Circulated to the Cabinet by direction of
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[September 15, 1927. |
SECTION 1.
30
[F 7326/181/10]
No. 1.
Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received September 15.)
(No. 691. Secret.) Sir,
Peking, June 28, 1927. WITH reference to your despatch No. 301, Secret, of the 17th March, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an extremely able and interesting despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Canton, which is primarily intended as a statement of his views regarding the feasibility of a blockade of the Government of China.
2. It contains, however, a very instructive commentary on present political conditions in South China, and it is for that reason that I now forward it to the Foreign Office. As regards the actual question of the practicability or otherwise of a blockade, I propose to await a reply from His Majesty's consul-general, Shanghai. before formulating my views on the questions raised in Foreign Office despatch referred to above.
Enclosure in No. 1.
I have, &c.
MILES LAMPSON.
(No. 100. Sir,
Acting Consul-General Brenan to Sir M. Lampson.
Secret.)
Canton, June 13, 1927.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 37 of the 9th May calling for my observations on the report presented to the Committee of Imperial Defence by the Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade on the possibilities of exerting economic pressure on the Nationalist Government of South China.
2. The political situation has, of course, undergone a considerable change since the report was written. The Nationalist party has been violently shaken in its efforts to expel the Communist elements in its midst. It looked for a while as though the whole Nationalist movement had been disrupted and that South China had again disintegrated into independent provincial satrapies. The continued advance of the Nationalist forces against the North would, however, appear to belie this assumption, and the real condition of the Kuo Min-tang and its potentialities as a united political force are for the moment exceedingly obscure. The elimination of the Communists, if they are eliminated, may possibly strengthen the party by bringing back to the fold some of the more able members of moderate opinion who had been shouldered out by the extremists, but the more likely view is that it will be weakened by the loss of its foreign organisers. There is no doubt that the whole driving force of the Nationalist movement, from which British interests have suffered so much in the last two years, was derived from the counsel and inspiration of the Soviet advisers attached to the Southern Government, and especially Borodin, who must be an exceedingly able man. This is becoming increasingly apparent in this province, where the revenues are diminishing in spite of desperate efforts to impose new taxes of all kinds. The financial organisation built up under Russian supervision is falling to pieces. The money, though collected, is not coming in to the provincial Treasury, and conditions are rapidly reverting to those of pre-Russian days. This is not to say that there is no genuine Nationalist movement among the Chinese, or that there is any lack of educated Chinese who resent the inferior position occupied by their country and sincerely desire to remedy it. The movement is undoubtedly there, and its supporters are increasing in number, but the Chinese are so hopelessly incompetent and corrupt that they are incapable of organising anything on a large scale, whether it be a commercial enterprise, a Government or a revolution.
[230 p-1]
B