Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW 1
Straw Richard,
Teim To Peking
Thi. He way to 515
Davies Erier.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATI N IN HONG KONG
R.E
575
1. When raising the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong with
the Ambassador last month Chang Wen-chin referred to it as an "old
question". Those of us who have dealt with the question previously
recollect something of its history and indeed the Ambassador himself has
a recollection of its going back to Nationalist days. But we can find
very little detail on file here.
2.
cince the question is clearly going to continue to raise its head from
time to time we should like to be better primed on the background. Have
you anything on file which you could copy to us, summarising the
histories both of this problem and of the related question of China's
view of the status of
Long Kong? If not, would it be possible for somebody in Research
Department to prepare a background paper covering both subjects?
Your Eve
Mulo2l.
E r fiorgan
cc AF Maddocks Esq
Hong Kong
RESTRICTED
PRIORITY
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REGISTRY ilo. 52
SECRET
TOP COPY
FM PEKING 850739Z
- 5 MAY 1972
SECRET
TEH 3
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 401 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
MY TELNO 28 TO HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1. AT THE
END OF MY MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY, AFTER I HAD GONE
THROUGH MY LIST OF POINTS TO PE RAISED, CHANG WEN-CHIN TURNED TO THE
QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE DID THIS IN A
RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CHANGING THE MOOD OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE
DISCUSSION WITH WHICH WE HAD DEALT WITH THE PREVIOUS POINTS. THERE WAS
NO HINT IN HIS MANNER THAT THIS COULD BE A DIFFICULT OR CONTENTIOUS
ISSUE BETWEEN US. 2. HE SAID THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED
THAT
IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE HANDLING OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING HONG KONG
AND OF RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA'' THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
WOULD LIKE TO SEND A SPECIAL COMMISSIONER** TO HONG KONG. I HAD ASKED
WHAT FUNCTIONS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND FOR SUCH AN OFFICIAL.
HE HAD NOW LOOKED UP OLD FILES AND FOUND THAT IN FEBRUARY 1956 THE
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION.
THE STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE WERE EXPLAINED QUITE
CLEARLY IN THESE PROPOSALS. IN 1958 THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE
HAD REPLIED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES WAS NOT RIGHT FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE MATTER HAD
THEREFORE BEEN SUSPENDED. THE SITUATION NOW WAS OF COURSE VERY DIFFERENT
FROM THAT IN 1958. MOREOVER BEFORE 1949 DURING THE TIME OF THE
KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT, THERE HAD BEEN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
IN HONG KONG, IT WAS ONLY AFTER 1949 THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCONTINUED. PAST
EXPERIENCE HAD THEREFORE SHOWN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN ORGAN OF
REPRESENTATION** WAS TO THE BENIFIT OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THERE WAS A
REAL NEED FOR SUCH A PRESENCE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER I WAS FAMILIAR
WITH THE DETAILS OF THE 1956 PROPOSAL.
**
SECRET
✅HE HOPED
T
SECRET
HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER IT AGAIN.
I SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL FROM LONDON AND
WE COULD THEN DISCUSS IT IN MORE DETAIL AT A LATER DATE. WAS THE CHINESE
VIEW THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 1956 SHOULD, IN
BROAD ESSENTIALS, BE MADE AGAIN HOW? CHANG REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT
THE PROPOSAL MADE THEN WAS A CONSIDERED ONE THE IDEA WAS ONE WHICH OUGHT
TO BE CONSIDERED. SINCE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN
THE PAST HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT APOUT
IT NOW. BASICALLY SPEAKING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WISHED FOR SOME KIND
OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT I SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMENT AT
THIS STAGE UNTIL I HAD LOOKED UP THE 1956 PROPOSAL. WE COULD THEN MEET
AGAIN AND HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION. WHAT
WE BOTH WANTED WAS AN ARRANGEMENT TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. CHANG AGREED AND
SAID THAT AFTER I HAD STUDIED THE PROPOSAL WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND
CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION ON THE SAME EXPLORATORY BASIS AS BEFORE, WITHOUT
COMMITMENT TO EITHER SIDE.
ADDIS
FILES
FED
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]
H K D
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS/MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
-2-
SECRET
COPIES TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE
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CYPHER CAT A
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REGISTRY No. 52
PEKING 650645Z
- 5 MAY 1972
RESTRICTED
Fest 3 Sri!
TOE F
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 399 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG
(FOR BCARFE) DTI ( FOR CRE4 AND WATTS AIR 1(1) B). MY TELEGRAMS NOS 240
AND 243 (NOT TO ALL):
HONG KONG
1.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH
WHEN I CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY CHANG REFERRED WITHOUT PROMPTING
TO OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR CIVIL AIR LINKS,
TELECOMUNICATIONS, AND IMPROVEMENT CF EXISTING LAND COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN HONG YONG AND CANTON, HE SAID THAT THESE WERE UNDER
CONSIDERATION BY THE CHINESE GOV- ERNMENT. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT
INCREASE OF TRAFFIC ON THE HONG KONG -CANTON ROUTE. THE NEED TO IMPROVE
COMMUNICATIONS WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BOTH SIDES.
2. I MENTIONED THE QUESTION OF A HONG KONG/CANTON AIR SHUTTLE SERVICE
AGAIN AT A SUBSEQUENT COURTESY CALL ON MA JEN-HUI, DEPUTY DIPECTOR OF
THE CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA ( SFE MIFT). HE DID NOT REFER
TO THIS IN HIS REPLY, BUT WAS CAREFUL NOT TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF EXTENDING BOAC'S HONG KONG SERVICES TO PEKING.
ADDIS
FILES
FED
AND
HKD COMS D MR WILFORD HR TURPIN
/REPENTED AS REQUESTED/
COPIES SENT TO MEI/
RESTRICTED
28
L
SECRET
♫ M Addis Esq CMG PEKING
3 May 1972
سیا
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. You may find it useful to have a copy of a memorandum which we have
prepared in the Department on the history of this problem.
2. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Arthur
Maddocks. I hope that he will correct us if he spots any errors of fact.
Are we right in saying that the Chinese did not mention the subject
between 1958 and 1971?
Eno 1
SECRET
RH Evans
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
26
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21
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Mr ford
Mr Loganj
Private Secretary
Mr. Royle
thinks that the
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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
Lord Bridges wrote to the Private Secretary on 27 April enquiring, in
relation to Hong Kong telegram No 31 to Peking, how this problem had
arisen in its current form and asking about our present view of the
Chinese request.
0.60-3/5
2. The Secretary of State minuted on Hong Kong telegram No 31: "I agree
with the Governor". Mr Royle commented: "I wholeheartedly agree with Sir
Murray MacLehose's wise advice".
3. We are now waiting for the Chinese to define the functions they would
like an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have. When they
do, which will no doubt be before long, we shall have to give the most
careful consideration to the terms of our response. In doing this 23 we
shall give full weight to Sir Murray MacLehose's views.
Mr Addis has indicated (Peking telegram No 28 to Hong Kong) that he is
content to rest on the arguments he set out in Peking telegram No 251
until we see how the Chinese frame their proposal.
4.
5.
I submit a draft reply to Lord Bridges's letter.
Hong Kong Department concur.
1 May 1972
cc Mr Laird
रिल
R.M. Erans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
سبا
wilfro
21v.
SECRET
PRIME
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MINISTER
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HK Dept for adricepil.
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FEAT
of Wilford
Patrick,
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Dear Patrick, 174
25
10 Downing Street Whitehall
27 April 1972
chinese went tic in Hong Kong
The Prime Minister has seen the recomendations made by Sir M. Maclehose
in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking, on this subject.
The full background is not known to lir. Heath but he has commented that
on the face of it, he is inclined to agree with the Governor's argument.
As the Prime Minister has not recently considered this question, I
should be grateful if the Department could explain how it has arisen in
its current form, and what view is at present taken of the requests made
by the Chinese
overnment.
3
your ere
Tom Bridges
P.H. Grattan, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GEORET
olemonts, and tho Kowloon Walled City.
3. Cantnata between lene Kons and Chian
(a) Status of China's Rarquemntation in the Colony
!
My Chou In-lai hinted during his mooting with ir Penson on
2 March that the Chinose would like como fora of official
ropresentation in the Colony. Phoro have been one or two
oubsequent indications confirming thio. It has not been mentiunod
at any otago in our negotiations for the oxaliango of Ambassadore.
It would bo vory difficult for us to accopt. It would give tho
Chinese enhacod status and increased opportunities to exert
in?lucnco in tho affairs of the Colony. It to in our interact
to continue to use the presont channels for communication with
the Chinoso authorition Whose aro, for cortain local matters,
botwoan the Tolitical Advisor and the low China Nowa Agoney in
Hong Kong, and, for other questiono, botwoon Mr Donson und tho
Ministry of Foreign Afiniro in Poking. Wo should avoid tho ung
of indirect channole, since they involve the risk of distortion
and indisèretion. Wormal communicationo botwoon the rolitical Advisor
and How China Fowa Agonoy ave writton or telephonio. the past there have
been mootings on noutral cround, or in o
recoption zoon in the Coverament off100s. Rocently howevor tho Folitical
Advisor recoivod the Now China Newa Agoncy representativo, at tho
laŝtor'a request, in hie offic0,
(b) Confxantation Driponera
From the point of view of Sino-Britioh relations our aim is to romove
this irritant as coon as possible,
In
Mio Chinone havo pado
it oloar that the quastion roaning a matter of major dundera, Thoy havo
howover not mačo the relonse of the rounining prisonera a condition in
the negotiations for an oxchange of Ambassadors.
-2. KEANIN
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loss of face are minimised consistent with the security
of the Colony.
7. I deal below briefly with the principal subjects which
have been brought to my attention during this period of
briefing.
8.
Chinese Representation in Hong Kong
Unless and until we are prepared to contemplate
changing the status of Hong Kong, the golden rule should
be to have the minimum of contact with the Chinese about
it which necessity requires.
9.
10.
Necessity requires:
(a)
arrangements about the practical local things
listed in Mr Wilford's minute. These are all
handled locally through tolerably well-established,
if diverse, channels. In so far as these channele
from time to time do not cope with specific problems,
it is usually the problems or the prevailing
Chinese mood which causes the trouble rather than
the channel. 80 far as I am aware, the Chinese
have never complained that their interests suffer
from the channels they are obliged to use;
(b) contacts with the Chinese Mission in London and
with the MFA in Peking about matters of principle
and policy or about local matters which local
Hong Kong channels are unable to deal with for
one reason or another.
This balancing of contacts between semi- or unofficial
/tuveaux
3.
CONFIDENTIAL
i
1
F
|
tuveaux in Hong Kong and official exchanges in London
and Peking is the traditional method. To work this system
most arrangements must be dealt with on the local Hong
Hong neta, both because this is common-sense, and because
otherwise our exchanges with the Chinese in London and
Peking would become over-loaded with Hong Kong affairs and
the latter would become too vulnerable to ephemeral
political pressures in China.
But
11.
The system just works enough to be supportable.
it does look very odd indeed, and it is hard to justify
logically our refusal to recognise an official Chinese
Representative in Hong Kong through whose office all this
business could pase. Particularly since in practice most
business already is conducted by offices in the Bank of
China building under the overall direction of Leung Wai-lam,
the holder of a diplomatic passport. I do, however, agree
with Mr Morgan that this is something which we must resist.
12. A Chinese Representative in Hong Kong night just be
acceptable if the relationship between Hong Kong and China
was defined and agreed. But without this there can be
no limit to what he could dlaim as his legitimate sphere of
activity, or to what his objections might be, or to what
Communiste would expect of him. It would be intolerable
for a Chinese Representative in Hong Kong to adopt a low
posture and, in any case, the Communist cadres would not
/allow
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
[
Γ
!
On the other hand, if he adopted a
allow him to do so. On the other hand
high posture he would amount to an alternative governor
and sooner or later a trial of strength would `occur.
Incidentally he would be a sitting duck for any agent
provocateur with a gun or bomb.
13. So far the Chinese Government has never pressed for
an official representative though they have made
occasional references to the possibility.
The last one,
by Chou En-lai, in March, was typical. He did not ask
for an official representative in Hong Kong but in an
exchange about Taiwan said it was illogical for us to
maintain the Consulate in Tamsul when the Chinese did
not have a Representative in Hong Kong, But the local
Communists in Hong Kong have been encouraged to claim
in private that representation is now a major Chinese
objective.
14. For my part, I think it arguable that Peking i8
fully aware of the situation described in paragraph 8,
and will not push a demand for Representation to the
limit unless and until a decision has been taken gradually
to change the status of the Colony. In this case official
representation would be a logical first step.
15. So I think that so long as we see no advantage in
negotiating about the future of the Colony, we must stick
to the present system of contacts and communications and
/stand
5. CONFIDENTIAL
+
stand firm againet, or better still ignore, any half-
hearted moves by the Chinese to alter it. If the Chinese
started to press really hard we would have to reconsider
in the light of what we believed the implications of the
pressure were.
16. I have asked the Political Adviser in Hong Kong to be
ready to advise me, on my arrival, whether there is some
L
small gesture I could make to Leung Wai-lam, the Head of
NCNA, which would be seen as a concession but would not
advance his position to an extent that would alarm the
Hong Kong establishment. Unfortunately, he has the reputa-
tion of being an implacable enemy of the Hong Kong
Government and I fear that little would be gained, and
much might be lost, by opening up a personal if unofficial
dialogue with him.
Confrontation prisoners
17. Chou En-lai has picked this out as the major item of
interest to him in Hong Kong at present. In view of the
numbers released since he spoke to Mr Denson for the time
being we can point to a generous response.
But it appears
from Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's letter of 13 September that
no further releases are likely in 1972 under present criteria
or procedures. My present inclination is not to accept
this, as failure to maintain momentum on this issue might
prejudice my entire governorship with Peking with all that
this would imply.
18.
I realise the delicacy of this issue, particularly vis-
/a-vie
6. CONFIDENTIAL
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CYPHER CAT, A
FM PEKING 287653Z
SECRET
SECRET
TO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 26 CF 28 APRIL
INFO F C G.
YOUR TEL NO.31:
1.
THANK YOU.
THE HAND WHEN THE
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THIS WILL HELP YE I THIS WILL HELP YE IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY
CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT,
"NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.
I SHALL
2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND YETHOD. THUS I
WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. PUT FOR THE TIME BEING
I AM CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL
NO. 251 TO F CO WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW
THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT
FY TRYING TO SIT TIGHT' WE MAY GET CURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE
WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET
AN EVOLVING SITUATION.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/ /COPIES SENT TO XO 10 DOWNING STREET/
FILES
FED
FAD
X AM D
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
COPIES TO
SIR P ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE
4
Mr. Evans (FED)
SECRET
1.
Mr. Royle has seen Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking about Chinese
representation in Hong Kong and has commented:-
"I wholeheartedly agree with Sir M. MacLehose's wise advice."
Copied to: Sir L. Monson
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Laird
Mail Voral
M. F. Forrester 26 April, 1972
SECRET
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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
- 1 MAY 1972
FEH 3/301/2
TO ROUTINE HONG KONG
(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 28
CF 23 APRIL INFO F C C.
a) YOUR TEL 0.31:
Q
1.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THANK YOU. THIS WILL HELP YE IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY THE HAND WHEN THE
CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT, I SHALL NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.
2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND
METHOD. THUS I WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING
| AP CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL
NO. 251 TO F CO. WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW
THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT
J
EY TRYING TO SIT TIGHT' WE MAY GET OURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE
WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET
AN EVOLVING SITUATION.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/
FILES
FED
HKD
NAM D
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
:
FFFFF
COPIES TO SIR P ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE
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MR RØYLE
SECRET
To su telur wedd
2
MiHeyes
не четны
Enie.
R.E. 15.
Following our talk yesterday morning I attach a draft telegram to the
Governor of Hong Kong. I have discussed it with Mr Wilford and taken
into account our telegram to Peking
No. 271 which I had not seen at the time of our discussion.
Ламбрин
(L Monson)
28 April 1972
Copy to: Mr. Wilford
SECRET
мигам
My Revans
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