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the Shanghai Defence Force, is a feasible operation, and we adhere to our opinion that the two Battalions should be regarded as landing-parties to be used in the same manner as Marines.
(2.) We do not recommend the scheme proposed by the Naval Commander- in-Chief (telegram No. 1015) and the General Officer Commanding Shanghai Defence Force (Telegram of the 28th April) for giving protection in addition to British property outside the Concession, involving the use of a total of four Battalions as well as Armoured Cars and field guns. The withdrawal of these large forces in case of necessity would involve loss of "face" and would increase the military difficulties of evacuation. We are strongly opposed to the dispersion of force involved, and to so large a military commitment.
(3.) We recommend that, if the reoccupation of the Concession is under- taken, there should be no preliminary warning other than that inevitably involved in the embarkation of the necessary forces at Shanghai and their trans- portation to Hankow.
(4.) We consider that, until the end of November, the line of communications of the force at Hankow with the sea can be maintained.
(5.) Judged by ordinary military standards, the above operations would be hazardous, owing to the long and exposed line of communications and to the fact that the British Concession at Hankow can be dominated by artillery established in adjacent hills, but the Chinese Army falls below the normal standard, and we assume that the local Naval and Military authorities, who support this operation and who are in the best position to judge, are satisfied that the risks can be accepted.
(6.) The destruction, or partial destruction, of the Hanyang Arsenal is, in our opinion, a feasible military operation. It might, however, antagonise the various forces hostile to the extremist faction at Hankow and so increase our difficulties. In any event, it would outrage local opinion at Hankow and might lead to reprisals against British property and the preparation of resistance to the reoccupation of the Concession. We consider, therefore, that, unless it is required as a military measure in connection with the reoccupation or subse- quent retention of the Concession, the destruction of the Arsenal should be kept in reserve for the present.
(7.) In view of the great fall of the water level at low water (the 30th November to the 26th March), which varies from 14 feet at Wuhu to 45 feet at Hankow, the small craft which alone can navigate the river above Wuhu during that period will encounter great difficulty in dealing with forts and guns on the other side of the steep banks. In these circumstances, apart from the risks referred to in conclusion (5), we cannot guarantee that communications with Hankow can be kept open during the months referred to."
24. The Report referred to in the preceding paragraph was examined by the Cabinet at its meeting held on the 2nd May, 1927 (reference Cabinet 29 (27) ). At this meeting the attention of the Cabinet was drawn to the advice given. by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee in their Second Report on Sanctions (C.I.D. Paper No. 793-B) in favour of greater authority being given to the Naval Forces, not merely to reply to fire from the banks, but to counter-attack with all their power anyone firing on ships flying the British flag on the Yangtse. It was pointed out that this plan might be extended to appropriate action at ports if British lives or property were assailed by the Nationalist Force.
The following passage from Sir Miles Lampson's telegram, No. 805 of the 30th April, was quoted in this connection:-
"Of course, if His Majesty's Government deliberately decide to adopt a new policy and are henceforth prepared in serious earnest wherever practically possible in future to defend by force and at once any attack on British lives and property, matters at once assume a new aspect. But in that case it should be dealt with on that basis and not as a reprisal for Nanking. I should welcome such a modification of policy which [two groups undecypherable] is overdue and should see with a sigh of relief such encroachments as are taking place almost daily at practically every Yangtse port forcibly resisted. If we did that—as we are not only justified but now in a position to do-such encroachments would quickly cease and our whole position in China would be immediately improved. Our prestige would at once rise one hundred per cent."
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