15
(c.) As firing is unlikely to be in the future any more than in the past, confined to the persons or parties who were guilty of the Nanking outrages, our reprisals must presumably be equally directed to any other parties firing on us who had nothing to do with those outrages.
Foreign Office, S. W. 1.
April 20, 1927.
A. C.
ANNEXURE No. 4.
Appendix I to Cabinet 28 (27).
Copy of a Telegram from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, China, No. 756, dated April 25, 1927.
(Emergency State.)
WITH reference to your repeated recommendations to take immediate action. against Hankow, what have you in mind besides bombardment of arsenal ?
Do you still contemplate reoccupation of Concession, vide your No. 980? If so, after consulting General Officer Commanding, report what force you propose to use? Having in mind, however, if the situation is not completely cleared up by October, the garrison would have to be evacuated when Cruisers are withdrawn, and that it would be deplorable to evacuate a second time, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is definitely opposed to a military occupation with considerable garrison.
Perhaps, however, occupation by Naval Ratings and Marines or troops acting as Marines and based on warships would not involve the same loss of face.
With reference to your No. 999 and Rear-Admiral, Yangtse's, 1946/23 and 1946/24, are you satisfied that lines of communications between Hankow and the sea can be maintained, whether Chiang Kai-shek remains friendly or otherwise.
D. O. D.
Appendix II to Cabinet 28 (27).
Copy of Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, China, to the Admiralty, dated
(Emergency State.)
10. YOUR No. 756.
April 26, 1927.
I have never [group corrupt, repetition asked for policy present or future, but I am still of the opinion, which is shared by G.O.C. and Consul-General, Shanghai, that time has come when an all British effort should be made as follows: Embark force of two battalions which the G.O.C. is prepared to supply. Proceed to Hankow with strong Naval force (I propose to go myself). Inform authorities at Hankow that we intend to reoccupy our Concession we hope peacefully but are fully prepared to use force if necessary. If any opposition is made we shall first destroy Hanyang Arsenal, and if we are obliged to take this drastic step we cannot be responsible for lives of inhabitants of Hankow and that other drastic steps will be taken at same time. The points of this proposal are as follows: (i) Hankow Concession will probably be reoccupied without firing a shot; (ii) it is an all British operation and does not affect any Nationality except our own; (iii) it will pave the way for reoccupation of all other Con- cessions and if Chiang Kai-shek is still in power it will place him in very strong position.
With regard to situation next October I could not hazard reply except that I am prepared to keep open all communication between Hankow and the sea, but it will probably be necessary for a cruiser to winter at Hankow and a permanent guard number to be decided later on, probably two companies.
2057