me commands
that :.
he has dripped 19
use of this phrase
las Before the outbreak of hostilities: there
a
should be in voluntary assiste of
scheme with
dezantime
praruling for women.
children,
mrahos
nt
people particularly
liable to veľabation by the Chinese,
inthaut
Bby After Hall his Ihe outhreat of
F.
In both cases
The C.3. F.
hostilities:
evacuation
final
(unted
very
showed the attempted
of personnel of special value
(e.g. intelligence and communications
st-ath)
capture
Mis.
and of archan's whore
would be compromisiną
would involve them in
extreme danger.
no racial discrummation would be involed.
and BDCC (FE) have endorsed
Mr....
Mr.....
Mr..
Mr.......
Sir
DRAFT
File No.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly, US. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
Date......
Mere
9.
military authorities
?
recommendations.
Area of disagreement.
The
l'omicole
that
to quie effect to the proposals
para 7
Somme
form of
and line planning
necessary.
planning is necess
The Governor appears to maintain
The view
that
There
shamed the
4
ho
evacuation plans"
outline
detailed
argumg
1201-
shopping in
not wheln to be
available
in those
last days
and
Bai
The numbers hirolved will
L
be so small
That it wramed
the a
bon 15
of words
to call tod
FURTHER ACTION
an "aramal.on
to.
necessary preparations an
Filan"
Failure to arrange for the
compulsory evacuation of European
1
children before the outbreake
women
97
hostilities could be
Service of
(Q1544) 19179/8175 2MP 2/61 AT&S. 768
political embarrassment for H.M.G.
It would be an essential part of
HM.G's case
+
defending
their
paration
to point to the exutence
Où in the hand st
Ele vaike.
+
-
ut of dim thi
in ostos?
well-laid plans
departure of
chose
Women
to leave.
therefore that
for the voluntary
children who
St
cow, deve of
bance plans for
implementing the voluntary assisted departure scheme (covering
admmmstrative
procedures, assembling of the shops and
aircraft, ecc.)
must exist
OK
paper.
Conclusions.
12at the aqued
proposals in para 7
be accepted,
subject to thre
Above
Hong Kong Government-
requirement that the Hong Kong
with departiment's
Shameel
mi comiultation
of H.M.G.
make
such and time
plans
Cur
are necessary for the implementation
of a voluntary assisted departure scheme
in the period prior
hostibles.
to the outbreaks of
Colomore office,
Nocember, 1963.
SAVE
DEF
SECRET
119/380/01
Ө
THIL ACUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT,
U.D.C.(62) 1
CUPY NO. 81
13th July, 1962
EVACUATION OF BRITIS SUBJECTS OVERSEAS
IN THE VENT OF GLOBAL WAR
Memorandum by the Uversea Defence Committee
Attached at Annex A is the relevant part of a Report prepared by a
Working Party set up by the Evacuation from Abroad Sub-Committee of the
Oversea Defence Committee, to consider the policy to be adopted for
evacuation of British subjects who are overseas in a Precautionary
Stage.
2. In the light of the considerations set out in the Annex and the
conclusions reached in paragraphs 5 and 6, the Oversea Defence Committee
consider that United Kingdom overseas posts should be guided by the
following recommendations in the preparation of evacuation plans (vide
Chapter VII, Section H of the U.D.C. memorandum 0.0.0.(58) 16 -
Preperation of Defence Schemes).
(a) It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government that it is neither
practicable nor desirable to make plans for evacuation of British
nationals to the United Kingdom which is likely to
major target area for nuclear attack. Plans for evacuation during a
precautionary period, should therefore be for local evacuation only from
likely target areas and should be based on the local availability of
transport and possible reception areas. It would be unreal to attempt to
co-ordinate such plans in the United kingdom; they should be laid in
advance as far as possible by posts abroad.
(b) In the case of NATO countries and those countries whicn are assessed
as "safe" in Annex B, the policy should be to "stay-put" (which does not
exclude all local moves to nearby areas of greater relative safety).
•
(c) It would be unwise to count on assistance from the Services because
they will be preoccupied with other tasks having higher priority. But
for the reasons given in paragraph 4(b) of Annex A, and in the unlikely
event that the Services may find themselves able to assist, it would be
important to keep local Service Commanders informed of the evacuation
plans in their areas.
a) Plans for evacution after the outbreak of war should be prepared for
countries, other than NATO countries, which are shown as likely to be
subjected to attack by the enemy or where a breakdown of law and order
is expected.
A very limited amount of sea or air transport may become available at
this stage.
(a) cre co-ordination of local evacuation plans is possible or desirable
this should be undertaken in accordance with the groupings shown in the
Overseas Defence Committee memorandum Regional Co-ordination of United
Kingdom Overseas Authorities in Global War (U.D.C.(59) 13 (Final)).
-
SECRET
-1-
SECRET
(f) The Services should be responsible for purely local evacuation of
their dependants from likely target areas, their dependants should be
included in any more ambitious civilian plans.
3. It is essential to guard against the aggravation of the international
political situation by the premature imple- mentation of evacuation
plans and it must therefore be emphasised that no plans should be put
into execution without first obtaining authority from London or until it
is known for certain that nuclear attack has been made on the United
Kingdom. Authority to implement evacuation plans in overseas territories
will be given by means of the evacuation of British Subjects telegram
(telegram no. 28 in the memorandum on Notification of Precautionary and
War Measures - 0.D.C.(60) 3 (Final)). The responsibility for keeping
under review the plans for evacuating British subjects overseas belongs
to the Oversea Defence Committee.
4. With the exception of paragraph 3 above, this memorandum is intended
to be for guidance only.
(Signed) A.H. FOYNTON
Chairman,
Overson Defence Committee
London,
13th July, 1962
-2-
SECRET
SECRET
AN EX A
Intelligence Assessment (July 1961)
1 •
The most likely risk of war is judged to come not from a calculated
Soviet nuclear attack, but from a miscalculation which will probably be
preceded by a period of political tension of indeterminate length during
which Her Majesty's Government
However,
would be able to take certain precautionary measures. warning of the
moment of attack derived solely from intelligence of a technical nature
might in most favourable circumstances be as little as forty-eight
hours; in the worst case the warning might be less than fifteen minutes.
The implementation of evacuation schemes during a period of tension is
inhibited because such overt actions would be likely to aggravate the
situation.
2.
The NATO countries (except, perhaps Norway, Denmark, Greece, Portugal
and Iceland) and peripheral strategic bases wherever situated, are
likely to be involved in the initial nuclear exchange. The Near and
Middle East and North Africa, except where there are strategic bases,
are unlikely to receive nuclear attack in the first stages of global
war, but certain strategic areas may be the targets for conventional
attack; and in many of the Middle East countries there may be a
breakdown of law and order. In the Far East, China might or might not
immediately enter the war on the side of the Soviet Union, but is likely
to take advantage of the situation to pursue her own interests. Any
movencnt in the Far East by sea may be hazardous, from the moment global
war has broken out. South America and Africa south of the Sahara are
unlikely to be attacked, but there may be a breakdown of law and order
in many African countries. A list of countries assessed as being
unlikely to be subjected to attack is given in Annex B.
Regional Co-ordination
3. One result of a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom may be the
complete severance of communications between Her Majesty's Government
and posts abroad. In these circumstances action should be taken in
accordance with Oversea Defence Committee memorandum 0.D.C.(59) 13
(Final) -Regional Co-ordination of United Kingdom Overseas authorities
in global war. Evacuation plans, where they exist, should be
co-ordinated between posts in similar lines.
Availability of Transport
La (a) Civilian Transport
The policy is to disperse shipping to safe havens during a precautionary
period, and subsequently tho shipping in overseas areas would as a first
priority be directed by Ministry of Transport Shipping Representatives
to assist with the rehabilitation of devnsted arcas. Similarly civil
aircraft during the precautionary period would either be directed to
military reinforcement task or evacuated from the danger zones.
Subsequently, such aircraft, together with military transport aircraft
would come under the control of a joint (R..F./Civil) headquarters to be
known as the Joint Air Transport Headquarters and would also be directed
to help with the rehabilitation as a first priority. It is therefore
difficult to forecast what sea or air transport would be available for
evacuation, but there is li.ely to be little or none in most places
either during a precautionary period or after the outbreak of global war
and it is considered that it would be unwise to prepare schemes
envisaging evacuation of large numbers by sea or air.
-3-
SECRET
SECRET
(b) Service Transport
It would be equally unrealistic to rely on Service transport, as the
Services are likely to be fully occupied with preparations for war or in
the prosecution of the war itself. They could be responsible for the
purely local evacuation of their dependants from likely target. areas,
using Service transport, but would wish their families to be included in
any more ambitious civil schemes. The Services would co-operate to the
maximum extent possible in any evacuation scheme and should be consulted
in all planning.
Conclusion
5.
In the precautionary period, the dispersal of shipping and aircraft to
safe havens makes it impossible to make an assessment of transport
available for evacuation purposes. It would therefore be unwise to rely
on evacuation plans involving the movement of British subjects by sea or
air. Furthermore, it seems questionable whether the putting into effect
of any large-scale evacuation plans would be politically acceptable in a
period of tension, as it could be interpreted as an overt act likely to
aggravate the situation.
6. After the outbreak of war, civil and Services shipping and aircraft
would as a first priority be directed to assist in the rehabilitation of
devasted areas and would not be available for the evacuation of refugees
from areas which had not been affected by the nuclear exchange.
SECRET
-4-
SECRET
ANNEX B
COUNTRIES UNLIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK
(See Paragraph 2(b) of covering note)
Afghanistan
Algeria
Ascension
Ceylon
Cyrenaica
Egypt (not Suez Canal)
Falkland Islands
Fiji
Finland
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Muscat and Oman
Nepal
Pacific Islands
Qatar
St. Helena
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tonga
Tripolitania
Trucial States
Tunisia
The West Indies
Central America
South America
East Africa/South Arabia
South and Centrul africa West Africa
-5-
SECRET