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20. On the 19th April the Chiefs of Staff again met and reviewed the whole question of possible sanctions in the light of the rapidly changing situation in China and of the latest telegrams which had been received from Peking, Shanghai and Hong Kong. As a result of this meeting a second report (C.I.D. Paper No. 793–B) was submitted on the subject of possible sanctions, the conclusions of which were as follows:-
"(a.) In view of the rapid changes in the situation in China and of the difficulty in securing agreement by all the British and international authorities concerned in any particular sanction, there should be a change of system. The attempt to prescribe sanctions from home should be abandoned, and the Admiralty should be empowered to authorise the Naval Commander-in-Chief not only to reply to fire directed against His Majesty's ships, but whenever fire is directed against any ship flying the British flag to take retaliatory action against the offender with all the forces at his disposal and, if necessary, to land parties for the purpose of completing the destruction of forts or guns guilty of such action. For this purpose the Naval Commander-in-Chief should be authorised to draw on the Shanghai Defence Force for any troops he may require and which the General-Officer-Commanding can spare. The War Office should be empowered to give the necessary authority to the General-Officer-Commanding.
(b.) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should notify these dispositions to the British Minister at Peking, and should take such steps as he may deem appropriate to invite corresponding instructions to their respective Senior Naval Officers from the other Powers concerned with us in the Nanking demands.
(c.) The above arrangement should remain in force as a means of exercising continuous pressure until the Cantonese Government have given satisfaction to the Nanking demands.
(d.) For the moment the proposed destruction of the Dane Island and Bogue Forts should be dropped as a measure of sanction for the outrages at Nanking, but the question should be studied and a plan should be prepared for adoption in case of enemy activity at Hong Kong, or, if circumstances should later on render this course desirable, either as a sanction or as a preliminary to the destruction of the Canton Arsenal. At present, however, we are not in a position to advise definitely whether the operation is advisable.
(e.) The Senior Naval Officer should be authorised before any attack on the Dane Island and Bogue Forts is made, and at such moment as he may deem appropriate, to reconnoitre and photograph them from the air."
21. In accordance with the general instructions from the Cabinet to keep the question of Sanctions constantly under review, the Chiefs of Staff again assembled on the 25th April, 1927, to re-examine their previous recommendations contained in C.I.D. Papers Nos. 792-B and 793-B in the light of the latest reports from China, and also to consider a Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Annexure No. 3 to this paper).
As a result of their discussion the Chiefs of Staff submitted a Third Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 794-B) on the subject of possible sanctions, the recommendations of which were as follows :
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(a.) We adhere generally to the recommendations contained in our Second Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 793-B), and we consider that, as far as possible, latitude should be given to the men on the spot in regard to the method and moment for such reprisals as have been generally approved by His Majesty's Government.
(b.) We agree in principle that, in present circumstances, Hankow is the proper place for reprisals, provided that it is not already too late and provided that effective sanctions can be found.
(c.) We adhere to the view we have already expressed against the reoccupation of the British Concession at Hankow if it involves the maintenance of a military garrison there. We think it possible, however, that a temporary reoccupation of the Concession, if strongly desired by His Majesty's Government, might be effected by means of parties landed from His Majesty's Ships, reinforced by Marines from Shanghai, and, if necessary, by a few troops used as additional landing parties. His Majesty's Government, however, must be the judge as to whether the withdrawal of these Naval forces when the river falls in October
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