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American Action on Chinese Counter-proposals.
3. The Chinese counter-proposals and my comments and request for instructions thereon had reached the Foreign Office early in January 1931, and the next few weeks were occupied by their study in London and by consultation with the American Government. The latter had, in the meantime, been pursuing the same zigzag course which they had followed from the outset of their negotiations with the Chinese Government on this question. It will be recalled that the State Department had just a year before submitted proposals to the Chinese Minister at Washington omitting any mention of two of the major safe- guards, namely, the reservation of criminal jurisdiction and the employment of foreign co-judges, on which we had up to that time proposed to insist, and that soon after, when His Majesty's Government, seeing their hand forced in this way, had suggested the desirability of seeking a bargain by offering to concede criminal jurisdiction, the State Department, professing a grievance at what they termed our surrender, had retraced their steps and announced their decision to stand out on these as on the other major points; all of which had accordingly been embodied in the British and American proposals presented to the Chinese Government in the autumn of 1930. The American Government now, as the result of their study of the Chinese counter-proposals submitted in December, formulated and communicated to His Majesty's Government in January a new draft, the principal features of which were the dropping of evocation and foreign co-judges. Following, it seems, on representations made from London, the State Department subsequently withdrew this draft; and on the 7th February they submitted instead to the Chinese Minister in Washington a statement intended to indicate the nature of the concessions they were willing to make. In this document no mention was made of the question of foreign co-judges, but evocation was definitely abandoned. To this statement the Chinese Government replied on the 20th February expressing their appreciation of the concessions offered, with special reference to the abandonment of evocation, but they repeated their inability to accept any of the three remaining major safeguards, namely, co- judges, reservation of criminal jurisdiction, and excluded areas, and requested a definite statement from the American Government as to their attitude towards these major issues before seeking to continue, the negotiations on other points. The State Department thereupon took no further action for the moment and intimated to us that they would await further developments and see what came of my impending negotiations at Nanking. This was satisfactory enough, but unfortunately the only result of these American negotiations had been to abandon evocation, in itself at least a useful pawn in the negotiations, without getting, or even seeking to bargain for, anything in return. It was, in fact, obvious that no other results than alternate deadlock and surrender could ensue from these attempts to negotiate with the Chinese Minister in Washington by means of formal written proposal and counter-proposal, instead of bargaining in the usual Chinese way with the National Government itself at Nanking.
Arrival at Nanking early in March.
4. For the first few days of my stay in Nanking, from the 1st March to the 7th March, I was awaiting your instructions, which, I was already aware, were to be expected at the beginning of the month. Apart from the transaction of other business with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I took the opportunity to make some preliminary soundings of the members of the Chinese Government, to whom I intimated that, anxious as we were to reach a settlement if we could, it was as a matter of fact the Chinese who were seeking something from us and who would be the greater losers if we failed to reach an agreement. I also had the opportunity of full and frank discussion with my American colleague, who had purposely proceeded to Nanking to meet me and who had been instructed by his Government to afford me all possible moral support in the negotiations. Mr. Johnson also explained to me that, while the State Department still insisted on keeping the American negotiations in their hands at Washington, there was at least a possibility, if not, indeed, a probability, of their being permitted to
'slide over into his hands at Nanking.
C
Receipt of Instructions on March 7.
5. On the 7th March I received your instructions, which were, in brief, to the effect that we should progressively abandon evocation, the reservation of criminal jurisdiction (subject to the American Government agreeing to adopt the same course) and foreign co-judges, in return for the retention of the other safe- guards which were regarded by His Majesty's Government as really vital, namely, the exclusion of certain treaty port areas, with special reference in the last resort to the International Settlement at Shanghai, adequate arrangements in regard to the functions of the legal advisers, and satisfactory guarantees and assurances in regard to taxation, arrest, detention, bail, personal status matters, arbitration, titles to real property, expropriation, domiciliary visits, immunity of shipping, rights of business organisations, discrimination, and other minor points. It was further suggested that, pending consideration of the question of criminal jurisdiction by the United States Government, I might open the negotiations by stating that His Majesty's Government were prepared to make concessions in order to arrive at an agreed settlement, but that in order to carry public opinion in Great Britain with them it was essential that the Chinese Government should be prepared to give complete satisfaction in regard to certain vital safeguards concerning, inter alia, the functions of the legal advisers, methods of levying, assessing and enforcing taxation, and so on.
Opening of Negotiations on March 8.
6. I formally opened the negotiations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sunday, the 8th March, being as usual accompanied by Mr. Teichman, Chinese counsellor to His Majesty's Legation, while Dr. Wang was assisted by Mr. Hsü Mo, head of the European and American Department of the Waichiaopu. Instead of acting at once on the above suggestion, which seemed to me to involve the introduction of the question of major concessions rather too abruptly and at too early a stage, I thought it better to skirmish at first on the ground of the four main principles, from which we had not as yet in theory in any way retreated. I was the more inclined to take this line because, when sounding informally the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the receipt of my instructions, I had offered him the alternative of discussing main principles at the outset or of seeking to find common ground on less contentious points of minor detail first, and he had expressed a very decided preference for, if, indeed, he was not going to insist on, the former method of approach.
Discussion of Four Major Points.
7. I, therefore, opened the discussion by formally examining the four main principles, namely, evocation, foreign co-judges, criminal jurisdiction and excluded areas. I purposely refrained from making concessions on any of these (though aware that the value of the first-evocation -as a bargaining pawn had been impaired, if not destroyed, by the action of the American Government in formally abandoning it). Dr. Wang, on his side, also confined himself to explaining why the Chinese Government could not possibly meet us on any of these major points. The only one on which there was the least give and take in this first discussion was that of the foreign co-judges, in regard to which, while insisting that adequate arrangements in this respect were a cardinal point in our attitude, I suggested that he should explore the possibilities of meeting us by strengthening the position of the legal counsellors in other ways. Having reached this point of apparent deadlock, I referred once more to the alternative method of approach and I mentioned the many so-called minor safeguards to which His Majesty's Government attached the greatest importance; and I thus gradually developed the argument that, if we secured complete satisfaction in regard to these legal safeguards, it might well influence our attitude towards the whole settlement, including the question of criminal jurisdiction.
Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to Discussion of Legal Safeguards by
Experts.
8. It was not easy to manoeuvre Dr. Wang on to this new ground, since the Chinese plan of campaign was obviously to force the issue over the four main principles, when, having driven us from our position on these major points, they
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