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The question which aree at the trial is whether
in issuing this statutory report Mr. Brewer was guilty
of the alleged misdemeanour.
It is not denied that the statutory report
corresponded with the entries appearing in the account
books of the bank.
Mr.Brewer (who conducted his own defence) submitted
that there was no case to go to the jury on the ground that
the transactions appearing in the books were in the language
of accountancy "cash." transactions and could not be other-
wise described in the statutory report. He cited "Spargo's
Case" (8 Ch. App. 407) in which it was decided that any
bona fide set-off between the company and a shareholder
would amount to a "payment in cash". Also "Eyles v. Ellis" (4 Bingham, p.112), where a "transfer" made in the books
of a bank, without notice from the account of "A" to the
account of "B" constituted a payment in cash by "A" to "B",
even though "B" knew nothing of the transaction and the
bank failed the following day. (Another case on this point
is "Larocque v.Beauchemin" (1897) A.C. 358).
Clearly the word "cash" will comprise assets of
an equivalent value included bona fide.
It appeared to me that the material distinction in
the case was not that between one thing of value and
another thing of value, but between substance and shadow. The question of the defendant's bona fides was in issue.
This was one of fact for the jury.
The essential allegation against Mr.Brewer was
that he made the statement of the sum received by the
company in cash knowingly (i.e. understanding what was being
stated), wilfully (1.c. intending to make that statement)
and falsely (i.e. aware that the statement was incorrect
and misleading). These elements constitute the criminal
intent of the offence.
So directed, the jury found a