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2.
with it a grave risk of inflicting considerable general
injury and perhaps loss of life. As regards the proposed
ro-occupation of Hankow they note that you would agree to
this step failing any other more effective measure but
that you are opposed to it on its merits.
3. It is clear from the report now received from
the Chiefs of Staff that it is impossible to guarantee
in advance that Hankow would not have to be evacuated
again at low water, even if no sort of settlement has
been in the meanwhile reached with the competent Chinese
authorities. The risk of a second evacuation in such
conditions is one which cannot be faced, as its realisa-
tion would expose His Majesty's Government to a far great-
er locs of prestige than anything that has as yet occurred. The Chiefs of Staff are moreover opposed to the occupation of British property at Hankow outside the concession.
4. It is clear from information now received that
the re-occupation of Hankow would make a most unfortunate impression throughout the United States of America and
probably alco elsewhere in the world outside China.
While therefore they have reluctantly but definitely decided against a policy of sanctions for the Nanking outrages and against the re-occupation of Hankow concession, His Majesty's Givernment are at present considering the possibility as a general line of policy of revising the instructions to their military and naval authorities in China somewhat on the lines suggested in your telegram No.805 (of May 1st), so as to give them greater latitude in adopting prompt reprisals for any similar outrages or incidenta in the future. There are considerable diffi- culties in the way of adopting such a policy which require careful examination, but I will keep you informed of any decisions which may be arrived at.
Repeat to Shanghai for Co ander-in-Chief.