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in reasonably close touch with the American negotiators, thanks to the loyal co-operation of my American colleague (of whose attitude throughout I cannot speak too highly), to whom I communicated the texts of the various articles as and when agreed upon between myself and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with whom I discussed freely and frankly all points as they arose in the course of the negotiations. I also, at this stage communicated, in the strictest confidence, the texts of the articles so far agreed upon to the Japanese and French representatives at Nanking.
Reserved Areas: His Majesty's Government's Instructions of April 27 and 29.
38. We were now closing in on the final and crucial point in the negotiations, the question of the reserved areas. On the 29th April I received your telegraphic instructions (despatched on the 27th April) dealing generally with this point, and on the following day your further telegram arrived dealing more specifically with the offer of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to concede the reservation of the International Settlement at Shanghai for a period of three years and nothing more. This offer of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to concede the reservation of the International Settlement at Shanghai for a period of three years and nothing more. This offer was, you stated, unacceptable and could not even be made the basis of discussion. Your telegrams contained a full statement of the reasons why His Majesty's Government could not possibly give way on the question of the four reserved areas, and certain suggestions were put forward that we should now pause to give Japan and France the opportunity of reaching the point we were at, or, alternatively, that the Chinese should accept the reservation of the four areas and sign the treaty with us and that provision should be made for a Joint Sino-British Commission to be set up after the entry of the treaty into force to study the question of the reserved areas and their settlements and concessions, on the understanding that negotiations on the basis of the recommendations of this commission would be entered into within a period of, say, three or five years.
Reserved Areas: Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 1.
39. On the 1st May I had an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him the bulk of the above telegrams. Dr. Wang, who was evidently impressed by, as well as greatly disappointed at, the very firm tone of these messages, which, I was at pains to explain, represented the ipsississima verba of His Majesty's Government, repeated in the course of our subsequent conversation in the most categoric terms that it was absolutely impossible for his Government to meet us over the four reserved areas or the 50-li zone round Shanghai. I urged repeatedly and as strongly as I could that he should give consideration to your very weighty suggestion regarding the establishment of a joint commission to study the question of the reserved areas, but without result, and the discussion again ended without any apparent progress being made.
Reserved Areas: Doubts as to His Majesty's Government's Instructions.
40. I was at this point somewhat puzzled as to the real attitude and intentions of His Majesty's Government towards the question of the reserved areas. My original instructions, received at the beginning of March, had indicated that our
last ditch" was to be Shanghai, if necessary even only the International Settlement. In subsequent secret telegraphic correspondence I had myself expressed the view that, while we could if necessary give up the reservation of Hankow and Canton, and throw in the British Concession in Shameen, we should insist on the reservation of Tientsin as well as of all Shanghai (not merely the International Settlement). The full telegraphic instructions which I had now received, however, appeared to indicate that His Majesty's Government intended to hold out uncompromisingly for the reservation of all four areas. Yet on the top of these instructions I received another telegram from home dealing separately with the question of the progressive abandonment of Hankow and Canton, wit special reference to the necessity of consultation with the French as regards the rendition of Shameen. In reporting, therefore, the deadlock now reached, I pointed out that we had so far maintained our original demands intact for the full reservation of all four areas, and I enquired specifically whether I was authorised to bargain, as I had hitherto understood to be our intention, on the
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basis of dropping Hankow and Canton, and, if necessary, throwing in also the Shameen Concession, in order to secure satisfactory arrangements at Shanghai and Tientsin.
Chinese Political Crisis: Canton declares against Chiang Kai-shek.
"
41. In the meantime there had been sudden and unexpected developments in the general political situation in China. On the very eve of the assembling of the People's Convention on the 5th May, the generals and political leaders at Canton issued a declaration openly repudiating General Chiang Kai-shek, whom they accused of arrogating to himself the powers of a personal dictatorship. These developments had a definite bearing on the extra-territoriality negotiations. On the one hand the National Government, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Waichiaopu, in their anxiety to justify their conduct of China's foreign relations, and, above all, of the campaign for the abolition of the unequal treaties," before the People's Convention on the 5th May, had again and again announced publicly that extra-territoriality was to come to an end, whatever the result of the negotiations, by that date; with the result that, as was to have been expected, the climax of the negotiations, namely, the deadlock over the reserved areas, appeared likely to synchronise with the opening of the convention. On the other hand, the National Government was, it seemed, at the same moment being shaken to its foundations by this internal split in the structure of the party, which threatened to result in the secession from the fold of Kwangtung, the traditional home of the Tang and the Revolution. Two leading members of the Government, Mr. Sun Fo and Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, who were both Cantonese, left Nanking at this time and retired to Shanghai, the former, as it subsequently transpired, en route to join the recalcitrant Southern chiefs in Canton, and the latter en route to Europe to resume his post as one of the judges of The Hague Court, on account, it seemed, of the unhealthy atmosphere in the capital for Cantonese political leaders. Thus by the irony of circumstances the two principal legal champions in the extra-territoriality issue on the Chinese side, Hu Han-min and Wang Ch'ung-hui, the heads of the Legislative and Judicial Yuan respectively, had disappeared from the scene at the very moment when the negotiations were reaching the most critical stage. This did not necessarily mean any diminution in the drive for the abolition of foreign extra-territorial rights, but it did mean the transfer of its direction to other and possibly less skilled and experienced hands.
Negotiations continued May 4 Minister for Foreign Affairs' further offer of
Greater Shanghai for three years.
42. It was quite impossible to tell how serious the Canton movement might turn out to be, but in this somewhat delicate situation I felt sure that the best course to follow was, as usual, to carry on, pending developments, as though nothing had happened; and, incidentally, it seemed that the political crisis might, from our point of view, not be altogether inopportune, since it might well serve to distract attention from our negotiations, which, I had throughout maintained in my discussions with the Chinese, were being conducted on our side without reference to the exigencies of Chinese domestic policy. At the conclusion of my interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 1st May, I had specially stated that so far as I was concerned I did not, in spite of our failure to make any progress towards reaching common ground on the question of the reserved areas, regard the door as in any way closed to further negotiation. To this Dr. Wang did not demur, and in fact the discussions between Mr. Teichman and Mr. Hsü-mo on the complicated question of personal status cases and other out- standing points were continued on the 4th May without reference to the political crisis and the opening of the People's Convention on the 5th May. On the same day I had occasion to meet Dr. Wang privately for a discussion of other matters, after the disposal of which the question of the extra-territoriality negotiations was naturally touched upon. In the friendly and intimate atmosphere of private conversation I was able to draw from him an advance on his previous offer of the reservation of the Shanghai Settlement alone to the extent of a tentative suggestion that the reserved area might be increased to cover "Greater Shanghai," provided we could hold out hopes of a settlement of the 'outside roads" controversy, so as to avoid creating the impression that we were seeking
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