SECRET.
795-B.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. April 1927.
2/3
(Also Papers Nos. C.O.S. 87
and C.P. 138 (27).)
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
Copy No.
40
THE SITUATION IN CHINA, APRIL 29, 1927. SANCTIONS AT HANKOW.
Fourth Report by the Chiefs of Staff.
AT the last Meeting of the Cabinet we were instructed to consider further the question of the practicability of holding the British Concession at Hankow during the period of low water. We have not only studied this question, but we are also in a position, as the result of a detailed enquiry, to report further on the whole of the proposed operations at Hankow. In making this Report, we also have taken into consideration all the latest information on the subject.
2. From the various telegrams to and from the Far East we note that co-opera- tion by other Governments in the application of sanctions is becoming more remote, and we have therefore considered the question mainly from the point of view of action by Great Britain alone. We further note that there is general agreement in principle by all concerned that Hankow is the right place at which action should be taken to put pressure on the Cantonese Government. This is the view of the Naval Commander-in-chief, the British Minister at Peking, the Consul-General at Shanghai, and has been accepted in principle by the Cabinet itself. There is, however, some difference of opinion as to what form the pressure should take. The Naval Commander-in-Chief, who is supported by the General Officer Commanding the Shanghai Defence Force and the Consul-General at Shanghai, strongly presses for the reoccupation of the Concession. The British Minister at Peking is prepared to agree at once to the proposed reoccupation of the Concession rather than to see nothing done at Hankow, though he very greatly prefers the destruction of the Hanyang Arsenal (Telegram No. 791 of the 27th April, 1927). We presume that the Čabinet will wish to be advised on the military aspects of these alternative pro- posals a question which is dealt with later in this Report.
Possible Immediate Action.
3. The detailed examination which we have made of the proposal to reoccupy the British Concession at Hankow confirms us in the opinion expressed by the Chief of the Naval Staff on our behalf at the last Meeting of the Cabinet in favour of the original proposals of the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the understanding that the two Battalions (which were the only purely military force then contemplated) should be regarded as landing-parties used in the same manner as Marines.
Judged by normal military standards, the proposed operation would be hazardous on account of the dangers inherent in the very exposed line of communica- tion and of the fact that the Concession is dominated from the surrounding country. and that artillery established on hills on the right bank of the river could, if suitably handled, make the Concession untenable. The Chinese Army, however, falls below the normal standard, and this factor can be assessed only in the light of local knowledge and local experience. It is evident that the local Naval and Military
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