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advisable to send the Report out to China for the comments of the local authorities. He had not, however, been influenced in agreeing to this course by the observations of Lord Beatty, with a large number of which he was in disagreement. He thought it was highly improbable that the Nationalist Government of the South, or, indeed, any other Government which might find itself in power in China, would fail to satisfy the interest on the old secured loans of China unless the movement became purely Bolshevist. This, of course, was possible but very unlikely. There was at present an important conference taking place between representatives of the Kuomintang and of the North, and he thought it much more likely that agreement would be reached between the two parties than that China would become Bolshevist.

LORD CECIL remarked that he also disagreed with most of what Lord Beatty had said. The Report by no means indicated that economic pressure would be useless in case of war, but it made clear two important points: firstly, that without belligerent rights a Pacific Blockade only would be possible, and that there seemed no prospect of the agreement with all the other Powers which would be necessary to carry it out; secondly, that in view of the undeveloped character of the Chinese and of the enormous size of their country, a blockade would have far less effect on them than on a more highly developed State. They could in the last resort get on without any foreign trade, and leakage would be bound to occur to Russia and French Indo-China. The actual physical effect of a blockade was unlikely to bring the Chinese to terms rapidly, and might unite the North and South against us, which was a matter which required serious consideration.

MR. AMERY stated that he had telegraphed to Hong Kong for information on a series of questions arising out of the Report. He had just received a reply which indicated that the authorities in that place were in favour of taking action on the lines of a blockade. He commented on the fact that the Report appeared to assume an atmosphere of neutrality, so to speak, between the North and the South in the event of our attempting to exert economic pressure on the South. Surely in this case we should make it our business to co-operate with the North and to look to them for assistance against the South.

LORD CECIL explained that in the view of the experts on China, who had been questioned by the Committee, the course suggested by Mr. Amery was out of the question, since once a state of war arose the North would join forces with the South against us.

CONCLUSIONS.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE agreed-

(i.) To take note of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade on the possibilities of exerting pressure on the Nationalist Government of South China. (C.I.D. Paper No. 771-B.)

(ii.) To recommend that copies of the Report should be sent by the Departments

concerned to

(a.) The British Minister at Peking,

(b.) The Naval Commander-in-Chief in China,

(c.) The Consul-General at Shanghai,

(d) The Consul-General at Canton.

(e.) The Governor of Hong-Kong,

who should be asked to report their views.

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2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,

March 4, 1927.

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