECRET AND PERSONAL
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R. GETRY NS5.50
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FEH3/301/2
(FE)
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELMO 338 OF 28 APRIL.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FPON MR ROYLE.
YOUR TELEGRAM TO PEKING NO 31: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1.
LESLIE PONSON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS TALK WITH YOU AND YOUR
ADVISERS AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE FURTHER ANALYSIS SET OUR IN
YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE,
2. 1 SROULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND ¡YSELF
FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE POSITION THOUGH AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE VE
RUST AWAIT ACY FURTHER COMMENT FROM ADDIS BEFORE WE FORMALLY GIVE OUR
POLICY DECISION, THEREAFTER WE MUST ALL STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE,
INCLUDING OF COURSE MYSELF IN PEKING.
3. I AM AT PRESENT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRAVELLING TO PEKING BY
RAF COUCT BUT THIS IS SUBJECT TO FINAL AGREEMENT HERE AND FROM
PEKING. 1. UNDERSTAND THAT YOU THINK IT GENERALLY UNDESIRABLE FOR A
MINISTER TO GO INTO CHUA VIA HONG KONG BUT WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO MY
RETURHING FROM CHIHA VIA HONG KONG7 | KOULD ONLY STOP FOR A SHORT TIME
JI HONG KONG BUT I WOULD MUCH LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MY VISIT
TO, PEKING, I SHOULD HAVE TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN HONG KONG OF
COURSE BUT I THUK THAT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL AND I WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH
YOU BEFORE HAND, 4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU
THINK THIS I DEA NAKES SENSE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED HKD
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PS TO MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON MR WILFORD
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8/5.
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TEE lei Gormori Arganti have it" anlitt we can Fath
which as
In your letter of 27 April, you asked how the problem of Chinese
representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view
was at present taken of the requests made by the Chinese Government.
The case has a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the
Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nationalist Government maintained
a representative in Hong Kong. lle gave the Hong Kong Government a great
deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the
Consular officers of other countries, based on the Chinese view
(Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 19th Century
treaties and hence that liong Kong belonged to Cuina.
In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally proposed the
estɛDiishment in Hong Hont of an "Orrice of d Commissioner of Forel,".
Arrkira of Che People's Republic of China, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd decidcu that
we ought not to accede to the Chinese request, but that it would be
wiser not to refuse it outright. No reply was therefore sent to the
Chinese.
+
1though the Chinese did not revert to the subjcct Formally during the
next two years, Chou In-lai mentioned it co a number of British
visitors. This led to some publicity in the British press and there were
questions in Parliament. Chou En-lai brought up the issue again with the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade (Mr. Erroll) when he
visited China in 1957. It was therefore decided that a fox! reply to the
Chinese request was necessary. In February 1958,
ir. Selwyn Lloyd told the Chinese Clergé d'Affaires that, given the
climate of our relations at the time, we could not agree to the
appointment of an official Chinese representative In Hong Kong.
The Chinese did not refer to the matter again until last year.
In March 1971. Chou En-lai brought it up during 4 conversation with our
Chargé d'Affaires. He spoke of "an CONETECTctory position' in
maintaining a Consulate on Taiwan
/while
Alt
5/5
Lord "ridges,
10 Downing Street
LI
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4
I
while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship wich Hong
Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal
request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.
The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The
first was when ow Mbassador called on the Director of the West European
Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange which took
place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I enclose a copy.
Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was envisaged that any
official Chinese representative in Rong, Row: would have and Ohang
underseas to pakko encui-ics. The_second_occasion was when the Chinese
Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the Department
at á reception at the Chinese Embassy here on 7 April.
What
Our Ambassador subsequently commenced that he thought there was a case
for considering whether the Chinese responsa contained the elements of a
negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose
a copy). Governor believes that the establishment of official Chinese
Teprésentation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position cud
damage, rather than improve, velations between Chiba and Tong Kong. his
arguments are set ont in detail in Keng Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking.
Sir lec Douglas-Home agrees with the Governor.
When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official
Chinese representative in liong Kong to have, as we wust expect them to
do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the tenus
of our responsc.
(Sμd) P. 14. Grattan
SEORIE
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SPORDI
لالة المحامة
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HÙNG HỒNG
5th May 1972
1.
2.
Hong Kong in the new Sino/British dialogue
Summary
We will have to negotiate with China
about the future of Hong Kong probably sometime
in the 1980's.
But we should wait till then both
to see what post-Mao/Chou China is like as a
negotiator, and also to give Hong Kong time to put
its house in order.
If both these factors are
favourable we might obtain some continuing special
status (1-5).
The present Chinese leadership seems
to wish to avoid a confrontation with us over Hong
Kong and preserve its status for the time being
because this is of advantage to China.
This
gives us a bargaining position of a sort in the
present dialogue (6-8).
3.
4.
Chinese policy in Hong Kong, and
its lack of success (9-10).
China's new international status may
make her feel entitled to a new status and gives her
The her
more liberty of action in Hong A...,
chip
1
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2.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
China has asked for the release of
confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong and the
appointment of an official representative there (12).
Confrontation prisoners can be conceded,
but at the time of our choosing (13).
Chinese representation could precipitate
a show-down with China on Hong Kong and
consequently threaten Anglo-Chinese relations (14 & 15).
The reasons why the Chinese may have
made this proposal and their implications (16).
In view of the dangers of conceding what
is asked, the unlikelihood of the Chinese pushing
this request quickly to dangerous extremes, and the
possibility that they may not feel committed to it,
we should play it long and start with a polite
brush-off (17).
We should look for some small and safe
concession that would take account of their enhanced
status; not easy to find (18).
SECRET
-
ECLIPSE
Sir.
Hong Kong, 5th May 1972
With Ambassadors exchanged and ministerial
In
visits to follow we are committed to a dialogue with
the Chinese leaders on outstanding problems.
these Hong Kong bulks large. This despatch suggests
a long term strategy, as well as short term tactics
for handling Hong Kong in this dialogue,
Inevitably
it takes one far into territory at least common
to H.M. Ambassador, Peking, and if I have in fact
trespassed in his territory, as I fear I have, I hope
he will accept my apology he knows he is welcome
in mine.
Strategy for Hong Kong
2.
-
Sometime, probably in the decade of the
1980's, the shadow of the end of the lease in 1997
will force us to negotiate with the Chinese People's
Government over the future of Hong Kong. Obviously
we must be careful not to miss any opportunity to do
so that presents itself and would produce the right
result. But we can afford no false step because once
we offer to negotiate and it becomes known, confidence
in the Colony would collapse and our bargaining position
would evaporate, and I think it is in fact agreed policy
not to negotiate meanwhile because:
a) it is moSL
misese
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ECLIPSE
2.
If on these grounds our strategy
were to be to play for time e.g. about 10 or
H
15 years
envisage should be the domestic strategy for Hong
Kong. This is to tackle the domestic problems
of the Colony so vigorously during the next 10
years that they would be eliminated to a point at
which by Western standards there was nothing to
be ashamed of anywhere, and by Chinese standards
much to spur civic pride and a sense of achievement
everywhere. What has already been achieved
and planned gives an excellent point of take-off for
such a policy. In terms of programmes for housing
and urban renewal, secondary and higher education,
transport, social services, cultural development
and improvement of urban and rural environment, I
believe it could be done
it would fit in well with what I
-
always provided world
trade keeps up and Hong Kong is not shut out from
a fair share of its benefits.
4.
Such a policy is worth pursuing for
its own sake. But I believe it also holds out the
best prospect for the least unsatisfactory arrange-
ment with China on the long term future of the Colony.
Of course in certain Chinese moods nothing will
count except the urge to end completely this
colonial blot on the national honour. But we do not
know what the state of China will be in 10 or 15
years time, or who the people will be who run it,
or what their policies or priorities will be.
SECRET ECLIPSE
3.
It
They might see merit in some continuing arrangement for Hong Kong
whereby a special regime was established that nominally removed the
colonial stigma, but preserved for China some of the economic and other
material and political benefits of the present status, saved them from
having to absorb a population with such different standards of living
and attitudes of mind, and on the other hand preserved for foreigners a
tolerable trading base, some security for investment and acceptable
living
conditions while concentrating them in a single area
where they did not affect life in the rest of China. could perform the
service which Shanghai might have done
if the CPG in the early days of their power had not squeezed the
foreigners out, and it could avoid the problems the CPG experienced in
absorbing that cosmo-
politan and volatile population. I believe that the more
undeveloped and discontented Hong Kong is the less likelihood there
would be of this or a similar concept
being adopted, and conversely the more evolue the colony
the more attractive such a half-way house might appear
to the Chinese leadership, assuming it was prepared to compromise at
all. At best there may only be a 50/50
chance though these are not bad odds in human affairs
and there are other factors which might affect the
attitude of the CPG too numerous to mention. But I think
that this is the best contribution the Hong Kong
Government can make to achieving a satisfactory
settlement, and for this it would need about 10 years.
I agree.
SECKET
ACLIPSE
4.
5.
So I suggest our strategy should be
to delay definitive negotiations on Hong Kong's
future because:
a) we are not likely to get a worse answer
in 10 or 15 years time than now and we
might get a better one; and
b) Hong Kong can be developed meanwhile
up to standards that will give it a better
chance of retaining a continuing special
status in China and so preserve the British
stake, discharge our obligations to the
inhabitants, and avoid the humiliation
of an unsatisfactory withdrawal.
So much for long term strategy, and I now turn
to tactics over Hong Kong in the present dialogue.
Bargaining position on Hong Kong
6.
We
We obviously must have some bargaining
position or the colony would not still exist.
have ample evidence of instructions from Peking