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International Settlement were recognised; in the case of the latter, there were only concessions, to the early recovery of which his Government were irrevocably committed. At length, after endless haggling and argument, I induced him to make the following final offer: The Greater Shanghai area (which includes the harbour down to Woosung) to be excluded for a minimum of five years and, subject to a negotiated settlement in the meantime, for a maximum of ten; an area at Tientsin, covering the concessions and ex-concessions and any really necessary neighbouring Chinese territory (but not the whole Chinese municipal area), to be excluded for five years. Again I refrained from committing myself, but I considered that, if we could incorporate this offer in a satisfactory text, we should have secured what we wanted, and indeed in a better form than our own original formula. It seemed impossible that any Chinese Government could now, after all that had passed since April 1929, be induced to bind themselves to the indefinite continuance of extra-territoriality at Shanghai. If things went well, and the political situation in China were stabilised, a solution of the Shanghai problem should, it seemed, be worked out in five years; if not, we had a further extension of time till 1942, which was as long as we could expect any modern Chinese Government to bind themselves to. In the case of Tientsin, we should have an assured breathing space of five years in which to make the necessary adjustments for the termination of extra-territoriality rights.
Reserved Areas: Discussion of May 26: Minister for Foreign Affairs withdraws
his Offer of May 25, and proposes Five Years for each Place.
59. On the morning of the following day, the 26th May, I sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a new draft, which embodied his offer of the day before, but, as a tactical move, in a rather improved form. He was out attending a meeting of the Cabinet, at which the question of his offer was being discussed, and did not receive my letter till after midday. He then requested me to come and see him, suggesting another river cruise (which assured us complete privacy and freedom from interruption and the favourable atmosphere of intimacy so necessary on these occasions). We accordingly embarked again, the same party of three, Dr. Wang, myself and Mr. Teichman. Once under way, Dr. Wang broke it to me that, despite his utmost endeavours, his Government had turned down the offer he had made to me on the previous day; his colleagues had insisted absolutely that they could not go beyond a limit of five years for Shanghai and three for Tientsin, while he had urged the terms of his own proposal; the matter had then been referred to the President himself, who had finally decided on five years for each place; and that was the final offer which he, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of his Government, could now make to me, and no more. I was constrained to use very plain language, and emphasised that my position had become an impossible one; I had been trapped into showing my hand and considering an offer which was in itself possibly further than I should have gone, and on which he had now gone back; I refused absolutely to consider his new proposal; in the circumstances the conditional offer to drop Canton and Hankow would lapse, and we should find ourselves in the position of pausing, abandoning the lead, and waiting for him to bring the other Powers into line- and I wished him joy of the task. Dr. Wang expressed great regret, but said he could do no more, and concurred that the discussions had better be wound up. While plainly showing my indignation, I kept him in play, imagining that his move might to some extent be the usual Chinese try-on. At this point, since there seemed nothing more to discuss, the launch was swung round to head for home, a manœuvre which was not lost on Dr. Wang, who gradually came round to discussing and criticising the terms of my draft, which, he complained, went further than his offer of the day before. Imperceptibly we found ourselves once more discussing this offer, with its ultimate limit of ten years, and the manner in which it could best be worked into a revised draft. The launch was run ashore, and we there and then sat down to draft an amended text on which we were eventually able to agree. Dr. Wang said (without any explanation of his changed attitude) that he would return to the charge with his colleagues and the President with this draft. He also suggested that Mr. Hsü-Mo and Mr. Teichman should meet and try to find common ground in redrafting the attached exchange of notes.
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