(b) That the above telegram No.235 to Peking should
be repeated to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China
Station:
122
(c)
To approve generally the Conclusions of the
Committee of Chiefs of Staff in C.P.115 (27) (Appendix II)ø
(a) That the Admiralty should be responsible for
instructing the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in accordance
with the Report of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, as
to the line he was to take in any conversations with his
foreign colleagues.
(e) That us regards Peking and Tientsin, the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs should warn the British
Minister that he was advised that the defence of Peking
and Tientsin required forces far exceeding any that could
be supplied from British sources, and that even the
defence of Tient sin ond the maintenance of the line of
communicationsbetween that place and the coast involved
forces beyond our capacity. That in the circumstances Sir
Miles Lampson must be prepared to evacuate both Peking
and Tient sin in the case of danger, and that he was at
liberty henceforward to issue any warnings or take any
steps he deemed necessary, without further reference
home. That he should inform his foreign diplomatic
colleagues that he had received these latter instructions.
And that the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China Station,
was being instructed to afford co-operation in any
measures