214
3
215
authorities, who support this operation, must be satisfied that these risks may rightly be accepted. We consider, therefore, that until the end of November the line of communications of the force at Hankow with the sea can be maintained and the Concession can be held.
5. If the reoccupation of the Concession is undertaken we consider that no preliminary warning should be given, since this would enable the Chinese forces to prepare resistance and render it a more formidable and expensive operation. The embarkation of the necessary forces at Shanghai will itself give sufficient warning to the Hankow Government.
6. Up to now we have been dealing with the Naval Commander-in-Chief's original project, which we had already recommended to the Cabinet as feasible from a military point of view. Since the last Meeting of the Cabinet, however, a telegram has been received from the Naval Commander-in-Chief (No. 1015 of the 27th April) reporting that he has received deputations from the British Chamber of Commerce representing that the decision to afford protection at Hankow only to British property in the British Concession in case of emergency there would expose British property outside the limits of our Concession to the risk of destruction, such property being ten times as valuable as that within the limits. As the result, the Naval Commander- in-Chief, in consultation with the General Officer Commanding, has suggested that protection should be provided for the bulk of these properties at the same time as the Concession is reoccupied. This involves an increase of the military forces up to three Infantry Battalions in addition to a Battalion of Royal Marines, four Battalions in all, as well as a Section of Armoured Cars and one Battery of Artillery (G. O. C. Shanghai Defence Force, telegram of the 28th April, 1927).
7. In our Third Report (C.ID. Paper No. 794-B*) we laid stress on the importance of using, as far as possible, Naval forces for the reoccupation of the Concession, owing to the possibility that we might later have to withdraw. We emphasised that the withdrawal of Naval forces would involve less loss of face than that of a military expedition. We recommended that any troops with which it was necessary to reinforce Naval landing-parties should be regarded in the same light as Marines. The Chief of the Naval Staff, at the Meeting of the Cabinet on the 27th April, reiterated that we recommended the proposals of the Naval Commander- in-Chief on the understanding that the two Battalions embarked from the Shanghai Defence Force should be regarded as landing-parties used in the same manner as Marines." The withdrawal of the larger force now contemplated by the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the General Officer Commanding would not only involve loss of prestige, but would be a more formidable operation at low river. The occupation of the British properties also involves increased tactical dispersion at Hankow. For these reasons we cannot accept the larger operation contemplated by the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the General Officer Commanding, and our positive recommendation is confined to Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's original proposal involving the use of only two Battalions over and above Naval landing- parties.
The Hanyang Arsenal.
8. We have examined in detail, so far as the information at our disposal permits, the project for the destruction of the Hanyang Arsenal, some particulars of which are given in the Appendix. From this it will be seen that any plans for the destruction of the Arsenal must take into consideration (a) the possibility of causing damage to the Japanese Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, (b) the danger of causing considerable loss of life in the densely populated areas of Hanyang and Hankow ('ities, and (c) the measure of resistance which is likely to be encountered.
9. Three methods could be employed to put the Arsenal out of action, viz. :-
(i.) Deliberate destruction by means of a landing-party;
(ii) Bombardment from the River;
(iii.) Bombardment from the air.
Of the above, destruction by means of a landing-party is likely to be the most effective, while the other two methods can only be relied upon to cause damage and not total destruction. Further, only by resort to a landing-party can the possibility
* C.P. 131 (27),
of damaging the Japanese works and of causing considerable loss of life to the Chinese inhabitants be absolutely obviated. The extent of the resistance to a landing is impossible to estimate.
10.
In a previous Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 792-B) we were opposed to the destruction of the Arsenal at Hankow as a measure of sanction, on the ground that this action might antagonise the various forces hostile to the extremist faction at Hankow, more particularly as those forces would probably be counting on obtaining the use of the Arsenal sooner or later. The attention of the Naval Commander-in- Chief has been drawn to this consideration, and we notice that he now wishes to keep the destruction of the Arsenal in reserve as a possible reprisal for resistance to the reoccupation of the Concession (Commander-in-Chief's Telegram No. 1015 of the 27th April).
11. Whether the destruction of the Hanyang Arsenal would result in antagonising the whole of China, involving a great increase in the risk to our long line of communications by the river, and other consequences such as the reimposition of the boycott, or not, we cannot doubt that the adoption of this course would cause great resentment locally. It would probably lead to reprisals against British property at Hankow, including the British Concession. Further, if adopted as a preliminary to the reoccupation of the Concession, it would provoke the preparation of resistance and increase our difficulties. Hence, although we regard the destruction, or partial destruction, of the Arsenal as a feasible military operation, we think that, unless the men on the spot consider it necessary as a military measure to hamper any opposition to our original reoccupation or subsequent retention of the Concession, it should be kept in reserve for the present.
12.
The Position during the Period of Low River.
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As the result of a detailed study of the question, we have ascertained that all cruisers other than H.M.S. "Hawkins and H.M.S. Vindictive can proceed as far as Wuhu at any time of the year. Gunboats can reach Hankow at any time, but Destroyers and Sloops are normally unable to do so during the period of low river viz., the 30th November to the 26th March. We understand, however, that in the opinion of the Rear-Admiral, Yangtse, Destroyers could in an emergency be sufficiently lightened to steam or be towed from Hankow down river, except perhaps for one month (unspecified) in the winter.
13. From a military point of view one of the difficulties in maintaining communications with Hankow during the period of low river is that the actual fall varies from 14 feet at Wuhu to 45 feet at Hankow; consequently, the guns of the ships could not be brought to bear on the forts or on field guns concealed in the vicinity on account of the height of the river banks. In such circumstances landings with a view to the destruction of defences would meet with exceptional difficulties, owing to the lack of covering-fire and the long stretches of muddy foreshore which might be encountered. We are aware that the Naval Commander-in-Chief has expressed the view that communications can be maintained, but we feel bound to warn the Cabinet that if the banks of the river are held by forces actively hostile, it might be impossible to maintain the communications. It is not possible for us to state definitely that the communications can be maintained after the 30th November.
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.
14. Our Conclusions and Recommendations may be summarised as follows:— (1.) From a military point of view the reoccupation of the British Concession at Hankow by Naval forces, supplemented by two Battalions from the Shanghai Defence Force, is a feasible operation, and we adhere to our opinion that the two Battalions should be regarded as landing- parties to be used in the same manner as Marines.
(2.) We do not recommend the scheme proposed by the Naval Commander-in- Chief (telegram No. 1015) and the General Officer Commanding Shanghai Defence Force (telegram of the 28th April) for giving protection in addition to British property outside the Concession, involving the use of a total of four Battalions as well as Armoured Cars and field guns. The
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