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the area of chaos in China proper, and (b) as an advanced base for their disruptive activities in the latter country. In other words, in these provinces she is pursuing a constructive policy. On the other hand, her policy in China proper may be described, at present, as one of disruption, in that it encourages and implements the continuance of civil war, and aims at the destruction of the interests of the British Empire with the certain knowledge that the interests of the other Powers, with the possible exception of Japan, must automatically fall as a natural sequence. It seems inconceivable that Russia can hope to pick up what the British Empire and the other Powers are calculated to lose. The needs of China's trade can never be satisfied by the Trans-Siberian Railway, and, even if Russia hopes eventually to secure Shanghai, Tsingtao or Canton as "a warm water port", she can never hope to monopolise the sea-borne trade of China. Since, therefore, Russia cannot reasonably expect much material gain from the chaos which she continues to aggravate in China proper, it seems logical to infer that her present policy is based on other and ulterior motives. The subsequent attraction of the Nationalist Government into the Russian orbit must undoubtedly be included in this category, but it is also probable that, if a serious military conflict with European and especially British forces should result from the present situation, vast field might be opened to the Soviets for the furtherance of their plans for world revolution." From information in our possession it also seems probable that the Bolsheviks are looking to Chinese Nationalist successes to stimulate anti-British opinion in India. Indeed, we have had reports of a proposal, emanating from the I.K.K.I. in Moscow, to induce the Cantonese authorities to formulate a plan for the invasion of Burma. However fantastic this idea may be, Borodin is said to have stated that once the Chinese revolution assumed definite shape, it would be followed by revolution in India, towards which end operations would probably be begun in Tibet. The danger of serious military conflict in this area may not be very great, and it should be possible to avert it by diplomatic or other methods, but it is reasonable to assume that Russia will continue to concentrate her energies, not only on carrying the war on British trade interests to the bitter end, but also upon infecting India, through Burma, with the revolutionary spirit of her neighbour.
RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA.
Я
7. For the purposes of this paper it is necessary to begin our examination of Russian activities in Central Asia at the time when those measures were instituted which resulted in the final subjection of Russian Turkistan. Early in 1924 Radzutak, now a member of the Politbureau, made a tour through Turkistan and Trans-Caspia, and returned to Moscow with a very pessimistic account of the results which were being obtained by the military methods then in use for the suppression of the insurgents in the Ferghama, Bokhara, Khiva and Merv areas. He urged the abandonment of the policy of suppression by force, and the substitution of a policy of conciliation, based on a recognition of nationalist aspirations. "The native intelligentsia and bourgeois classes" he said, "must be made to become our friends and also close assistants in the struggle for the liberation of the East." In September, 1924, these suggestions were put into effect and resulted in the creation of the Uzbeg, Turkoman and Kirghiz republics and the Tajik and Kara-Kirghiz autonomous provinces.
It is reasonable to assume that the pacification of Russian Turkistan was, primarily, a domestic necessity. With larger political issues at stake in adjacent countries, it was obviously essential first to settle lesser and domestic problems within the boundaries of Russia itself. In Turkistan, not only was the solution of these difficulties proving to be costly and irritating, but their continuance was likely to embarrass the development of external schemes by sapping Russian resources, and by exposing one of the main lines of communication with the countries concerned to interruption. But if the primary motive was domestic necessity, it is evident, none the less, that the Bolsheviks were quick to appreciate the advantages to their external policy which might accrue, fur, in every case, these newly formed republics had an ethnological overlap into the neighbouring provinces of Afghanistan and Persia which revealed a possible method of peaceful territorial expansion. One of the corollaries of this settlement was the inauguration of an important programme of railway construction throughout the new republics. Although the majority of these projected railway extensions may be intended primarily to promote the economic development of the country, it is undoubtedly true that the increased railway facilities afforded must eventually become of material assistance in any subsequent programme of gaining control in Afghanistan and in the consequent approach to India.
AFGHANISTAN.
The
8. The activities of Bolshevik Russia in Afghanistan have their origin and official recognition in the Russo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. By the terms of this treaty, Afghanistan accepted an annual subsidy, gifts of munitions, and the services of specialists and experts to assist in the modernisation of her communications and in the general development of the country. The result has been a steady growth of Russian influence in Kabul and the continued infiltration of Russian personnel into the country. Russification of the Afghan Air Force came as an unforeseen development, but in other respects Russian activities have followed the natural course which was to be expected. Thus at the present day a telegraph line, built under Russian supervision, is in use between Kabul and Kandahar, whilst an extension is being built towards Spin Baldak near our Baluchistan frontier. The Kushk-Kandahar telegraph line is nearing com- pletion, and it is understood that work on the Termez-Kabul line is scheduled to begin this March. The survey of a road which is to run from the Oxus to Kabul over the Salang Pass is steadily progressing, while reports from Meshed indicate Work on a railway that improvements are in progress on the Kushk---Herat route. extension from Tejend, on the Trans-Caspian Line, to Pul-i-Khatun, close to the Perso- Afghan border, has been intermittently carried on. In August last, the Red Air Ministry are believed to have issued orders for aerial surveys to be completed by April, 1927, of areas covering the main routes north of the Hindu Kush. It is understood, also, that negotiations are now progressing in Moscow for the formation of a joint Russo-Afghan Company to promote civil aviation in Afghanistan, and link up Kabul and Kandahar with the outside world, via Tashkent and Kushk. There are indications, also, that fresh orders for military munitions may shortly be placed by the Afghan Government in Moscow. In commercial spheres, as well, the Russians have secured concrete results in the establishment of a cotton ginning factory and power plant at Herat, while steps are being taken to develop cotton production in Northern Afghanistan.
One may perhaps be inclined to doubt the sincerity of Russia's intentions (and indeed her ability) as to the immediate fulfilment of the ambitious programme outlined above but, in their cumulative effect, even as projects, they cannot fail to impress the unbiased mind with Russia's obvious desire to strengthen and to go on strengthening her hold over Afghanistan. Most of these projects would obviously be of great assistance to Russia in the event either of a peaceful absorption of Northern Afghanistan or of an ultimate military advance. In either case, it would be essential for her to prepare the way carefully, before committing herself to any line of action in a country as wild and undeveloped as Afghanistan.
Although the military menace is undoubtedly a very real and grave one, it is by no means impossible that Russia will adopt the more peaceful policy of absorbing the defenceless northern provinces of Afghanistan by propaganda and infiltration. It is, further, conceivable that she may prefer, on the analogy of her recent successes in China, to risk no half measures, but to try to extend her control in one stride to the very borders of India by less obvious and dangerous means. On this premise it is possible that her present activities are, in theory at least, part of a constructive programme in Afghanistan. We have no direct evidence to show that disintegration of the country is her intention; on the contrary the bulk of our information indicates that her primary endeavour is to cultivate Afghan reliance on Russia, and eventually to secure political domination over the country. In August, 1926, M. Osterov, a member of the Eastern Control Commission attached to the I.K.K.I., stated "our business is to bring as much political pressure as we can to bear on the Government (of Afghanistan) and to make it directly dependent on us".
This statement followed the remark that " Revolutionary and party work, in We are not interested in the question of the ordinary sense, are out of place here. whether this semi-savage kingdom is governed by an Amir or by a Revolutionary Dictator". If my appreciation of Russian aims in China is correct, it does not seem impossible that Russian political strategy may be aiming at securing political domination over Afghanistan, with the object of developing it as a defensive buffer, to be consolidated and exploited as a jumping-off place for the next move towards India.
A certain degree of support is lent to the above theory by the manner in which the Soviets handled the Urta Tagai incident of November, 1925. This incident probably Russia ample owed its inception to purely local causes. but subsequent developments gave excuse for military aggression had the time been considered opportune for such a venture. For example, failure by Russia to comply with the truculent Afghan demands for the evacuation of this obscure island would undoubtedly have provoked the Afghans to declare war, and responsibility for this outbreak could hardly have been brought home to the Russians, Various reasons have been advanced in explanation of their very conciliatory attitude. It was suggested, for instance, that internal conditions in Russia
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