73
(2).
condition of the Shanghai proposals that the Powers should organise a naval patrol in the harbour at Shanghai, naval protection at Woosung and at extra settlement 'wharves
and possibly also at other southern treaty ports. This accords with your views (see your telegram No. 1149) that
in the last resort goods could only be protected from
illegal taxes by the use of force. We have throughout
shared your view that it is essential that other Powers,
at any rate and particularly Japan, should join us in
the use of force but by the time the Shanghai proposals
had been formulated there were already clear indications
that America would in no circumstances co-operate in any
scheme of naval protection while Japan's first aim
appeared to be to call an informal conference with the
Chinese before adopting any other measures. I deemed it
desirable therefore to accede to your request for an
early indication how far in these circumstances His Majesty's Government were prepared to go (see your telegram No. 1187). If, owing to the refusal of other
Powers to co-operate, or for any other reason, the Shanghai proposals proved to be impracticable it would be necessary to consider what degree of resistance
short of force was possible.
intended to suggest for your
My telegram No, 488 was
consideration a line of
action to be adopted in this eventuality.
It appears
however to have given rise to certain misapprehensions which this further explanation of my views may help to
clear away.
3. I consider that some form of concerted
resistance