Telecommunications Administration of Shanghai, 34 Nanking Road
(Eastern),
Shanghai,
Peoples Republic of China
+
Commercial Counsellor's Office,
Office of the British Chargò d'Affaires,'
5 Kuang Hua Lu,
1
Chier Kuo Man Wai,
Peking.
Peoples Republic of China.
Commercial Counsellor
+
Office of the Chargé d'Affaires
of the Peoples Republic of China,
G Gloucester Gate,
Regents Park,
London, N.W.1.
י
Mr. Wilfred Moore,
F. & C.O...
67B 1st Floor,
Gt. George Street,
London SW1A 2AH
The Secretary,
Sino British Trade Council
25 Queen Anne's Gate,
London, S.W.1.
The General Manager, Cable & Wireless Ltd.,. г.0. Box 597,
llong Kong
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Sir L Han O ON
CONFIDENTIAL
FE Regu
19
BRIEFS ON HONG KONG/CHINA RELATIONS
DRIKFO
I attach three briefu prepared by Far Eastern
1. They ar91-
ON FEN 14
17
2.
Brief He 10
Brief He 115
Confrontation Prisonera
Chinese Government Representatio in Hong Kong
Brief Me 121 Hong Kong/China Oo mimisationa
(Background)
draft. Hong Ious Department approved the briefe in
11 April 1972
se Mr Vilford (with enclosures)
Er Lairi
CONFIDENTIAL
11 Ivana
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
18A
Far Eastern Department
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. At his reception on 7 April the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires spoke to me
about Mr Addis' talk with Chang Wen-chin on 27 March. He asked if we
were giving consideration to the point which had been made on an earlier
occasion by Chou En-lai to Mr Denson. I said that when Chang had raised
the matter H M Ambassador had asked what exactly such a representative
would be expected to do. Chang had replied that he did not know and I
said that so far as we were concerned we should have to wait for further
clarification. TO this Mr Pei said that there were unofficial
representatives of China in several places in Hong Kong he mentioned Li
Choh-chik in the Bank of China, whom he knows I know, and the NCNA - and
said that he thought it would be more convenient if the Chinese
Government could work through one official representative. Such a
representative would be from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I said
that it was interesting to have his ideas on what would be the task of
the representative for whom the Chinese Government had asked, but that
we must await the considered response of the MFA to Mr Addis question to
Chang Wen-chin.
-
-
2. I thought it interesting that Mr Pei should have mentioned the
representative as being an MFA man and his idea of the man's duties are
clearly that he would in effect be a sort of Consul General. This, if we
should in the fulness of time find ourselves forced to accept a
representative, would at least limit his ability to damage Hong Kong's
or our interest by becoming a focus for the Chinese people there or at
least for the more militant elements. It also suggests that if we have
eventually to have a representative if we were to insist on his calling
himself Consul General we could equally try to ensure that he was
assimilated as closely as possible to other Consuls General (and his
"foreigmees" would be emphasised far more than if he were to use the
title by which the MFA representative is known in other cities of China,
eg Shanghai),
3. I do not think this conversation alters the way we are setting about
considering this question. I would still like Mr Evans to review
carefully the past history of this subject, including the point raised
by Sir M MacLehose about a discrepancy in the record of Mr Denson's talk
with Chou En-lai and the guide lines drafted for the Governor before he
took up office. If this study is concluded before the Chinese revert to
the question with Mr Addis and give us details of what they want their
man to do, we can then put the matter to the Governor as we see it and
ask for his considered reactions which we do not yet have. We might then
discuss the matter with him when he comes home in May Sir L Mon son will
also have a chance to talk informally to him in Hong Kong next week.
4. If the Chinese do come back to us with a "job specification" I would
expect any negotiation of it to be detailed, complicated
SECRET
/and
SECRET
The
and lengthy (cf how long the exchange of Ambassadors took). Chinese
have, of course, in the case of Hong Kong where they are the demandeurs
means of putting pressure on us which were not open to us in the earlier
negotiation,
5. Incidentally Mr Pei made no mention of the confrontation prisoners in
his talk with me.
10 April 1972.
c.c. HKD
Sir L Monson
FS to Mr Royle PS
Mr Daunt
SECRET
हु
KM Wilford
CONFIDENTIAL
Brief No 12
BIR L MONSCA'S VISIT TO HONG KONG 14-22 APRIL
HONG KON//CHIFA O
HÒNG KON//CHINA COMMUNICATIONS (BACKGROUND)
1.
ree ways of improving communications between Hong Kong
and C ́áton are under consideration:
(1) The establishment of an improved telecommunication
link:
(11)
The rescheduling of train services,¿bo reduce present delays at the
frontier; and
(iii)
The establishment of a direct air service between
Hong Kong and Canton.
(718)
Telecommunications link
2.
A telecommunications link (consisting of a 12-channel VHF At the times
of the Spring and telephone link) already exists.
Autumn Canton Fairs this link is inadequate to cope with the traffic.
Cable and Wirless have been pressing for some time for
The Chinese made it clear the establishment of a telex link.
last year that they were not prepared to discuss the catter in advance
of an exchange of Ambassadors.
Mr Addis brosched the subjec
with the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 27 March.
He pointed out
that communications personnel in Hong Kong had already been in touch
with the Chinese authorities and that discussions should be started
between the people concerned in Hong Kong and Canton. The Foreign
Ministry official undertook to have the matter looked into. It is quite
possible that the Chinese may now respond
/positively.
CONFIDENTIAL
A
SECRET
3.
"he Governor's views remain as he expressed them in
paragraphs 8-16 of the paper on "Guidelines for the Governor-
Designate of Hong Kong" which he prepared before he left for Hong
Kong last Uctober (Hong Kong tel No 272). We have told him
f (PCO tel No 265 to Hong Kong) that his assessment of the implications
for Hong Kong of such representation remains the over-riding
consideration.
Our inclination is to play things long with the
Chinese; ie not to bring the subject up with them and to say if
they revert to it with us that we cannot respond until we know
what functions the Chinese would like an official representative
to have.
Line to Take
4.
Toss the Governor think that these are the right tactics?
What are his views on how we should play our hand when, as we must
assume they will, the Chinese define the functions they have in
mind?
Far Eastern Department
11 April 1972
SECRET
SECRET
BIR L MONGON'S VISIT TO HONG KONG 14-22 AFRIL
Brief No 11
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Background
1.
During Mr Addis's call on the Head of the Western European and American
Department on 27 March, the latter brought up the subject of official
Chinese representation in Hong Kong (Feking
He reminded Mr Addi a
A, tel No 245 and paragraph 19 of the record).
C
that Chou En-lai had raised the subject with Mr Denson in March
1971. On that occasion (according to Chang Wen-chin), Chou En-lai
had asked whether it would be possible to send an official Chinese
representative to Hong Kong. What was the British Government's
reaction to Chou En-lai's proposals? In response to a question
from Mr Addis Chang said he would have to find out what functions
it was envisaged that an official representative should have.
2.
According to Mr Denson's record of his conversation with
Chou En-lai, Chou merely spoke of the illogic of our position in
maintaining a Consulate in Taiwan when the Chinese Government had
no official representative in Hong Kong. However, the account of
the interview distributed by the Chinese to leading Communists in
Hong Kong fave much greater prominence to the subject. Mr Addis'
views are set out in Feking tel No 251. Mr Addis recognises that
the next move is up to the Chinese, but expresses the hope that we can
consider carefully whether the eventual response from Peking
contains the elements of a negotiable arrangement.
SECRET
13.
'
CONFIDENTIAL
positively.
(There has already been on significant development: -
a through telephone link between Hong Kong and Peking was opened
in mid February.)
Train Services
3. On the Hong Kong side there already exists a regular (roughly
hourly) service to the frontier. The present schedule on the
Chinese side is thoroughly inconvenient to passengers, There is
usually only one daily passenger service each way. The Embassy
in Peking may wish to raise, at some stage, the possibility of an
improvement in this service. There is no urgency about this.
The Governog, has suggested that, if and when the subject is taken
up, it should be discussed on a technical basis between the railway
managers on the two sides.
Air Link
4.
The Governor believes that a Hong Kong/Cgaton air service
would be of much greater potential convenience to both Hong Kong
and China than any improvement in the train service. Mr Addis
discussed the idea with the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 27 March.
The Chinese official responded positively to the suggestion, implying
that the exchange of Ambassadors had changed the situation. Previous
proposals for a link, he said, could not be seriously considered
because of political obstacles. The Embassy will pursue the subject
with the Chinese airline authorities. The Hong Kong sir authorities
will obviously have to be involved in any discussions,
Far Eastern Department
11 April 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
1
DIS' THEETING
EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF TIR ADDIS
DITH
THE DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND ATTERICAN DEPARTMENT
"
27 MARCH
direat nir link could be set up it would greatly freilit te trovel for
vi iborn. How long would it toko t: fly tho distance? fíe Adis said that
they thought about half-an-hour and that he would follow Chis question
ur. La Obang said that he would have it followed up too.
19. A related question, Mr Chang said, erose from when in Korch 1971
frnier Chou in-lai had received Ir Denon end discussed r:lations between
their two acumtrier. He had rrised the old question that o cọng the meny
affairs which involved the llong Kong; authoritis in Shin Bone wore tken
up with the centrel Government and some with the local authorities. This
atote of affairs was nol convenient Ironier Chou had roked whether it
would be possible to nond on official representative to llong, Kong.
What was the Nitish relation? Nr. 2Judo ooi' that he would have 10 find
cut. Jie would be glad to mako enquiries. Chong neil that this was an
old question but a malter now la b boken up in the light of the now
relations. betw on the two coun rien, which were now moving forward. US
Aig naked whet Junations for the official the Chinese Gaveînions ned in
Lind in making this proposal. lin Cheng replied but his inpression who
that the original proposal wun for the 0. ingoo Ministry of for...ága A
frizo to send a representative to long Kong. He would love to find out
vhnt Auctions it was envionged that he should hove,
+
ח
7
20. lip Adia onid that he had ono other polul to raise. The ans87 would
quite odun by sending a note to the Mill try of Foreign Aff ira about
claim orising from Gov ennent mi eserci ̈1 property teken over in reenɩ
geyre by th: Gaineso authori`ies. › 21 la kro puzz to plnue the British
Government's position on rocord. Bo did not think that there would be
any need for di cunsiong âu dotnil.
21.
Hr Addis enid he bed now come to the end of his list. Chu orid that he
had rai.cd quite a large number of questions. All 1-10 #11 good ones and
there Wers gf und3 for onsideřetion in 11 of them. They would orch bo
dooll with and bat'led onɑ by ona.
ir A In said Uhrk bo thou, ht it was an excellon' ide to discuss suci.
problems in e giural way and then follow than up in d.tail later. Orde
agr ed aud nai that some of them clearly nooded to bo di cu sen vltà the
Departaɛnto conc road. If obstacles arose in such discu elong họ and the
Albanador could meet again to review thu me
!
CONFIDENTIAL
D
loss of face are minimised
of the Colony.
-
consistent with the security
7. I deal below briefly with the principal subjects which
have been brought to my attention during this period of
briefing.
8.
Chinese Representation in Hong Kong
Unless and until we are prepared to contemplate
changing the status of Hong Kong, the golden rule should
be to have the minimum of contact with the Chinese about
it which necessity requires.
9.
Necessity requires:
(a) arrangements about the practical local things
listed in Mr Wilford's minute. These are all
handled locally through tolerably well-established,
if diverse, channels. In so far as these channels
from time to time do not cope with specific problems,
it is usually the problems or the prevailing
Chinese mood which causes the trouble rather than
the channel. So far as I am aware, the Chinese
have never complained that their interests suffer
from the channels they are obliged to use;
(b) contacts with the Chinese Mission in London and
with the MFA in Peking about matters of principle
and policy or about local matters which local
Hong Kong channels are unable to deal with for
one reason or another.
10. This balancing of contacte between semi- or unofficial
/tuveaux
3. CONFIDENTIAL
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1
T
I
tuveaux in Hong Kong and official exchanges. in London
and Peking is the traditional method. To work this system
most arrangements must be dealt with on the local Hong
Hong nets, both because this is common-sense, and because
otherwise our exchanges with the Chinese in London and
Peking would become over-loaded with Hong Kong affairs and
the latter would become too vulnerable to ephemeral:
political pressures in China.
But
11. The system just works enough to be supportable.
it does look very odd indeed, and it is hard to justify
logically our refusal to recognise an official Chinese
Representative in Hong Kong through whose office all this
business could pass. Particularly since in practice most
business already is conducted by offices in the Bank of
China building under the overall direction of Leung Wai-lam,
the holder of a diplomatic passport. I do, however, agree
with Mr Morgan that this is something which we must resist.
12. A Chinese Representative in Hong Kong might just be
acceptable if the relationship between Hong Kong and China
was defined and agreed. But without this there can be
no limit to what he could dlaim as his legitimate sphere of
activity, or to what his objectives might be, or to what
Communists would expect of him. It would be intolerable
for a Chinese Representative in Hong Kong to adopt a low
posture and, in any case, the Communist cadrea would not
/allow
L
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
..
:
+
allow him to do so, On the other hand, if he adopted a
high posture he would amount to an alternative governor
and sooner or later a trial of strength would occur.
Incidentally he would be a sitting duck for any agent
provocateur with a gun or bomb.
13. So far the Chinese Government has never pressed for
an official representative though they have made
occasional references to the possibility. The last one,
by Chou En-lai, in March, was typical. He did not ask
for an official representative in Hong Kong but in an
exchange about Taiwan said it was illogical for us to
maintain the Consulate in Tamsui when the Chinese did
not have a Representative in Hong Kong. But the local
Communists in Hong Kong have been encouraged to claim
in private that representation is now a major Chinese
objective.
14. For my part, I think it arguable that Peking is
fully aware of the situation described in paragraph 8,
and will not push a demand for Representation to the
limit unless and until a decision has been taken gradually
to change the status of the Colony. In this case official
representation would be a logical first step.
15. So I think that so long as we see no advantage in negotiating about
the future of the Colony, we must stick to the present system of
contacts and communications and
1
1
5.
CONFIDENTIAL
!
/stand
I
1
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1
stand firm against, or better still ignore, any half-
hearted moves by the Chinese to alter it. If the Chinese
started to press really hard we would have to reconsider
in the light of what we believed the implications of the
pressure were.
16. I have asked the Political Adviser in Hong Kong to be
ready to advise me, on my arrival, whether there is some
small gesture I could make to Leung Wai-lam, the Head of
NONA, which would be seen as a concession but would not
advance his position to an extent that would alarm the
Hong Kong establishment. Unfortunately, he has the reputa-
tion of being an implacable enemy of the Hong Kong
Government and I fear that little would be gained, and
much might be lost, by opening up a personal if unofficial
dialogue with him.
Confrontation prisoners
17. Chou En-lai has picked this out as the major item of
interest to him in Hong Kong at present. In view of the
numbers released since he spoke to Mr Denson for the time
being we can point to a generous response. But it appears
from Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's letter of 13 September that
no further releases are likely in 1972 under present criteria
or procedures. My present inclination is not to accept
thie
as failure to maintain momentum on this issue might
prejudice my entire governorship with Peking with all that
this would imply.
18. I realise the delicacy of this issue, particularly vis-
/a-vie
6.
CONFIDENTIAL
F
Mr. Evans
(FED)
SECRET
16
1. Mr. Royle has seen Peking telegram No. 251- of 29 March on the
subject of Chinese Government representation in Hong Kong. He has
commented:-
"I believe it would be very dangerous to allow official Chinese
representation in Hong Kong. No-one can foretell the future and a
Chinese representative might well become a focus for anti-British
feeling and in times of trouble become a rival to the Governor. He will
inevitably emerge as a powerful and influential figure.
"I cannot agree with paras. 4 and 7. I doubt if a refusal would have a
bad effect on Sino-British relations. If a Chinese representative had
been in Hong Kong during the '67' troubles the position of the
10
Colonial Government might have become untenable. I note that Sir Murray
MacLehose also does not appear to accept the Ambassador's views."
Copied to:
Mr. Laird Mr. Wilford
Much Fans
M. F. Forrester 4 April, 1972
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
SECRET
if
FM HONG KONG 328438Z
PECRET
FER 3/2.2
TO ROUTINE FCC TELNO 272 OF 30 MARCH INFO| PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 251 TO YOU.
12
OP COPY
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
MY VIEWS WERE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 16 OF PAPER QUOTE C UNQUOTE IN
THE QUOTE GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNOR DESIGNATE
UNQUOTE DRAWN UP BEFORE I LEFT LONDON. I WOULD PREFER TO DEFER FURTHER
COMMENT UNTIL I SEE YOUR OWN REACTIONS.
2. 1 WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE FULL RECORD AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH THE ISSUE WAS RAISED. THERE IS A CURIOUS DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN THE MFA'S VERSION OF WHAT CHOU SAID AND JOHN DENSON'S RECORD. AS
RECORDED CHOU'S POINT WAS ONLY OUR ILLOGIC IN WISHING TO RETAIN A
CONSULATE IN TAIWAN WHEN THE C.P.G. HAD NO REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG,
IF DENSON'S RECOLLECTION IS CORRECT
THE DISCREPANCY IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE.
3. I PRESUME IT IS REALISED BY ALL CONCERNED THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL
WERE LEAKED DELIBERATELY OR INADVERTENTLY IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST
SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS HERE. I DO TRUST THEREFORE THAT SPECIAL
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO SECURE THE INFORMATION THAT THIS
APPROACH HAS BEEN MADE.
MACLEHOSE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST &
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
PCD
لأمن
N AM D POD PSD CONS D IRD NEWS D
SECRET
.
CYPHER CAT. A
IKING 20053eZ
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG
AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
1. DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SIFO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED THE
QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH DENSON 14
MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS AFFECTING
RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS
VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS STATE OF
AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT
WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMERT'S REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. !
REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID
THAT THIS WAS AN OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN
THE LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE
ENVISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS
THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HỌNG KONG. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT
EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE ENVISAGED.
ADDIS
FIL
LES
FED
HKD
P & C D
X AX D
PS
PS TO FUS
YR WILFORD
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
ה
·
CYPHER CAT. A
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C
LKING 293145Z
1
SECRET
OF
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 251 03 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR
GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON AND
AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM THAT IT
WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE TO EYE. 1 HOPE HE
WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG,
MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN
MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF
HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CANNOT EVOLVE
SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT_AT_EACH_STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS
TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED.
CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY
ON NORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF
A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG HOW THAN AT ANY OTHER
TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD DE MIKWARD IF MADE
LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR SILATERAL RELATIONS
IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON