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(c) We agree that patrols by His Majesty's ships for the purpose of intercepting pirates should continue so far as the strength of the squadron in the Far East allows.
(d) While recognizing that, for the present, the provision of regular naval and military guards on board ship must continue, we strongly recommend that the shipping companies should be informed that the provision of these guards will cease in one year's time, and that they will then have to assume full responsibility for the internal protection of their ships. (e) We suggest that the local authorities should be asked to consider how co-operation in intelligence between the various ports of call can be improved.
(f) The root of piracy is firmly embedded in Chinese soil, and piracy can only be effectively suppressed by Chinese action on shore. We therefore suggest that strong representations should be made to the Nanking Government, if possible jointly with other foreign Powers, with a view to action being taken to this end. We suggest that the question of exacting reparation for injury to British lives or property should be considered.
4.
The above report was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 240th Meeting on the 8th March, 1929, and it was agreed---
**(a) To recommend to the Cabinet that approval in principle should be given to the recommendations submitted by the Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 38 of their Report (C.I.D). Paper No. 330-(); and
(b) To recommend that the Admiralty should be authorised to instruct the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, that the Anti-Piracy Committee at Hong Kong should proceed on the assumption that the policy recommended by the Chiefs of Staff will be adopted in principle, and should submit in due course detailed proposals for giving effect to this policy.
(c) To take note that the Foreign Office were prepared in principle to make representations to the Chinese Government at Nanking, either on the general question of piracy or in connection with each specific case, though they were not optimistic as to the result."
5. On Wednesday, the 13th March, 1929, the Cabinet approved the recom- mendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence as set forth above (Cabinet 11 (29), Conclusion 8), and the necessary instructions were communicated forthwith to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, the Anti-Piracy Committee. Hong Kong, and His Majesty's Minister at Peking.
As a result of these instructions, the Shipping Companies then enjoying the services of regular naval and military guards were informed that these guards would be definitely withdrawn on the 31st March, 1930, and that after that date complete responsibility for the internal protection of shipping against piratical attacks must be assumed by them.
6. Since the above decision was communicated to the Shipping Companies persistent representations have been made by the shipowners to bring about a reversal of the Cabinet decision. The valuable time expressly provided by His Majesty's Government to enable the Shipping Companies to find a suitable substitute for the regular guards was thus lost, and the shipowners have laid themselves open to the accusation that they cherished the hope that inaction and procrastination in formulating a new scheme for the internal protection of shipping after the 31st March next might result in the provision of regular guards being continued. Representations by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. that the Shipping Companies would be incurring grave responsibilities in not taking early steps to provide against the position which would arise on the withdrawal of the naval and military guards appear to have had little effect until last month.
Apart from the principle that the onus of providing adequate measures for the internal defence of their ships must rest with the shipowners. it should also be appreciated that the provision of anti-piracy guards in the Far East has resulted in considerable disorganization of the forces stationed there. The Navy cannot provide detachments for this purpose without immobilising ships, while the training and efficiency for war of military units are seriously affected by the constant absence of large number of N.C.O.'s and men.
7. As reported in the second paragraph of the attached telegram, representa- tions were made on the 13th February to the Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong that he should receive a deputation for the purpose of considering a scheme for the formation of a special force to be created of good-class fighting men from India with an establishment of British or foreign N.C.O.'s, the whole to form aeparate unit under its own Commanding Officer, and placed for training and discipline under the Naval ('ommander-in-Chief or the General Officer Commanding. It was suggested that the cost should be met in the first instance by the Government of Ilong Kong and recovered by a surcharge on all shipping visiting the port, assisted by a grant in aid by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and a contribution from the Singapore Government and other unspecified sources.
8. The Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong reports that, on receiving the deputation, he found that the scheme had only been considered in barest outline. No idea of the cost had been obtained, nor did the details involved seem to have been considered. The number of men required was tentatively stated
to be 400, with 35 white N.C.O.'s and 4 white Headquarter Staff.
9.
It was evident during the discussion that strong opposition would be offered to any general tax which would increase charges on shipping not interested in anti- piracy guards.
10.
The Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong considered the scheme altogether too nebulous and too expensive to be undertaken at a moment's notice, and it was represented to the deputation that the only scheme admitting of prompt application was a development of the former system of Indian Guards, possibly supplemented by white N.C.O.'s. It was left to the deputation to confer with the Inspector-General of Police, Hong Kong, with a view to evolving a practical scheme at the earliest possible moment.
11. No further information is yet available as to the result of the Conference with the Inspector-General of Police, but the Oversea Defence Committee suggest that unless very active steps are taken to press the Shipping Companies to evolve a satisfactory scheme and to implement it as soon as possible, a further long delay will Whatever action may be taken now, however, the Committee are of opinion that it will be impossible for the Shipping Companies to produce an efficient substitute for the present naval and military guards by the 1st April.
occur.
12, In view of the above, the Oversea Defence Committee feel it their duty to mention the forcible representations made to them to the effect that if advantage
is taken of the absence of guards to undertake an intensive campaign of piracy a serious blow will be dealt to British trade in the Far East.
It is for the Cabinet to decide whether this danger is of sufficient gravity to merit any modification of their original decision.
The Committee, however, venture to recommend that if it is decided to continue the provision of regular naval and military guards, such continuance should be for a definitely limited period, and should be on condition that the Shipping Companies evolve an efficient scheme and agree to bring it into operation at the earliest possible date, the latter date to be fixed by the 1st April. Furthermore, the Committee consider that if regular naval and military guards are extended after the 31st March, their full cost from the 1st April should be borne by those Shipping Companies which employ them.
13.
As regards the details of a scheme for the provision of guards by the Shipping Companies, the Oversea Defence Committee consider that any practical scheme must emanate from the Companies after they have reached agreement amongst themselves. At this juncture any detailed criticism of the proposals made to the Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong up to date (vide Appendix) would be of little value.
At the same time, as the Companies cannot be expected to have the organizing and administrative knowledge, and undoubtedly have not the facilities for recruit- ment which are available to Government institutions, such as His Majesty's Forces and the Police, the Committee feel that it would expedite progress if the shipowners were informed that His Majesty's Government are willing to advise them on these
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