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the river, the interruption of the passage of troops cannot be ensured until the guns have been dealt with; and we now learn that a 10-inch or 12-inch gun is being mounted there. The Commander-in-Chief also makes it clear that the interrupti of the passage of the river is also impracticable at Chinkiang until the forts have been dealt with. It is clear also that considerable Cantonese forces have already crossed the Yangtse and that we are too late to obtain the maximum results from this form of reprisal. Nevertheless, even now the cutting of the cross-river communications of the Nationalist armies might have some influence in averting a repetition at Peking and Tientsin of the outrageous incidents that occurred at Nanking and elsewhere, and we think it ought not to be definitely discarded for use when the situation has been cleared up as regards the forts.
war.
6. We do not overlook that the British and United States Naval Commanders-in- Chief consider that a stoppage of troop movements involves taking sides in the Chinese On the political side of this observation we express no opinion, but from a military point of view we think that the Powers would be justified in any action on the Yangtse which would help to avert a catastrophe at Peking and Tientsin, as well as to prevent the domination of the comparatively friendly forces in North China by the violently anti-foreign elements in South China.
7. The Naval Commander-in-Chief states that it is practicable for him to stop military movements up and down the Yangtse, but not across that river, owing to the length to be patrolled. We assume, however, that at important strategic points, where railways, important roads, or canals cross the Yangtse, effective control could be exercised once the forts had been disposed of. We therefore recommend that this measure, as well as the cutting of railways at points where they are accessible from the river, should be reserved for consideration when it is seen whether the measures proposed by the Naval Commanders-in-Chief effect their purpose.
8. Similarly, we recommend that the question of a blockade should be reserved for later consideration. In this recommendation we note that our views are shared by Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister at Peking, who, in telegram No. 605 of the 2nd April, suggests that the idea of a blockade should be kept in the background for production later, if agreement on the original proposals is not forthcoming.
9. The measures proposed by the Naval Commanders-in-Chief are, in themselves, acts of war, and once they have been committed we think there might be less reluctance than at present to follow them up by other steps necessary to produce the desired results.
10. The Naval Commander-in-Chief appears satisfied as to the capacity of the allied forces to deal by bombardment with the forts at Wusung and on the Yangtse, the latter being tackled one at a time, and in reply to a question as to whether he could maintain naval forces in the Yangtse, up to and including Hankow, Admiral Tyrwhitt replies, "Yes, certainly." It is clear, however, that every day's delay gives the Chinese Nationalists a better chance of getting the defences into shape. That they are alive to the importance of this is shown by the haste with which they have mounted a 10 or 12-inch gun at Nanking. We hope, therefore, that there will be no long delay between the refusal by the Cantonese to give satisfaction to any ultimatum which may be delivered to them and the enforcement of sanctions.
11. With a view to enabling the Commander-in-Chief to judge as to the extent to which the forts both at Wusung and on the Yangtse are capable of resistance, and generally in order to put him in possession of all possible information of military importance, we recommend that Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt should be given authority to use his aircraft for naval or military purposes, not merely at Shanghai, but anywhere in China within the range of their flight. We suggest also that the military importance of this should be communicated to the British Minister at Peking and the Consul-General at Shanghai.
12.
One difficulty involving delay in putting sanctions into operation is the existence of British and other foreign communities in the interior of China. We learn that by the morning of Sunday, the 3rd April, the evacuation of the river above Hankow had been effected as far as Ichang, and that all gunboats (including H.M.S."Mantis," in regard to which we were apprehensive) have been brought below the gorges. Evacuation to Hankow will have been completed almost at once, with the possible exception of H.M.S. "Woodcock" at Chansha.
13.
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We are not precisely informed as to the numbers of British nationals on the Yangtse at and below Ilankow, though we understand that the number is small. Their withdrawal, however, after belligerent operations had been undertaken lower down the river might involve considerable risk. If the aids to navigation had been withdrawn, the passage of the river past the forts by night might be impossible, aud the passage by day might involve casualties.
14. In view of the uncertainties of the situation, we recommend the withdrawal of all British nationals from the Yangtse, and we suggest that other countries likely to be concerned in sanctions should be urged to order a similar withdrawal.
15. Military intelligence is to the effect that the Chinese Commander-in-Chief, General Chiang Kai-shek, is at variance with the Cantonese Government now established at Hankow. We do not wish to interfere in a political matter, but from a military point of view there appeared to us to be certain advantages in making any demand in regard to Nanking to the Nationalist Government rather than to the military Commander-in-Chief.
16. Tientsin. In this survey of the situation in China as a whole we have necessarily to consider the situation at Peking and Tientsin, and we have taken note of Sir Miles Lampson's telegram No. 591, dated the 1st April, in which he suggests that reinforcements amounting to one brigade would be necessary for the defence of Tientsin.
17. We have frequently urged in previous Reports that in existing circumstances reliance must be placed on Japan for protection of British and international interests north of the River Yangtse. If it should now be decided that such a procedure is impracticable, and that the defence of the concessions at Tientsin is to be a British commitment, a close re-examination of the whole military situation in China will be necessary.
18. Before dealing, therefore, with the suggestions contained in Sir Miles Lampson's telegram, referred to above, we feel that further guidance is necessary as to the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to safeguarding British interests in the North.
19. We are informed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that for the protection of the international concessions at Tientsin the existing inter-allied forces would have to be reinforced by at least one mixed Brigade. This estimate does not take into account forces necessary for maintaining communications (over 30 miles long) to the sea, or for the protection of His Majesty's Legation at Peking.
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.
20.-(a.) We concur in the following sanctions proposed by the Naval Commanders-in-Chief in China of the British, American, Japanese and French Fleets, and recommend their adoption as the basis of the sanctions to an ultimatum :-
(i.) The seizure and destruction of the Wusung forts.
(ii.) The bombardment of the Yangtse forts.
(iii.) The destruction of the arsenals at Hankow and Canton-but not Shanghai. (iv.) The seizure or destruction of the Cantonese fleet.
(6.) In case the above sanctions do not produce the necessary result, the following measures of reprisal should be kept in reserve for the present:-
(L) The interdiction to the Cantonese of the passage of the Yangtse. (II.) Blockade.
(c.) In order not to give longer than absolutely necessary to the Cantonese to complete their measures at the forts and elsewhere to enable them to impede the movement of British and foreign ships on the Yangtse, there should be as little delay as possible between a refusal by the Cantonese to give satisfaction or their non-compliance with an ultimatum and the enforcement of sanctions.
(d.) The Naval Commander-in-Chief should be given authority to use his aircraft for Naval and Military purposes not merely at Shanghai, but to reconnoitre the forts on the Yangtae and anywhere in China within the range of their flight.
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