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tions would involve at least two divisions, and is therefore more than we can undertake alone in view of the demands elsewhere.
2. In these circumstances you must be prepared to evacuate both Peking and Tien-tsin in case of danger, and may forthwith issue any warnings and take any steps
think necessary
without further reference home. you
3. You should inform your foreign colleagues of the instructions contained in paragraph 2 above.
4. Commander-in-chief is being instructed to arrange with you and competent military authority to carry out evacuation if and when you consider it necessary.
Repeat to Commander-in-chief and General Officer Commanding, North China (Repeated to Washington, No. 162; Tokyo, No. 75; Paris, No. 78 (by bag); Rome, No. 98, for information.)
C.P. 130 (27).
ANNEXURE No. 3.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA, APRIL 17TH, 1927.
POSSIBLE SANCTIONS.
Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Second Report by the Chiefs of Staff (C.P. 128 (27) ).*
I AM quite clear-after reading all the telegrams which have reached me I am not at all sure that to-day-that such instructions cannot be issued now.
they ought ever to be issued, but this question can be better decided later.
The first step is to secure agreement on the answer to Chen. Assuming that that brings no satisfaction from him and that the Nationalist Government is still at Hankow, I hold that Hankow is the proper place for reprisals—all the more so because the Japanese are deeply engaged at Hankow.
But, in truth, time is essential to enable us to see (1) what is the attitude of the new Japanese Government; (2) what is the attitude of the United States Government; (3) what is the immediate result of the struggle (a) between Borodin cum Chen and Chiang, and (b) between North and South.
Of the new proposals from the Chiefs of Staff I would say at present only—
1. They are a complete reversal of our present policy, especially as regards the dispersal of military force. The Chiefs of Staff have hitherto insisted that the Shanghai Defence Force should be used for defensive It was not and protective purposes only in one specified area. contemplated that these troops would be used elsewhere or be placed at the disposal of any naval or other authority to carry out reprisals all over China.
2. They would take all control of the situation completely out of the hands of the home authorities. For, in order to be effective, the instructions free issued to the naval and military authorities must give them a very hand, and enable them to act at once on their own judgment.
3. As a substitute for the application of sanctions to enforce the Nanking
demands they seem of doubtful efficacy for:
(a.) If firing ceases on the Chinese side we will be no nearer to
getting satisfaction for those demands;
(b.) If some measure of satisfaction is conceded to those demands, but firing on the Yangtse or elsewhere continues, we are still faced with the question how to deal with that firing;
* C.I.D. Paper No. 793-B.