have followed his argument correctly, he claimed
that this is the position of the courts of üyer and
Terminer in england and that any power possessed in
this matter by the courts in England had been
conferred upon the Jupreme Court of Hong Kong by
section 7 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1873,
(ürdinance No. 3 of 1873). This court, therefore,
on this view may be said to have obtained a juris-
diction in piracy both directly from international
law and also from the same source through the
channel provided by the Supreme Court Ordinance.
The importance of this submission lies in this
that if the court is here to refer for its juris-
diction to international law, and to it alone, then
its jurisdiction may be held not to be limited by
decisions given by the English courts proceeding
under the common law and the statutes of the realm
of england. More particularly, the learned Attorney
general has based his submission on the language used
in the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the case of "The Attorney General
for the Colony of Hong Kong v. Kwok A Jing" ( (1873)
L.k. 5 P.C. a.C. p. 179). In that case Kwok A sing
had been accused of piracy jure gentium.
He was
himself a Chinese subject and the crime alleged
against him was stated to have occurred upon the high
Seas and upon a French vessel. Having been found
in Hong Kong he was brought before a police magistrate
and was by him committed for trial on that charge
to the Supreme Court of the Colony. linbeas Corpus
proceedings followed, in the course of which the
matter
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