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Affairs, in which the latter, in reply to Sir J. Tilley's statement of our desire to co-operate with Japan, had replied that, "although an alliance no longer existed, the spirit of it did, and he hoped by frank conversations to keep it in force.
In this connection the Cabinet agreed-
(a.) To take note, with approval of the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to reciprocate the views of the new Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported in Sir J. Tilley's telegram No. 216, that, although an alliance no longer existed, the spirit of it did.”
(Cabinet 30 (27), Conclusion 1 (a).)
4. The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee met on the 5th May to consider the memorandum by the Foreign Office and the terms of reference mentioned in paragraph 2 above, and submitted a report (C.I.D. Paper No. 798-B) containing draft instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.
5. In this report (C.I.D. Paper No. 798-B) the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee also dealt with the reference, quoted in paragraph 2 (b) (ii) above, in regard to Chinking, and reported that they concurred in the views expressed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, the General Officer Commanding Shanghai Defence Force and the Consul-General, Shanghai, and were unable to recommend any military measure at Chinkiang at present."
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6. At this meeting on the 5th May, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee also considered a joint memorandum by the Foreign Office and Colonial Office on the question of defending Wei-hai-Wei, and agreed that this question should be considered in the first instance by the Oversea Defence Committee.
7. The report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee referred to in paragraph 4 above was considered by the Cabinet at a meeting held on the 11th May, when in reply to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Beatty agreed that there would be no objection, if the Cabinet so desired, to the insertion of words in the instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief to make it clear that punitive action taken in regard to outrages which endangered British property, but not British lives, should only be taken after reference to, and sanction by, His Majesty's Government. He emphasised, however, the importance of not fettering more than was absolutely necessary the discretion of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who had up to now shown the greatest circumspection.
The Cabinet agreed :—
"(a.) To approve generally the Fifth Report by the Chiefs of Staff on sanctions in China (C.I.D. Paper No. 798-B), subject to amendment of the draft instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief with the object of making clear the circumstances in which the prior sanctions of His Majesty's Govern- ment should be obtained before taking punitive action.
(b.) That the First Lord of the Admiralty, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, should draw up telegraphic instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief based on the Fifth Report of the Chiefs of Staff, amended as above, and that the telegram should be repeated to the British Minister at Peking."
(Cabinet 31 (27), Conclusion 1.)
8. The Cabinet again met on the 19th May, and considered various questions affecting the situation in China-
(1.) With regard to facilities for the supply of Arms to Chinese authorities,
the Cabinet agreed:-
"(a.) As regards the arms embargo, that the policy of neutrality among the various contending factors in China should be adhered to, and that no facilities in the matter of arms should be given to the Cantonese General, Li-Chai-Sun."
(Cabinet 32 (27), Conclusion 4.)
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(ii.) With regard to the Retention of Shipping in the Far East the Cabinet were informed that the China (Military Details) Committee had decided on the 28th February, that sufficient troopships should be kept between Hong Kong and Shanghai to enable a Brigade to be on the water simultaneously at short notice and at the minimum expense. Under this decision three ships were at present retained. The five transports conveying the 15th Brigade were now arriving at Hong Kong, and the Secretary of State for War proposed that these should be dispensed with as soon as the troops were landed. To retain them in the Far East would cost approximately £1,400 a day. The 15th Brigade might not have to move from Hong Kong, and if a move became necessary it could be carried out by the ships already retained.
CC The Cabinet authorised the Secretary of State for War to continue to act on the decision of the China (Military Details) Committee referred to above.”
(Cabinet 32 (27), Conclusion 5.)
(iii.) In connection with the subject dealt with in sub-paragraph (ii) above, the Cabinet were informed that, if there were any question of returning the Indian Mixed Brigade to India, a saving of perhaps £100,000 would be effected by sending it back in the ships which had brought the 15th Brigade to Hong Kong, The Cabinet were reminded that considerable expense was involved in the retention of the Indian Mixed Brigade.
The Cabinet agreed-
"That until the situation in China became clearer than at present it would be unsafe to dispense with the presence of the Indian Mixed Brigade of the Shanghai Defence Force."
(Cabinet 32 (27), Conclusion 6.)
9. At a meeting held on the 25th May the attention of the Cabinet was again drawn to the financial aspects of the retention of the Indian Mixed Brigade of the Shanghai Defence Force. It was pointed out that in the case of the British portion of that Force the cost, apart from incidental expenses, was only the difference of maintaining men in Shanghai instead of at their normal stations. In the case of the Indian Mixed Brigade, however, the whole burden fell upon the British taxpayer and their cost was three or four times as great as that of the British troops.
The Cabinet agreed-
CC
(a.) That three of the ships which had brought to the Far East the last British Brigade of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and had not yet started their homeward voyage should be retained at Hong Kong for a week, or, if necessary, longer, in case the rapidly changing events in China should render possible the withdrawal of the Indian Mixed Brigade.
(b.) That the Cabinet Committee on China should meet before the next meeting of the Cabinet to consider (in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff as required) the following points :-
(i.) The possible withdrawal of the Indian Mixed Brigade.
(ii.) The effect of recent developments in the Government's policy in
regard to Peking and Tientsin."
(Cabinet 34 (27), Conclusion 2.)
10. The Cabinet Committee on China met on the 26th May, when the Chiefs of Staff were also present, to consider the terms of reference quoted at the end of the previous paragraph.
(i.) With regard to "The effect of recent developments on the Government's policy in regard to Peking and Tientsin," the Committee took into consideration-
i
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(a.) Sir Miles Lampson's telegrams Nos. 18 and 20 of the 25th May,* in which he pointed out that the question of
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