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(d.) Whether the above troops can be found from forces now in the Far East will depend on the general situation prevailing at the time. (e.) The presence of His Majesty's Minister in the Colony would seriously complicate the accommodation problem, since all the existing accommodation and more would be required for the troops mentioned in (b) and (c) above. His presence would also involve an additional military commitment, and would thus prove an embarrassment.
(f.) The evacuation of the remainder of the Leased Territory outside the defensive zone would be advisable in the event of the situation deteriorating.
And (ii) the following telegrams :—
From the Secretary of State for the Colonies (No. C.O. 183 (27))* to the Commissioner of Wei-hai-wei, dated the 4th June, 1927, summarising the above Report, directing the Commissioner to communicate with the Commander-in- Chief with a view to preliminary preparation, and stating that a Battalion from the Shanghai Defence Force was now under orders for Wei-hai-wei to act as an escort for the Convalescent Depot, on the arrival of which the detachment now at Wei-hai-wei would be withdrawn to Tientsin.
From the Commissioner of Wei-hai-wei (No. C.O. 184 (27))* to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated the 8th June, reporting the prepara- tions and progress at Wei-hai-wei; welcoming the presence of the Battalion; stating that he had conferred with General Duncan; and suggesting, inter alia, that with aircraft the whole territory could be protected by a smaller force than experts at home, without knowledge of China, consider necessary.
From the Naval Commander-in-Chief in China (No. 1164),* dated the 14th June, stating that he was assured by the Consul-General at Shanghai and Colonel Carpenter. R.M., both of whom are intimately acquainted with Wei-hai-wei, that two additional Battalions and Batteries were entirely unnecessary, and that one Battalion and a few seaplanes, which Admiral Tyrwhitt proposed to send in the “ Argus, ** could hold the whole of the Leased Territory against any force which was likely to attempt to break through.
The Committee agreed that in present circumstances it was unnecessary to main- tain more than one Battalion at Wei-hai-wei for defensive purposes.
16. Mention was also made at this meeting of—
(i) the possibility of sending a further battalion of the Shanghai Defence Force to Wei-hai-wei for climatic reasons, and no objection to the proposal was raised; and
(ii) of the appointment of a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief all the British forces in China. It was finally agreed that General Duncan should be responsible for the British military forces in China other than those at Hong Kong.
17.
At a meeting held on Wednesday, the 29th June, at 11:30 A. M., the Cabinet took note of the Conclusion of the Cabinet Committee on China in regard to
(a) the Reduction of Cruisers on the China Station (see paragraph 14 above)
and
(b) Wei-hai-wei (see paragraph 15 above).
(Cabinet 37 (27), Conclusion 9.)
18. At this meeting also the Secretary of State for War reminded the Cabinet that on the 31st May it had been decided that no troops should be withdrawn from China, as the Southern troops were advancing north rapidly and the occupation of Peking by the Nationalists appeared imminent. Since then there had been a check in this advance and various changes had taken place in the situation. For example,
* Not printed.
i
there had been an accession of strength to the foreign forces in China since the 31st May, the main items of which were
France America Japan
900. 2,800 and 12 aeroplanes. 2,000 (Tsingtau).
For the above reasons the Chief of the Imperial General Staff considered that there was a surplus of British troops, and recommended to commence the withdrawal of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, which would at all times admit of our reinforcing North China with one Brigade, if necessary. A reinforcement in North China of a second Brigade would also be available until such time as it was decided to with- draw the 13th Infantry Brigade, provided the position in Shanghai remained unchanged. The withdrawal of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade would mean a saving of about £62,500 a month.
The Secretary of State for Air asked for authority to withdraw a Squadron of the Royal Air Force from China, as it was now redundant, and there were no adequate facilities for flying practice.
Subject to the agreement of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Cabinet agreed-
(a.) To authorise the Secretary of State for War to arrange for the withdrawal
of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade from China.
(b.) To authorise the Secretary of State for Air to arrange for the withdrawal
of one Squadron of the Royal Air Force from China.
2. Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1, June 30, 1927.
(Signed)
M. P. A. HANKEY.
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