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and are useless from a naval policy point of view, the ships keep on disappearing; to-day one destroyer, to-morrow another; to-day a submarine, and within two years perhaps all our destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines. Of our cruisers the Vasco da Gama has gained The the sad fame of being the "senior Man-of-War in the World." Adamastor when she went to the Far East attained a speed of less than 5 knots, with her tubing rotted and eaten by rust, and she is now undergoing costly repairs. The other two small cruisers are vessels tired out by service in the English Navy during the Great War, and can last but little longer.
Two years more and then the Portuguese Navy, which has lasted bravely throughout the centuries, will finish its existence, thanks to national indifference and the neglect of political chiefs who, confident in their control of the Government, of finance and of parliamentary influence, have never responded sincerely to the appeals of Ministers of Marine when they insisted on the need of renewing the material of our fleet. And so after centuries of service and with glorious pages in its history, the National Navy, worn out by weather and time, has from a material point of view come to an end, and this just when we specially need it in order to ensure our political unity both at home and in our colonies in the critical time through which we are now passing.
A generation which thus negligently witnesses the crumbling of a traditional institution, which was and should continue to be the principal force of our political action in the world, should be judged severely, and condemned by those who come after. But it is only right to say that the miserable state at which our Navy has arrived is not due to the officers of the Navy. They have done, in all ranks, as much as possible to invigorate our decrepit material, and there is also no body of officers of any navy in the world, which has entered into It is such a vigorous campaign in favour of naval reconstruction. more than thirty years ago since naval officers embarked on stubborn propaganda, in newspapers, reviews, and books, regarding the re- juvenescence of our naval power, but although the nation has contemplated their exertions with sympathy, they have not exercised any influence on the souls of our political chiefs.
There was an epoch when the Navy had the illusion of an early reconstruction of the Fleet and that was when a basis for defence was instituted for this purpose. But this hope soon vanished, because a Minister of the Republic thought it best to suppress this foundation for defence, by which the navy trusted to replace, at an opportune moment, the units of our Fleet.
And now, what is to be done? Everything must be created afresh. This ridiculous and depressing situation must cease; we must no longer see foreign squadrons on the Tagus, on a political mission, being received by Admirals of a navy which is no longer in being. It is deplorable that a Minister of Marine should find himself forced to toast a powerful navy which visits us, in the name of a navy which scarcely exists in our thoughts and in our hearts except by means of historical records.
Portugal has been a noble nation, with glorious traditions, and she must continue to live nobly, without ridicule, whatever her aspect or condition, and more especially without ridicule of her navy.
The considerations we gave when we dealt with our naval and maritime power well show that our navy must consist of cruisers and surface flotillas, submarines and aircraft.
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In order to express our ideas we have examined the Naval pro- grammes published and the books on naval policy which are in circulation in the country. To carry out our naval policy, as we have outlined and established in previous articles, we need cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
As we have said, and as we inferred when we dealt with our maritime power, our naval forces require great strategical flexibility, for con- centration in this or that sea, in this or that maritime region, in accordance with political needs; this means the adoption of small rapid groups with a large radius of action and able easily to combine or concentrate. Our destroyers will combine the duties of destroyers, flotilla leaders and cruisers, as we shall have to use these units for many cruiser missions. This has been done by nations more powerful than ourselves, as for example, the United States of America. The few cruisers we shall have to have will carry out the more important cruiser missions and will also be used as flotilla leaders to support our destroyers.
We must adopt cruisers of about 5,000 tons, destroyers of 1,300 tons and submarines of 600 tons; we must have cruisers with a radius of action of 7,000 miles and maximum speed of not less than 29 knots; destroyers with radius of action of 4,500 miles and maximum speed of 34 knots; submarines with 4,000 miles radius of action and 16 knots maximum speed on surface; all these must be of appreciable fighting value sufficient for action at home and in the colonies both for political needs in times of peace and collaboration with an allied nation in time of war.
As regards strategic flexibility and political utility, we need at least three groups, each consisting of one cruiser, four destroyers and two submarines; two groups at home and one in the colonies, or a total of three cruisers, twelve destroyers and six submarines. In this way we could normally concentrate at home a naval force composed of two cruisers, eight destroyers and four submarines and in the colonies a force of one cruiser, four destroyers and two submarines.
Altogether we require a fleet made up of →
Cruisers Destroyers
Submarines
15,000 tons. 15,600 4,000
}
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Taking as a basis the latest prices of the British Admiralty per ton of ships ready for service, we get for cruisers £217; destroyers £275; submarines £260, therefore :
3 cruisers
12 destroyers
6 submarines
3,255,000
4,290,000
1,040,000
£8,585,000
Adding to this Naval force four sloops to constitute with our present sloops three cruising groups for escort duties, minesweeping and laying, and various missions in time of peace, we arrive at a cost of approxi- mately £9,000,000.
Considering 10 per cent. of the cost as an expense for maintenance in service, exercises and manoeuvres, according to the English figures, we have a Navy representing maintenance expenses of £900,000 annually, which is within the financial capacity of the nation without representing an excessive charge.
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