matter ome before the Judicial Committee. in their
judgment the Judicial Committee decided that the
custody was legal. The language of their judgment,
in which the jurisdiction of this court to adjudicate
upon an indictment for piracy jure gentium was for-
mally recognised, did not contain any reference to
statute or ordinance on shich suon jurisdiction might
be founded. The Judicial Committee contented itself
by observing that the crime alleged was by the law
of nations, justiciable everywhere.
I have noticed that a similar submission
was made by the counsel for the prisoner in "The
King v. Depardo" (1 Taunton at p. 29) who argued that
"the statute 28 tien.VIII, o.15, merely altered the
mode of trial in that court, and its jurisdiction
still continues to rest on the same foundations as
it did before that act; it is regulated by the civil
law, et per consuetudines marinas, grounded on the
law of nations which may possibly give to that court
a jurisdiction that our common law has not.” It
appears that in that case no judgment was given by
the court.
During the argument I drew the attention
of the learned Attorney General to the fact that the
same point had been taken for the crown in Angland in "The queen v. Keyn” (L.K. 2 zx.Div. p.63). In
that sase a German subject, who was the master of a
foreign ship, had, during a voyage when his ship was
within three miles of the coast of ngland, by his
negligence, caused the death of a passenger upon a
British ship with which his vessel was in collision.
84
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