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(Telegraphic.)
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(B.)
Draft Reply to Sir M. Lampson (Peking).
YOUR telegram No. 825.
Your attitude is fully approved.
Foreign Office, May 1927.
*
You should in any further conversations or communications with Chang Tso-lin explain to him clearly that his suggestion that His Majesty's Government should assist him in fighting Bolshevism in China and that his future movements depend upon the intentions of the Powers towards the Bolshevist menace in that country practically constitute an invitation to His Majesty's Government and the other Powers to co-operate with him in action amounting, on their part, to direct inter- vention in the internal affairs of China.
Such an invitation cannot possibly be accepted by His Majesty's Government, whose main object at the present time is to refrain from any action which might be interpreted as interference, in China's internal affairs and to observe complete neutrality between all the contesting factions.
His Majesty's Government cannot believe, moreover, that they would be in fact assisting Chang Tso-lin's cause or helping on the campaign upon which he is already successfully embarked for dealing with the extremist elements in territory under his control by adopting a new policy on the suggested lines, which would publicly associate his name with their action, and so probably serve to discredit him with other Chinese elements, and perhaps produce a general reaction from the tendency now becoming apparent all over China to deal with extremist and Bolshevist movements as they deserve.
Repeat to Tokyo, Shanghai, Mr. Newton, Canton for Hong Kong.
(C.)
Draft Letter to Colonial Office.
Sir,
Foreign Office, May 1927. WITH reference to Colonial Office letter of the 4th instant, transmitting copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Governor of Hong Kong regarding the suggested relaxation of the Arms Embargo in favour of General Li Chai-sum, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to state that he has carefully examined this proposal.
2. It appears to Sir Austen Chamberlain that it is at present premature to form any conclusions as to the value of any assurances given by General Li, of whom comparatively little is known. The past has seen many instances of the rise of military leaders who made amicable professions and whose prospects appeared promising, but who have speedily proved to be either unreliable or ineffectual, and it accordingly appears essential that His Majesty's Government should observe the utmost caution in their relations with any new aspirant.
3. Moreover, any assistance, however, restricted, and however well safe- guarded by conditions and assurances, would, in fact, be the first step in a new policy of rendering concrete help in the suppression of Bolshevism in China. Mr. Secretary Amery will remember that his telegram No. 825 of the 5th instant, Sir M. Lampson reported that he had been approached by Chang Tso-lin with a request for assistance for thus purpose. Sir Austen Chamberlain proposes to send the enclosed reply to Sir M. Lampson,* explaining the grounds on which it is impossible to accede to his request. The reasons which necessitate this attitude in the case of such an old-established and well-known leader as Chang Tso-lin, would apply with much greater force to the case of a comparative new-comer like Li Chai- sum, and while he is refusing assistance to the former, Sir Austen Chamberlain cannot consider facilitating the supply of arms to the latter.
4. A further reason for not agreeing to these latest proposals lies in the fact that only a short time ago Sir M. Lampson was anxious as to the possibility of Southern troops invading Peking and Tien-tsin. While the probability of this is more remote at the present moment, it is a possibility that must always be contem- plated, and it is obvious that His Majesty's Government would be placed in a most embarrassing position vis-à-vis the Peking Government if it could be shown that
* See (B).
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they had in any way contributed, however indirectly, towards the strength of the Southern forces.
5. A further point to be considered in this connection is that Li Chai-sum is nominally a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek; it is, therefore, by no means improbable that any arms which His Majesty's Government allowed to reach the former would eventually be used by the latter's troops in the Shanghai area. In view of the presence of British troops in that area, and the possibility that such arms might be used against them, Sir Austen Chamberlain considers that every precau- tion must be taken to guard against this contingency.
6. A copy is enclosed of Mr. Brenan's telegram No. 32 of the 6th May, in which he supports the Governor of Hong Kong's suggestion. Sir Austen Chamberlain, however, remains unconvinced as to the desirability for embarking on this new Arms policy for reasons adduced above. His objections, of course, do not apply to the sale of unarmed motor-boats to the Canton authorities. As regards the proposed shipment of arms through a German firm, it is clear that no special treatment can be given at British ports such as has been and will be denied to other
leaders shipments consigned to other Chinese traders. In fact, the foregoing arguments i
Mr. Brenan will be informed apply as in the case of a direct sale of arms. accordingly, and instructed that the assurance and authorisation suggested in the third paragraph of his telegram must not be given.
Enclosure in (C).
Mr. Brenan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received May 6.) (No. 32.) (Telegraphic.)
Canton (via Hong Kong), May 6, 1927. COLONIAL OFFICE telegram to Hong Kong of 3rd May. Although General Li Chai-sum is at present the outstanding person in Canton, he is by no means an all-powerful dictator. He is still nominally the subordinate of Chiang, and cannot ignore Kuo Min-tang. I fear, therefore, it is useless to expect from him the declaration suggested by Governor of Hong Kong.
I do not suggest we should supply him with arms or encourage British firms to enter into credit transactions, but only that he be given facilities to buy for cash at reasonable rates in Hong Kong or through Hong Kong agents. quite agree that we should regard Chiang's faction with caution. They are not friendly to us, and we may yet have to deal drastically with them, but in the meantime they are undoubtedly fighting our battle by attacking Communists and Soviet agents. They have just searched Soviet consul's mails in Canton and found incriminating documents. If they are forced to compromise with Communists because we prevent them from getting arms we may look for renewal of anti-British boycott in this province, whereas trade prospects are now improving.
General Li Chai-sum is attempting to obtain a consignment of arms, ammunition and explosives through a German firm. German agent has given me particulars and stated that he can import these from Scandinavian countries by a Norwegian ship provided shipment will not be stopped by British, and he asked attitude of His He also wished to Majesty's Government in view of anti-Communist movement. insure with a British company. I could only reply that, provided that the ship did not enter British waters, consignment was not likely to be stopped. As it is difficult to avoid British ports, this is unsatisfactory, and risk of seizure makes transactions unattractive except at high price. In the present circumstances can I give assurance that consignment for Li Chai-sum will not be seized en route and authorise British insurance company to cover risk?
Canton naval authorities also wish to order from Arnhold and Co. eight motor- boats with Thornycroft engines and wireless for pirate prevention, and have offered attractive terms for payment. I have told agent that there is no objection provided that no armament is supplied, but if you do not approve please telegraph immediately, as the matter is urgent.
Anti-foreign movement was not contemplated when Arms Agreement was concluded. Latter, like all co-operative schemes in China, has proved a sorry farce We from British point of view and is now definitely dangerous to our interests. cannot afford to discard any political weapon in present struggle, and should use our control of arms trade, especially in Hong Kong, to our own advantage.
(Repeated to Peking. No. 45, and Hong Kong.)
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