opinion that the defence of Shameen was practicable and that it should not be evacuated.
In these circumstances the Chiefs of Staff concluded (C.I.D. Paper No. 789-B)-
“8. In the circumstances we see no reason to depart from the recom- mendations contained in paragraph 15 of our previous Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 762-B), to the effect that the men on the spot should have full discretion to hold Shameen as long as they consider possible with the forces available nor to modify the instructions issued to the local authorities at Hong Kong when these recommendations were approved."
16. The Chiefs of Staff, at their Meeting held on the 11th April, 1927, also had under consideration a telegram from the Naval Commander-in-Chief (No. 962 of the 10th April, 1927) outlining his proposals for bombarding the forts on the Yangtse and the batteries and Arsenal at Hankow, as well as for controlling Chinese traffic on the Yangtse between Hankow and Nanking.
As a result of their discussion of this telegram the Chiefs of Staff concluded :—
"In order that the various measures may be taken in accordance with the proposed programme, the Commander-in-Chief will require at least three days for making the necessary preparations and getting his ships into position. We therefore strongly recommend that he should be informed as early as possible of the decision of His Majesty's Government as to whether he is to be prepared to act alone in the event of America and Japan refusing to co-operate, and, if so, on whose instructions."
(C.I.D. Paper No. 790-B.)
17. At the same Meeting the Chiefs of Staff had under consideration two telegrams from Sir Miles Lampson (Nos. 634 and 642 of the 7th and 8th April respectively) and a Memorandum" by the Foreign Office regarding the situation in China, with Special Reference to Peking and Tientsin, and submitted a report (C.I.D. Paper No. 791-B), from which the following Conclusions are extracted:~-
(a.) Peking Legation.
"We are, therefore, firmly convinced that no attempt should be made to retain our Legation and Legation guards in Peking, beyond the point when they can withdraw without requiring assistance from extraneous sources in the form of additional troops. The decision as to when this point has been reached must, of course, rest with our Minister at Peking, and we recommend that he should be instructed on no account to run the risk of being beleaguered in such a way as might involve the despatch of a relief column to extricate him and his Legation."
(b.) Tientsin.
"(i.) We can make no contribution to the defence of Tientsin until the end of May, when, if the situation in other parts of China permits, we may be able to provide a maximum of one Brigade.
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(ii.) The use of this Brigade for the defence of Tientsin is dependent upon the provision by the other Powers of the balance of the two Divisions which we consider the minimum force necessary for holding Tientsin and keeping open the lines of communication to Tangku."
18. The Cabinet, at a Meeting held on the 13th April, 1927 (reference Cabinet 27 (27) Conclusion 1), considered the three Reports by the Chiefs of Staff referred to in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 above, and reached the following Conclusions:-
"(a.) In regard to Peking and Tientsin: That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should send telegrams to Washington and Tokyo on the lines of the draft telegrams attached as Enclosure 3 to Appendix (A) to the Chiefs of
* Printed as appendices to C.I.D. Paper No. 791–B.
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