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a desire to make the transaction at once less hazardous and more lucrative. To give an assurance in the sense recommended by Mr. Brenan would be tantamount to providing evidence for a charge that His Majesty's Government were conniving at the supply of arms to Li Chai-Sun and would, in Mr. Amery's opinion, constitute a most dangerous precedent which might seriously embarrass His Majesty's Government in the maintenance of the China Arms Embargo Agree- ment. While, therefore, Mr. Amery concurs with Mr. Brenan and Sir C. Clementi in considering that facilities for the supply of arms should be given to Li Chai- Sum, notwithstanding that no public declaration of good intentions is likely to be obtainable, he considers that it would be at once safer, more expeditious and more convenient if the supply of arms were secretly arranged through Government channels.
5. It is, of course, clear that if any substantial quantity of arms were placed immediately at Li Chai-Sum's disposal, considerable risks would be run, since there would be no guarantee beyond the General's personal assurance that the arms would, in fact, be used in maintaining order in Kwangtung. This objection could, however, be overcome by granting only small supplies of arms at intervals and by making the delivery of each consignment contingent on His Majesty's consul-general being satisfied that Li Chai-Sum was, in fact, making serious efforts to maintain order and to suppress piracy and brigandage in the Province. It would, of course, be understood that these small consignments of arms would be delivered through a shipping company or other intermediary, and not direct from Government sources.
6. It appears to Mr. Amery that the adoption of this procedure would not constitute a breach of the China Arms Embargo Agreement, since the transaction could legitimately be described as involving only the supply of arms to the established authority in Canton for police purposes, and not for use in the Civil War, and as such could be regarded as outside the scope of the Agreement. I am, moreover, to invite Sir Austen Chamberlain's attention to the fact that provision already exists for authorising supplies of arms in special cases, notwithstanding the terms of the China Arnis Embargo Agreement, since the King's Regulations made in 1919 in pursuance of the Agreement contain the following reservation :-
'Nothing in these Regulations shall be deemed to prohibit any transaction authorised by a written licence granted by His Majesty's Minister."
"
7. Mr. Amery is, moreover, of the opinion that the supply of arms in this manner need not be considered to involve a departure from His Majesty's General Government's policy of neutrality towards the contending factions.
Li Chai-Sum is understood to have been in control of Canton for some months, and appears now to have succeeded in consolidating his position there. There is no question, therefore, of assisting him to effect a coup d'État in overthrowing an existing régime, or of encouraging him to extend the bounds of his authority at the expense of rival Administrations. On the contrary, it is only desired to render him such assistance as would enable him to maintain those peaceful conditions which he has already succeeded in establishing in Canton, and to police satisfactorily those outlying districts which he is now engaged in restoring to order.
8. In the last resort, all Governments depend on force, and when, as in this case, an authority has at last succeeded in tranquillising a disturbed district in which a neighbouring British Colony has a vital interest, it would appear illogical to handicap that authority by placing obstacles in the way of the supply of the arms and ammunition necessary for the maintenance of peace and good order while the forces of disorder are liberally furnished with arms by the Soviet. This principle appears long since to have been recognised by the Governments of France and Japan so far as their respective spheres of influence are concerned, since the French have until recently succeeded in avoiding trouble in Yunnan by subsidising the Governor, while the Japanese are well known to have lent material assistance to Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. Neither of these Powers has been openly accused, so far as Mr. Amery is aware, of interfering in affairs in China. On the other hand, each has repeatedly asserted that it is following and will continue to follow a policy of neutrality towards the contending parties, and it seems clear that each regards its established policy in its particular sphere of influence as in no way inconsistent with a general policy of neutrality in China. In view of the
3.
special significance of the relations between Canton and Hong Kong there would appear to be no reason why the considerations urged in respect of France and Japan should not be held to apply with equal force to His Majesty's Government in respect of Kwangtung.
9. Finally, I am to invite attention to recent correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Peking in regard to the supply of Vickers' aeroplanes to Chang Tso-Lin. It is understood that in response to Sir M. Lampson's repre- sentations the supply of these aeroplanes has now been sanctioned, but that while it is clear that they will, in fact, be used for military purposes, they have been described as commercial, in order that there may be no conflict with the terms of the China Arms Embargo Agreement. If the supply of aeroplanes to a Northern general under a specious disguise of this nature is not regarded as improper, Mr. Amery can see no reason why the despatch of arms to a Southern general for police purposes should not be regarded as equally legitimate.
10. In short, it appears to Mr. Amery that the adoption of the Governor's proposal in the form suggested above would not constitute a breach of the China Arms Embargo Agreement, would not involve a reversal of the established policy of neutrality in China, and, even if known to them, would not be objected to by other Powers, at least two of which follow the same principle. Moreover, the proposal can scarcely be distinguished in principle from the concessions already granted to a Northern general. In view of these considerations and of the importance to Hong Kong of preserving harmonious relations with Canton, I am to commend the proposal to Sir Austen Chamberlain's favourable consideration.
11. A copy of this letter is being sent to the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Committee of Imperial Defence.
Enclosure 1.
I am,
&c.
G. GRINDLE.
Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Dated May 6, 1927.
(Received Colonial Office, 8:30 A.M., May 6, 1927.)
My telegram of 27th April: Arins embargo.
Portuguese consul-general called to see me to-day at the request of the Governer of Macao, who had received request from General Li-Chai-Sum for arms and ammunition, accompanied by offer that, if request were granted, all Reds and strikers now causing anxiety to the Macao Government would be driven away from Lappa and Portuguese frontier. The Governor of Macao asked for my opinion and said that he would in this matter follow the policy of Hong Kong Government.
I replied that Li-Chai-Sum had also asked the British authorities for arins and ammunition; that in my opinion arms embargo was injurious to Hong Kong and Macao, but that I did not think that it should be relaxed in favour of Li-Chai-Sum unless he publicly declared his intention to suppress all anti-foreign manifestations to respect foreign treaty rights pending negotiation in proper form of revised treaties and to suppress piracy and brigandage; and that in any case decision would have to be taken in London and Lisbon and not by the Governor of Macao and myself locally.
Portuguese consul-general said that the Governor of Macao would doubtless telegraph similar views to Lisbon and meanwhile postpone definite answer to Li-Chai-Sum.
(Repeated to Peking, No. 34; Canton.)
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