York we had the minimum of contact necessary with the Nationalist
representative at the United Nations but otherwise did not give the
Nationalists or their representatives any recognition whatever. Mr. Huan
remained unconvinced.
6. As regards Hong Kong, Mr. Huan said that the Chinese were very
dissatisfied with the attitude of the Hong Kong Government towards
themselves
19026-34 232-14
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and cited the " Kashmir Princess "case, the riots of 1956 and the
alleged "official reception" given by Sir A. Grantham to Nationalist
delegations. He said that the Chinese Government were anxious to
"co-exist" with Hong Kong and to improve relations with the Hong Kong
authorities and to this end wanted a through train service between Hong
Kong and Canton (for which he alleged that his Government had made
further proposals to the Hong Kong authorities) and representation in
Hong Kong. They believed that the latter would be beneficial and not the
reverse.
7. I said that I should be grateful if Mr. Huan would inform his
Government that, despite the differences between us, we sincerely wished
to improve relations. Despite the difference of our political systems
there were many potential points of sympathy between this country and
China. Onu must, however, be patient and proceed slowly. It was
important to recognise the mutual desire for improvement. 8. Mr. Huan
replied that the Chinese Government also certainly wished to improve
relations. But the question of responsibility cut both ways. He had been
very disappointed during his stay in this country (and he followed the
English Press and proceedings in Parliament fairly closely) to find that
China was almost universally regarded as a potential aggressor or some
sort of bogey-man. It was up to us also to reduce recriminations.
9. Mr. Huan agreed, however, that greater use could profitably be made
of contact through official channels.
10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at
Washington, the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in
South-East Asia at Singapore. Her Majesty's Consul at Tamsui and the
Secretary of State for the Colonies (for transmission to the Governor of
Hong Kong).
I am, &c.
SELWYN LLOYD.
AIDE-MÉMOIRE
The statement on Anglo-Chinese relations made by Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr.
Erroll has been given careful consideration by Her Majesty's Government.
It is apparent from that and other statements, such as that made to the
retiring Indian Ambassador at Peking, that the Chinese Government are
under some misapprehension regarding Her Majesty's Government's policies
in certain respects, and even in one or two cases misinformal on matters
of fact. Moreover, from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government
the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the United Kingdom has in
some respects been far from satisfactory. I agree with Mr. Chou Enlai
that frank discussion is the only way of removing misunderstandings and
therefore welcome the opportunity of explaining Her Majesty's
Government's point of view to the Chargé d'Affaires, with the request
that he should convey the substance of my remarks both to Mr. Chen Yi
and to Mr. Chou En-lai himself. Indeed it is a matter of regret to Her
Majesty's Government that the Chinese Government make so little use of
the normal diplomatic channels provided by the Charge's own Mission in
London and the Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking. The
officials concerned on both sides are specially qualified for such
exchanges, and more contacts between them and the Governments to which
they are accredited might help to clear up misunderstandings at an early
stage.
2. The suggestion that Her Majesty's Government favour a "Two Chinas "
policy is one of a number of views apparently held by the Chinese
Government but based on a misapprehension.
Her Majesty's Government recognise only the Government of the People's
Republic as the Government of China. They do not recognise the
Nationalist authorities as a Government nor do they have any diplomatic
relations with them. They accept that the Cairo Declaration of November
1943, was a statement of intention that Formosa was to be "restored to
the Republic of China " after the war. Since that declaration, however,
there has been a civil war in China and, rightly or wrongly, the world
is still deeply divided in its views as to the legitimate Government of
China. To attempt to precipitate a solution of the question in
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3
such circumstances seems to Her Majesty's Government to be both
premature and dangerous. For the time being, therefore, they favour a
détente and reduction of tension in the area.
This is not a "Two Chinas" policy. Nor have Her Majesty's Government
changed their policy. This was their attitude in 1950 and it is their
attitude now. They do not officially refer to the "Nationalist
Government. or the "Formosan Government "but to the "Nationalist
authorities," as the authorities who are in practice administering the
territory for the time being. The maintenance of a Consulate in Formosa
does not mean that diplomatic relations exist. Consuls are not
diplomatic representatives. In Tamsui, as at every other consular post,
the Consul must necessarily be in communication with the local
authorities in order to discharge his functions of protecting British
interests in the area. It is well-known in international practice that
the presence of a Consul in an area where the authorities are not
recognised as a Government does not of itself imply recognition as such
of these authorities.
It is not the British practice to interfere with the movements or
activities of private individuals. Ordinary Members of Parliament are
private individuals and, if they choose to visit Formosa, that is their
affair and does not imply that Her Majesty's Government recognise the
authorities in Formosa as a Government. Nor do trade relations with
Formosa imply recognition. The mere fact that a territory is not
recognised by Her Majesty's Government as a State does not, of itself,
prevent United Kingdom nationals from trading with persons or companies
in that territory. As has already been explained, cultural activities,
such as the appearance in London of a theatrical group from Formosa,
also, in British eyes, carry no political significance. The Chargé
d'Affaires is in a position to confirni this through his own knowledge
of this country.
There is, therefore, no foundation for Mr. Chou En-lai's statement on
February 10 to the National People's Congress that the "flirtation"
between Her Majesty's Government and the Nationalist authorities has
markedly increased.
3. It can be understood that from the Chinese point of view it must seem
anomalous that, having recognised the Chinese People's Government, Her
Majesty's Government do not positively support the seating of their
representatives at the United Nations. They would, however, ask the
Chinese Government to understand that they have to view this matter in
the general context of world affairs. They have never said that the
Chinese People's Republic should never be admitted. li his statements in
the General Committee and Plenary Sessions of the Assembly in September
last Sir Pierson Dixon said that this was a matter which the General
Assembly would one day have to consider. But China's intervention in the
Korean hostilities and her unwillingness over the years to contemplate a
settlement of the Korean question on the basis approved by the United
Nations have influenced the views of members of the United Nations. In
this connection Her Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction
the recent Chinese announcement on the withdrawal of their forces in
Korea. But the fact remains that over half of the...members of the
United Nations are at present opposed to seating the representatives of
the Chinese People's Republic. In these circumstances, to prese the
question of representation of the Chinese People's Republic would only
raise bitter controversy, would not contribute towards a solution and
would not, în Her Majesty's Government's view, be in the best interests
of the organisation itseif. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, so
far thought it in the general interest to avoid such controversy and for
this reason have voted for the moratorium resolutions. They cannot say
for how much longer they may think it right to do so. The state of
feeling in the United Nations and the state of the relations and
tensions between countries concerned must necessarily influence their
views. To the Chinese Government this may not appear to be a very
satisfactory attitude. For Her Majesty's Government's part, however, it
is a considered one and not taken lightly.
LL
+4
4. Her Majesty's Government consider that Hong Kong provides an
excellent opportunity for demonstrating the reality of co-existence.
They regard their functions in Hong Kong as being to administer the
territory in the interests of the inhabitants, the promotion of their
well-being and the preservation of law and order. They have no intention
of allowing Hong Kong to be used as a base for hostile activities
against China.. Subversive activities from whatever source are
resolutely put down whenever they are found and the Hong Kong Police
exercise complete impartiality in action against any persons attempting
to create disorder. The basis of the administration is the rule of law,
before which all parties are equal,
7
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applied on the basis of established evidence and true facts. The Chinese
Government, however, do not seem to recognise this position. They
present demands "without waiting, or apparently even trying, to
establish facts: as, for instance, in the matter of resettlement at Wong
Tai Sin. The Hong Kong Government's resettlement programme is a
humanitarian endeavour on a large scale for the benefit of people.who
have come from China to live in Hong Kong. The Chinese Government's
misrepresentation of this problem suggests either that they are
deliberately distorting the truth for some hostile motive, or that they
do not attempt to verify reports which reach them. Whatever the real
intention, such action has the effect of fostering ill-feeling against
the Hong Kong Government.
5. Mr. Chou En-lai referred specifically to the case of the through
train. If the Chinese Government have received accurate reports from
their negotiators in Canton, they must know that agreement on all
practical points was reached long ago and that the signature of an
agreement has been made impossible only because the Chinese have been
unwilling to accept the proposals of the Hong Kong Government for normal
immigration control. The Hong Kong Government have consistently
maintained their readiness to resume discussion of a through train
service, if the Chinese Government are able to put forward satisfactory
alternative suggestions to meet the Hong Kong Government's only too
obvious need to control the number of passengers bound for Hong Kong and
to respect that Government's refusal of admittance to any individual to
whom they may take exception. It is a distortion of the facts to blame
the Hong Kong Government for the breakdown of negotiations which could
be restarted at any time on the above basis.
6. Her Majesty's Government have reluctantly come to the conclusion that
the Chinese Government are not at present prepared to acknowledge the
legitimate point of view of the Hong Kong Government so as to co-operate
with that Government on the problems arising between them. It is in the
light of this unwelcome conclusion that, while they have given careful
consideration to the Chinese Government's suggestion for the appointment
of a representative in Hong Kong, they regret that the present climate
of relations does not appear to be suitable for such an appointment,
7. As already mentioned, Her Majesty's Government are disappointed that
the Chinese Government so often seem to prefer distorted or false
propaganda to the truth. In the case of the Hong Kong dockyard, for
example, a series of reports in the New China News Agency
English-language service (notably those published on November 30 and
January 3) have distorted official statements by the Hong Kong
authorities and have omitted any mention of the efforts that the latter
are making to assist in finding employment for discharged workers. This
could be construed as incitement to the dockyard workers not to accept
the opportunities available to them for finding new employment, to the
detriment of their wellare and that of their families.
8. On wider international questions, such, for example, as disarmament,
Her Majesty's Government regret that their and Western policies
generally are so consistently misrepresented on the Chinese side and
that the Chinese Government, again without any apparent attempt to
establish the facts, so readily support the claims and statements made
by others against Her Majesty's Government, as recently, for example, in
the case of the Yemen. Such an attitude, so consistently adopted, can
only lead Her Majesty's Government to conclude that the Chinese
Government are less than sincere in their expressed desire for improved
relations.
9. For their part Her Majesty's Government heartily endorse the
principic of peaceful co-existence. They consider, however, that, to
develop as they hope. the concept must be given a positive meaning. It
must include not only the absence of war, vital as this is, but also a
genuine attempt at mutual understanding. It is this that unfortunately
seems to them to be lacking on the Chinese side, and it is against this
background that the settlement of Anglo-Chinese problems and of some of
the major international questions which concern China have become so
difficult. Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that it will be
possible to promote better understanding. They welcome the development
of commercial relations and hope the increasing contacts between the two
countries will also play a useful part. They trust that the Chinese
Government for their part will seek more opportunities for establishing
facts and for frank discussion through official channels.
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}
I
I
EXTRACT OF RELORD * MR HAROLD WILSON'S TALK WITH CHOU EN-LAI
2
25 FER 1958
It is today still inconvenient for the United States to come out in the
open and do it officially, so the way it adopts is to create "two
Chinas" by manipulating behind the screon ccrtain people in the British
and the Japanese Governments who appear in the foreground to create such
a situation. Not only the Government and the people of new China are
against "wo Chinas," the poople of Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek/are also
against it. It is the aim of the United States to establish first a
situation of "two Chinas" ghd ask us to accept it. If we accept it, the
United States would then be able to compel Chiang Kai-shek to accept it
too. I wish to tell our British friends, if Britain should help the
United States in creating "two/Chinas" it would hurt the feelings of the
Chinese people. We absolutely cernot agree to have China enter the
Security Council, with Chiang Kai-shek romaining in the United Natiors.
Wo will not participate in an international organization or conference
if hiang Kai-shek's representatives are there. We did not go to the 1956
01ympic Games because Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were there,
Last year
ve withdrew from the International Red Cross Conference on the last day
of the session when Chiang Kai-shok's representatives came/in. Wo
shoolutely cannot allow such a situation to arisé. If we do, it would be
tantamount to legalizing United States occupation of Taiwan. Any
government treating us in this way is unfriendly, for that means to
sráit China, just like to separate Wales from Britain. Honce I should
like to express the hope that Britain will not follow the United States
in creating "two Chinas". Otherwise, it will hurt the feelings of the
Chinese peoplo. We are convinced that Taiwan will certainly come back to
China one day.
Kestoration
(3) The question of Hong Kong. I received Sir Grantham, former Governor
of Hong Kông, when he visited Peking, Mr. Trevelyan, then British Charge
d'Affaires, was also present. I expressed the hope for improving the
relations between the mainland and Hong Kong, and 8ir Granthan agrecd.
I put forth several proposals: (A) Restoration of through traffic
between Canton and Kouloon. Agreement has now been reached on all
technical matters and the question of controlling the number of persons
travelling both ways can also be solved by a gentlemen's agreement. But
still the Hong Kong authorities do not agree to restore through traffic.
(B) Appointment of à Chinese government representative in Hong Kong.
China has state enterprises, banks and other
1
-3-
properties in Hong Kong, with nearly 1,000 employees, let alone the fact
that over 90 per cent of the Hong Kong population is Chinese. Wo have
many business mattera on which contacts have to be made with the Hong
Kong authorities. It is reasonable that there should be a Chinose
Government representative thero. Thore are only 1,000 Americans in Hong
Kong, and the United States has à consulate with a staff of more than
100. Yet we are only represented by reportera of the Hoinhua News
Agency. this ridiculous ?
Ian't
Britain has a factory, a number of shops and several scores of British
nationala in Shanghai, and with our approval there is a representative
of the Office of the British Charge d'Affaires thora. China has so many
enterprises in Hong Kong with the number of employecs alone maning up to
1,000 and yet we have no reprosen- tative there. We have sent diplomatic
documents on this mattor to the British Government, but no reply has
boen received in the past two years and more. This is something unusual
in the history of British diplomacy.
We wish to improve relations with Hong Kong. But under the pressure of
the United States, the Hong Kong authorities and the British Government
have not agrecd to do so.
(4) the question of trade embargo, Sino-British trado has a long
history, and it should now be placed on a new basis of equality and
mutual benefit. But if the embargo is not wholly lifted, equality and
mutual benefit will be out of the question. For instance, Britain sells
us motor care and tractors, but pot gasoline and dicsol 011. Then what
is the use of buying these vehicles ↑ Again, wo want to buy ships, but
ships are on the embargo 11at. Not long ago, when the Chinese Economic
and Technical Mission visited Britain, they saw some machinery we wished
to buy, but 95 per cent of them are on the embargo list. It should be
pointed but that the embargo cannot prevont the construction 92 China.
What we cannot buy from Japan, Britain and West Gerzy, can be bought
from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Morcover, we are
now gradually able to produce ourselves some of the articles. The
process may be somewhat slow, but we will catch up.
Prade is beneficial to both sides. We stand for peaceful coexistence,
friendly intercourse, and trade
dotut
GA, 4
Ix100-2/26-A1493)
Filc Nof. TS. 2/1126/50
SAVINGRAM
To the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
www.
Com. Gen, Sing-pore./// Washington.
39
CHIES REGISTRAR'S OFFICE
From the Governor, Hong Kong.
Date
19th Hoverbor, 1957.
22 NOV 1957
STRY:
No. 2065
a Hot 1957
J
VAL OFFICES & CAB
F190316
My telegram No. 986 (âct repeated to other addresses); Chinese
Representation in Houg Kong.
F1903/6
II.1. Charge d'affaires baking's telogram Ko. 535 to the Foreign Office
does not cur to raise any fresh arguments in favour of the acceptance of
a reprosentative of the Chinese liinistry of Foreign Affairs in Helg
Kong other then is termes improvement such an act on to art of llor
Majesty's Governs in the United Kingdow night bring to Anglo-Chinese
relations til oxouse which might be offered, if the reprosentative
should quently prove objectionabio, for postponing a settlement of the
major problem of Anglo-Chinoso diplomatic relations.
2.
The basic position stated in ry savingrem No. 400 of 1770 romains
unchangod. Hy stron: opposition to a rosidont re, Pusentativ may be
summarised as follows:-
Fr1044/1
(a) Frosh impetus would be given to United Front activity in the
Colony. I have reatedly (most recently in my dogpatch 1.0. 1672 of
September 16tii) stated that the policy of the ChinesO Govornment
towards H...... in recent years is to build up an United Front allying
innocuous non-Communist olor:ents in tho Colony with pro-Corist
clononts, who would thus be lont aura of respectability. 114 the samo
timo the Chinees Goval. appear to have hope of achieving a state of
affairs in vlich Hong Kong Govornmant will bo sufficiently intimidated
to rein. from action unwelcome to 1's Chinese Govorm:ont. Both of OS.
moasures appear directly designed to facilitate the ultimate objective
of the Chinese Government, which is to ro-incorpora- tion of Hong Kong
with China, The appointment of a quesi diplomatic representative could
help the Chinese to preparo tho ground for this devolor Car Lottor than
the presont repre- sontatives of moro specialized Chinose Government
2gencies or their local follow-tiavolling allics are able to do,
.L
(b) It would have a deplorable effect upon the morale of the grout
majority of Chineso in iho Colony, who would be given tho impression
that Grout Britain was making & first 120vo in thic direction of selling
them out. Local Chinese would regard it as evidence that il,.G. in the
United Kingdom wore unable or unwilling to resist pressure from Cornist
China. fonoo-sitters would fool that the tino hud colo to throw their
lot with the Communists; and local pressure promis, which the Communist
have tried to creat in order to stir up agitution against the Government
in matters of domestic policy, would be given fresh encourtigoment.
(0)
·
Many moro
It would convey the improɛ ion to the United States Government and to
Commonwealth and ot friendly countrics that we were on the road to
retrout from Hong Kong. In matters of defence policy this might well tum
the scale against any fira quarentce of military support.
(d) Thore would bo no end to tie claims of the roprosentative to what
constituted his functions. Even if, na hr, hilson ivyliez intorrorunco
by the roprusinitivo in intovnal matters word to hu used as a pretext
for declining any further political concessita to the Chinese, ity well
be the case that the stato of tena.. would become such ::. tote it
necessary for my Buccussor 29 oxpel the Chinese representativo if he
attempted to interfuro, goll ho might, in solico - Jejal mattors
involving Chines
ket wit Bríkum sågsels. An expelled jestatične would stotaing bee
intial refusal t
·
D
SAVINGRAM
STCRET
To the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
H
+
From the Governor, Hong Kong.
Date
No.
to admit a feprosenttservo,
(o) Th:o representative would become a prins targot for K., T. and other
anti-
Communist activitios in the Colony, It would for examplo be impossiblo
to allow him to soo for himself that the Chinese Government had got
their facts wrong in a dispute, c.g. about rosettlement, without risking
a serious disturbance. The security of the representativo's porson would
be a constant worry and responsibility.
+- 1963/6
I.L
3.
Far
For all these reasons the establishment of a representative in Hong Kong
would be calculated to increase rather than to diminish tension between
the United Kingdom and China over liong Kong questions. from lessening
the source of friction, the friction- creating bodies would be brought
into closer contact. Matters which can now be confined to diplomatic and
propaganda exchanges in Peking and London would becoLIC conflicts taking
place within this Colony, in addition to providing still more serious
grounds for diplomatic and propaganda exchanges.
As
4.
I am not impressed by the argument that trade between the United Kingdom
and China might in some way be increased by the concession of accepting
a represent- utive here. Mir, hilson admits that the Chinese will
probably buy from the United Kingdom anything that they really must buy
whatever the political atmosphere. I have already argued, it would by no
means necessarily follow that the political atmosphere would be
improved. It would be a strange irony if Great Britain, having acquired
Hong Kong for the purpose of facilitating trade with China, were after
all these years to begin the process of handing liong Kong back in the
hope that it might bring to British Merchants a few extra contracts.
5.
There remains the question of whether a reply
As the should be given and what that reply should be, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs pointed out in reply to Mr. Younger's supplementary
question on June 6th "it was about four years after the Labour
Government recognised them that the Chinese Government decided to But if
we do not send a Charge d'Affaires to London". wish to follow Chinese
precedents in this respect, I would suggest that there is an alternative
reply to the negative suggested in paragraph 2 of Lir. Wilson's telegram
19.535. That would be to link the question of Chinese representation in
Hong Kong with the whole question of the exchange of Abassudors and
Chinese membership of the United Nations, If we can at least secure a
post- ponement until such time as China has become internationally
accepted, then I think that we will have postponed our retreat until it
has become much less easy to resist,
The position of the than it would appear to be today. United States in
regard to China is of course the crux of the matter. I would, however,
recommend that if this alternative suggestion were to be accepted by
lier Majesty's Government, it would be so vorded as not to imply a
definite commitment contingent upon the exchange of Ambassadors, but
rather that the Chinese request could not be accepted at present and
that it would be given fresh consideration when relations between our
two countrics have been nommlized.
+ -
1
Cypher/OTP
Mr. Wilson
No. 535
November 2, 1957
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1908/6 F
FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
JF
FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
R.
D. 12.20 p.m. November 2,1957 4.59 p.m. November 2,1957
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 535 of November 2, Repeated for
information to Hong Kong
and Saving to
Singapore and Washington
✓ Flag H
My telegram No. 526 paragraph 6: Chinese Representation at Hong Kong.
In the light of Chou En-lai's strong representations it would seem very
difficult to Jelay some definite reply much longer.
If we do so we are likely to be faced with publicity from the Chinese
side designed to force an answer out of us and you will, no doubt, wish
to bear in mind the terms of your reply to a Parliamentary Question on
this subject by Mr. Younger of June 6, 1956 (your telegram No. 443, 1956
to Peking).
FC
Plagi
100/76.2
fensifiya
t
+
2. If we give a negative reply to the Chinese, it will equally seen
difficult to conceal our true reason for refusing to take what they
regard as a normal step to meet their reasonable wishes. If it were not
for their general hostility we could surely not deny them official
representation in a place where other Powers are officially represented
and they themselves have such special legitimate interests. Chou En-lai
has asked for a frank answer and we might say frankly that the necessary
political confidence for this further step does not exist, basing
ourselves on general Chinese propaganda about United Kingdom policies
and on the nature of their communications with us about Hong Kong
affairs which has been very far from helpful (ny telegram No. 533).
Rag M
3. I hope, however, that the possibility of giving a more positive
answer to the Chinese will be very seriously considered. The situation
has considerably changed since the matter was last 'considered (your
telegram to Peking No. 41 Saving of 1956 is the last word on the
subject). In brief, while trade relations show signs of improvement and
are of more interest to us than to China, political relations, which are
of more interest to China than to us, are stagnating. I do not wish to
argue here the casc for taking what steps lie within our power for
improving political relations /with
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Poking telegram No. 535 to For.ign Office
2.
with China, though I think it a powerful one. If we do not take any such
steps I do not anticipate disastrous results in the political field,
c.g. major trouble from the Chinese Government in Hong Kong itself. If,
however, we stand pat on our present position about Chinese
representation in Hong Kong, I think that the Chinese Govern-
In his ment may quite possibly react in the sphere of trado. interview
with Mr. Erroll, Chou En-lai linked the possibilities of trade progress
with the improvement of our political relations. In the present, and for
some time in the future, it seems that it is we who are anxious to sell,
rather than the Chinese who are anxious or able to buy in any large
quantity, and that there are plenty of competitors from Western Europe
for the limited Chinese market. Admittedly, the Chinese are realists who
will probably buy anything that they really must buy from us whatever
the political atmosphere. If, however, we can make no political response
to Chou En-lai's exposition, the Chinese Government would, I think,
discriminato against British suppliers in all lines not essential to
them and would be ready openly anu with some apparent reasons to blame
us for the lack of progress in trade devolopment.
4.
I realise with regret the difficulties which the admission of a Chinese
representative might cause to the Governor of Hong Kong and he will, no
doubt, comment about the effect of such admission on Hong Kong morale. I
would, however, like to put forward certain considerations additional to
those advanced by my predecessor in this
Fe143/connexion (Peking telegrams Nos. 135 and 190 of 1956).
It is, I
think, admitted that the Chinese will chose their own time for heating
up Hong Kong issues to boiling point; that this time is probably not
yet; and that they now have plenty of means, even without a special
representative, of stirring up everything short of major trouble. It is,
I think, also fair to say that, in the light of their constant
agricultural difficulties and the repressive aspects of the
rectification campaign, Communist China is probably a less attractive
magnet to overseas Chinese at the moment than it has bean for some time.
If a Chinese Commissioner were seen to settle down in Hong Kong without
doing much substantial harm, might not the Chinese bogy lose some of its
terrors and might not moralc recover from the initial blow of his
appointment to at least its previous level? Finally, if a Chinese
Commissioner were obviously to cause serious additional trouble in Hong
Kong, this would provide us
/with
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+
CONFIDENTIAL
Pcking telegram No. 535 to Foreign Office
- 3 -
with ready reasons, if these were thought necessary, for not going
further towards meeting the political demands of the Chinese Government.
5. I hope that, in these circumstances, it may be thought advantageous
to meet the Chinese half way and in our own time on this admittedly
difficult question.
Foreign Office pass to Hong Kong as my telegram No. 222 and to Singapore
and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 44 and 163 Saving.
[Repeated Saving to Singapore and Washington and copy sent to Telegraph
Section 0.0. for repetition to Hong Kong.]
HEICHH
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+
+
J
Cypher/OTP
Mr. Wilson
30: 526
October 31, 1957.
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CONSONANTS I
+
FROM PEKING TO FORLIGE OFFICE
C151
151/143
FOREIGN OFFICE DIN
WHITEHALL, DISTRIBUZION
D: 11.55 a.. October 31, 1957. R: 6.03 p.m. October 31, 1957.
| Pangraphs
Addressed to Foreim Offico tolegren No. 525 of Cotcher 31, Repeated for
information to Hong Kong,
Washington,
Singapore.
Ky telegram Ko. 520:
Visit of Ir. Erroll,
Mr. Exroll and I were summoned at a few hour's notice to see the Prime
Minister on October 29. During the interview, which lasted
two-and-a-half hours, and was also attended by the Minister of Foreign
Trade, Chou Er-lai gave a full-socle rewiow
A full of Anglo-Chinese relations, both political and economic. record
will be sent by the next bag. The main political points are summarized
below, and economic matters are dealt with in ny telegram No. 523.
2.
The Two Chinos" Policy.
After opening roforencos to the embargo, for which please seo my
telegram No. 528, the Prime Minister, despite Hir, Erroll's reminder
that he had come to China chiefly to discuss questions of trade, said
that he would like a fran: talk on Sino-British relations, as a whole,
When he had met Hr. Eden at Geneva în 1954, he had expressed the hope
that they would gradually develop, Unfortunately, that had not happened,
Unnecessary difficulties had occurred over recognition. There had boon
now developments The British Govermont were
As he understood
in the British attitude to Taiwan, coming to recognize two Chinas
simultaneously. it, thoir intention was to establish Taiwan as a second
China with the aim of facilitating American recognition of the now
China,
3. The Prime Minister then solemnly asked lir. Erroll to convoy China's
views on this matter to Her Majesty's Governmont: Recognition was a
problem that was already solved.
It did not matter to China China could not be overthro./n,
The new
It was
whether American recognition ocme carly or late. impossible for Britain
to recognize Formosa, and from this basis to persuade the Americans to
recognize Communist China as one of
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/two Chinas.
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Peking telegram No: 526 to foreden Office.
two Chinas.
-2-
Taiwan's "independence" was simply a matter of American occupation and
China could not accept Taiwan as an
China could not independent entity under any name whatsoever.
take part in cny international function inside or outside the United
Nations in which there were representatives of two Chinas. China was not
like the two Koreas or to Germonies, which had It was one country, and
been split as a result of tho war.
The American,
Faiwan would eventually return to China. occupation of Taiwan did not
affect the devoloyment of friendly Sino-British relations but that would
be affected if Britain helpod Azerica to favour two Chinas.
Chou in-lai
Ir. Erroll emphasized that it was no part of Her Majesty's Government's
policy to create thro Chines. He would nevertheless convey the Prine
Minister's views to his Goverment. took Lote of this, but acted Kr.
Erroll to remind Her Majesty's Government that the Chinoso Goverment
regarded the British use of the term "Formosa Government" in reference
to the Taiwan authorities, as a means of "fabricating two Chinas."
Exchonse of Ambassadors enë këmission to the United Nations.
The United States It was not even a for India had put
5. The Prino Minister argued that it was mercly because of the lack of
agreement over the United Nations that Ambassadors had
Britain was in the embarrassing position of not been exchanged. being
the only Power which recognized the new China in Peking and
Could not Britain, like the old China at the United NationS, Horway and
Denmark, also nambers of N.A.T.0., vote against the United States on the
question of admission? had, after all, opposed Britain over Suez.
.question of voting for a Soviet rasolution, forward the latest
resolution on Chinose aâmission. said that this was a more difficult
question than the Prize Hinistor had represented, and that such an
action on Britain's part would cause great difficulties at the United
Nations. Kinister said that in that case Britain and China would have to
be content with Chargés d'Affaires.
For Yout.
Mr. Erroll
The Prizo
The Prime Minister asserted that in the past for years
He had had a long China had often tried to improve relations, talk two
years ago with the Governor of Hong Kong in the hope of
6.
+
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/doing co.
J
CONTEDENNIAL
Peking telegram No: 526 to Foreign Office.
doing so. But the question of through trains on the Canton- Ka/loɔn
lize, which he had then ruisod, had still not been solved. Again, he had
proposed in 1955 that the Chinese Government should send a
roprosentative to Hong Kong to havo direct contact with the cathorities
there, "just as the British kupi a man in Shanghai." But he had had no
answer. In the whole of British diplomatic history there could be very
few examples of such a dolay, Exitein ought to say that she meant
and give russons,
7.
The Prime Minister then turned to the case of the "Kashmir Princess",
saying that the Hong Long Government had never published a full account
of the accidout and had always given indefinite replies to the Chineso,
Sinco Chizase delegations were continually tunvolling through Hong Kong,
the Chineso wanted to maintain prɔNS relations with the Hong Kong
authorities on such matters. ic trc reformed, in familier terms to the
Sabre-Jet fighter which had roided China and then landed at Hong Kong,
and the "Pak Tang" (zy telegram No. 192 of October 12). All had involved
unfriendly behaviom' by the Hong Kong authorities. I intervened to say
that all these matters had been the subject of detailed correspondence
between my office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
communications from the latter gave the impression that they were not
arguing in any very factual spirit and that they would be certain to
opposз whatever arguments were put forward from our side. The Prize
Minister retcrted that the cases he had quoted wore all examples of
unfriendly action iritiated from the British side, and that China had
never been the first to be udendly. As far as Sino-British relations
were concerned, there was room for good work and improvemont.
8. The Primo Minister finally asked Mr. Enroll if he believed in
forceful co-existance, Mr. Ervoll raplied that he certainly did so, but
that both sides must renaber the foolings and interests of the other
sião. Who Primo Minister then romarked that China wanted peaceful
development, but equally was not afraid of war end would 21ght 12 the
United States wanted.
9. The interview endod with scao quite friendly sparring on the [eneral
political fate of the rightists in China, While Chou Er-lai spoke
seriously, especially on Hong Kong, he was never discoutoous and wes
ready to break up factual discussion periodically with joking
interludes.
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/10.
During the
1
:
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Peking teloftya No: 526 to Foreim Office.
10.
During the farewells the Prime Minister enquired with consern after the
health of Sir A. Eden and asked lir. Erroll to convey his good wishes to
Mr. Necmillan and to you, Sir.
Foreign Office plocso pass to Hong Kong, Washington and Singapore as my
telegrams Nos. 215, 38 and 162 respectively.
[Repeated to Washington and Singapore. Copy sent
sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office, for repetition to Hong Kong.]
IXXXX
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