11
place almost daily at practically every Yangtse port
forcibly resisted. If we did that -- as we are not
only justified but now in a position to do such
encroachments would quickly cease and our whole
position in China would be immediately improved. Our
prestige would at once rise one hundred per cent".
They
The Cabinet felt that, on political grounds, the
case for re-occupying the Concession at Hankow had proved
on investigation to be weaker than they had expected.
were impressed by the fact that the operation was not only
not likely to be welcomed by the Powers who had participated
in the Nanking Note, but that it did not receive whole-
hearted support from all British official representatives
in China. While accepting the view of the Committee of
Chiefs of Staff that the original and more limited plan
is a feasible military operation, it was commented that
proposals had already been made to extend its scope and
that the extent of the ultimate military liability could
not be gauged. In these circumstances the Cabinet agreed
(a)
That neither the re-occupation of the Eritish
Concession at Hanow nor the destruction of the
Hany ang Arsenal should be undertaken at present:
(b) That, in the absence of any acceptable sanctions,
it would be undesirable to co-operate in any further
Note by four Powers only to the Nationalist Goverment
at Hankow:
(c)