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European Powers they had refused to accept a duration of more than five years. The upshot of a lengthy discussion was tentative agreement on the following three points of principle: That the treaty itself would last for a certain period I insisted on ten years and Dr. Wang offered five; that certain special provisions, such as the arrangements in regard to special chambers and legal counsellors, should last for a shorter period-I suggested seven years, and Dr. Wang offered three; and that the clauses in existing treaties abrogated as conflicting would not be revived on the termination of the treaty. This was as far as we got at the time on this pont. Subsequently Mr. Teichman and Mr. Hsü-Mo worked out a text for the duration article, on the above lines, leaving the specified periods outstanding for the time being; and eventually I was able, in the course of the crucial discussion about the reserved areas, to manoeuvre the Minister for Foreign Affairs into accepting my periods of ten and five years for the main treaty and the special provisions respectively. This text was accepted as agreed ground until, at the last moment, I received your further instructions on the subject, with the result that final agreement on this article was not reached until our last discussion on the 5th June, as reported in paragraph 67 below.
Meeting of May 18: Ratification.
52. I next presented the draft of a ratification article, based partly on the text which you had telegraphed to me. The main features of this draft were that ratifications were to be exchanged as soon as possible; provided that the Chinese Government should have manifested their ability to give effect throughout China to the terms of the treaty; and provided that China should first or simultaneously have concluded similar agreements with the other Powers concerned, so that British subjects would only be amenable to Chinese jurisdiction as from a date applicable to all foreigners. As I expected, Dr. Wang objected very strongly to both these provisoes; in fact, he stated most categorically that the Chinese Government could not possibly accept either in any shape or form. He also insisted that (as in the case of the Weihaiwei Convention) a date should be fixed within which ratifications should be exchanged (having the 1st January, 1932, in mind). I subsequently got him to drop this point, but on the subject of the two provisoes he was adamant. As regards the first, I undertook to report to you his objections, which personally I considered to be not without force. A similar point had arisen in connexion with the Weihaiwei negotiations, when the difficulties attending such a proviso had been clearly manifested. Moreover, if such a stipulation were to stand, when the time for ratification came, His Majesty's Government would in all probability either have to refuse to ratify on what might well be a technical point, or, by ratifying in the face of such a clause, expose themselves to criticism and ridicule from the British press and British interests in China owing to the obvious inability of the Chinese Government at Nanking to give strict effect to the terms of the treaty (if called upon to do so) in remote parts of, say, Yunnan, Szechuan, Kansu, and other border provinces. In regard to the second proviso, however, I made it quite plain that His Majesty's Government, whatever course they might ultimately decide to follow, could not possibly agree to bind themselves to any agreement which might result in British subjects passing under Chinese jurisdiction while other foreign nationals still in practice retained their extra-territorial rights, for I foresaw the possibility of à situation arising in which we and the United States might have concluded our treaties while Japan, and perhaps France, had not done so, and in which China might then seek on the 1st January, 1932, to carry into effect her declared intention of assuming jurisdiction over all foreigners, without in actual fact being able to enforce such jurisdiction on Japanese nationals at the ports. The Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that the point was safeguarded by the pro- visions against discrimination in article 18, and became unusually heated in vehemently declaring that China would "ride roughshod" over any Power that blocked the way. When I referred to the provision, similar to the one I required, in the Sino-Italian settlement of 1928, he declared that times had changed, and that, while he would absolutely guarantee me against the point I had made, he could, since the People's Convention and the mandate of the 5th May, under no circumstances agree to any stipulation that China must first come to an agreement with all the Powers concerned. Eventually he offered the formula, which I undertook to refer to you, to the effect that it was to be understood that British
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subjects would only be amenable to Chinese jurisdiction as from the date on which such jurisdiction is enforced on the nationals of all the Powers." Final agreement on this point was not reached until the end of the negotiations (see paragraph 62 below).
Meeting of May 18: Reserved Areas.
53. In conclusion, I raised the major outstanding issue of the reserved areas, and, with the object, as I explained, of focussing the points at issue, I submitted a new draft article, which I had prepared, in four clauses, the first providing that the transfer of jurisdiction would not apply in areas where Chinese administrative jurisdiction did not apply (referring to the foreign- controlled settlements and concessions); the second providing for the exclusion of ring areas round Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton; the third providing (in the terms of your telegram) for a joint commission to study the question of the reserved areas and for negotiations on the basis of the recommen- dations of such commission to be entered upon within a certain number of years (you had suggested three or five-I inserted ten to start off with); and the fourth providing for the continuance in the reserved areas of the jurisdiction of the British courts. I was fully aware that it would be impossible for the Chinese Government to accept
this text, which contained the substance of all our original demands. But under my instructions (see paragraph 48 above) I did not feel authorised to suggest any concessions beyond meeting the Chinese objection to the "30-li zones by referring to the Chinese municipal areas of the ports in question, which, supported by Chinese maps, covered the necessary ground, including the foreign concessions and settlements and neighbouring Chinese municipalities. As I expected would be the case, the more Dr. Wang and Mr. Hsü-Mo examined the text the less they liked it, and, after they had explained their insuperable objections to each paragraph, and the impossibility of negotiating on such a basis, the interview, which had up to that moment proceeded for over three hours in a very friendly and favourable atmosphere, came abruptly to an end.
Americans present Draft Treaty at Washington.
54. It should be mentioned at this point, to preserve the chronological sequence of this report, that about this time the American Minister communi- cated to me the text of a draft treaty presented to the Chinese Minister in Washington by the State Department on the 27th April. This draft contained the texts, with a few verbal alterations and additions, of the articles agreed upon between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself up to that time, as well as drafts, on the lines of our original proposals, of the other articles still outstanding. So far nothing new had been accomplished by the State Depart- ment, since the Chinese Minister in Washington had refused to discuss even minor details, referring everything to Nanking. I urged, however, on my American colleague the importance, in which he fully concurred, of our being informed of all points, if any materialised, on which the State Department might secure improvements on our texts, in order that when the time came we might incorporate them in our treaty; we were communicating every article or other document, as and when agreed upon, usually the same day, to the American Government through Mr. Johnson at Nanking, and we looked to the State Department to keep us similarly informed of their doings.
Americans suggest Consular Convention.
55. My American colleague also consulted me at this time, under instruc- tions from his Government, as to the desirability, which was favoured by the State Department, of seeking to incorporate in the treaty either the substance of a consular convention, or provisions for safeguarding the position and functions of consular officers. My own view on this point was that no useful purpose would be served by raising this point in the extra-territoriality negotiations; if we did so, the Chinese would certainly bring up the embarrassing question of exequaturs, while they were most unlikely to agree to anything more than strictly reciprocal treatment for consuls, as in their recent reciprocal treaties with minor European Powers; moreover, it would be futile to propose to the Chinese (as suggested by
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