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this moment comes, the control of foreign sources of supply may become a popular issue in American politics. On the other hand, British opinion will no doubt follow Deterding in his protests against the Russian efforts of the Standard Oil Company of New York, which may appear as a challenge to Britain in the regions she dominates, a challenge that will seem in extremely bad taste after the "generosity' shown by Great Britain in allowing American operators to participate in the development of Iraq under a sort of British hegemony. And, doubtless too, many Americans knowing no more than their British cousins about the real situation, will lend what support they may to the New York company because it is an American company.
We may look with more or less equanimity upon a trade war between two American companies, but a trade war in the oil industry between a powerful British group and a powerful American group holds within it the possibility of a struggle for dominance of control over the supply by the nations themselves and that is, unfortunately, more serious. There is, of course, the alternative possibility of a combination, or some sort of co-operative arrangement between the great competitors in the field of petroleum; if this can be effected under proper control the danger of serious tension will be materially lessened.
It seems almost as inevitable as the operation of a biological law that the world's oil resources must be developed to supply the world's demands without much reference to political boundaries and ownership of the deposits. The possibilities of accomplishing this without serious international difficulties rest largely upon the shoulders of Great Britain and America. If they accept their dominance as a quasi-trust under which they shall deal justly and reasonably both with the producing nations and the consuming nations, whether they be large or small, strong or weak, trouble can be avoided, but deviation from the course of fairness and justice will be attended with grave danger.
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PART III.
Extracts from the Press.
Articles printed in this section in small type, being mainly translations or cuttings from the Press, are not in themselves confidential, but the existence of such official translations from foreign papers as may be read herein should not be disclosed. Officers are invited to forward extracts translated from foreign naval literature or reviews of books of naval interest suitable for inclusion in this section.
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NOTE.-Extracts from “ Der Krieg Zur See" will be continued in M.I.R. as soon as the new volume, The Mediterranean Squadron," just issued, has been translated.
THE PORTUGUESE NAVAL PROGRAMME.
("O Seculo," 27th January, 1928.)
THE PRESENT SITUATION OF OUR NAVY.
In former articles we dealt with the present situation of the Portuguese Navy and of our Maritime and Naval power. We are now going to show, in a way we consider convincing, that this situation has become alarming and is going with rapid steps towards the complete annihilation of the Portuguese Navy, in its material aspect. Cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines all have reached the maximum age limit, and truly, even when new, they were never anything very great. These vessels are weather-beaten old iron, and our Navy may be correctly referred to by the simple expression, lamentably true, as
Naval sweepings."
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It is the duty of the nation to end a situation so profoundly lament- able. We do not ask to know whether the Naval budget is great or small, for the truth is that this budget is principally concerned with the maintenance of services, which, though necessary to the nation, do not really affect our Navy. It would in fact be better, in order to avoid confusion, that such services should be in another ministry, or that, if they are to remain under the Ministry of Marine they should be the subject of a separate budget. If in the part actually affecting our Navy the budget is, nevertheless, relatively large, the blame is not on the central administration of the navy, but on the Government administration and on our naval policy, which maintains ships on service much beyond their age limit, some ships being more than thirty and others even fifty years of age. This is the simple reason why the cost of our present navy is so high, in comparison with its negligible military value.
None of our insignificant cruisers, none of our frail destroyers, none of our small torpedo boats merit the costly repairs which they frequently undergo, and yet there is no remedy except to repair them for the instant needs of service and naval education. But in spite of so many costly repairs, which amount to some thousands of contos per year
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