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negotiate a satisfactory agreement would probably react unfav-
ourably, not only locally but generally. I ventured the opinion
that there seemed little hope that the wide divergence between
the Hongkong and the Chinese proposed versions of Article 5 would
render the text as revised by Hongkong acceptable to the
Nationalist Government. This last view was I think the feeling
of the majority at the Conference, especially of the Chinese
members. But there was a still stronger feeling that nothing less
than asked for would compensate Hongkong for the grant of the
privileges expected; in fact the conviction found general ex-
pression that it would be unwise to ask for too much, and that
Hongkong was formulating strictly moderate demands in comparison
with the concessions contemplated.
10. I formed the further impression that there was little real
hope that the Agreement would be definitely concluded as redrafted
at the Conference, but that there was general confidence that
enough had been done to show general goodwill, and to keep the
Chinese from breaking off negotiations by demonstrating how
much was common ground.
It seemed to be felt that the mere
gaining of time was a definite advantage inasmuch as a delayed
decision would not prejudice the negotiations of the new Commercial
Treaty between Great Britain and China, especially as regards the
question of inland waters and coastal navigation moreover it
would give time for the clarification of the political situation
in China, both domestic and international. I venture to think
that the feeling that the gaining of time was an advantage partly
prompted the decision of Sir Cecil Clementi to await the authori-
zation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies before
addressing any communication concerning the result of the
Conference