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If these assumptions are correct, I think the memorandum states the position most clearly, and that Sir M. Lampson should be informed of the position as shown in the draft prepared by Mr. Strang.
If these assumptions are, however, either incorrect or doubtful, I am most strongly of opinion that the position and its possibilities should be carefully re-examined by the competent military and naval authorities as it is to my mind essential and only fair that Sir M. Lampson should be informed of what can or cannot be done for the protection of British lives and vital interests in Northern China.
I do not of course know what is the task or ultimate destination of the fresh brigade which is now being despatched to Hong Kong. It may be that its work is already cut out for it and fixed. But if there is any possibility that in a sudden emergency or crisis His Majesty's Government could and would order this brigade, or indeed any other troops, to Tien-tsin or Peking, then I think this draft telegram must be revised and held up until we are in a position to tell Sir M. Lampson quite clearly and definitely what amount of additional British force can in the last resort be despatched for the defence of those cities.
It must be remembered that a very heavy responsibility is being placed upon Sir M. Lampson in this matter. It is in the circumstances inevitable that he should have to bear this responsibility, in consulation at his discretion with his foreign colleagues. But it is on that account all the more imperative that His Majesty's Government should give him the clearest possible guidance as to the exact degree to which he can count on any military or naval reinforcement. It would be altogether unfair to him and undesirable on more general grounds to leave him under the impression that he can count on no more British troops, and so compel him pre- maturely to arrange for evacuation and withdrawal from Peking and Tientsin, and then at the last moment, in the face of some sudden crisis, rush sufficient troops there to enable him to remain.
April 9, 1927.
G. MOUNSEY.
I entirely agree with Mr. Mounsey. A brigade is starting for Hong Kong. If it can be made available for Tientsin, I think Sir M. Lampson should certainly be told at once.
If not, then the draft telegram, which is based on the assumption that the despatch of further troops is out of the question, can stand.
April 9, 1927.
V. W.
Enclosure No. 2 to Appendix (A).
Copy of Telegram to Sir M. Lampson, Peking.
1927.
(No. ———.)
Foreign Office, April Your telegram No. 634 of 7th April: Evacuation of Peking and Tientsin. In your telegram No. 591 you said that unless His Majesty's Government were themselves prepared to take precautions in advance and, if necessary, alone for the protection of British subjects in Tientsin, you would be glad of authority to warn British nationals accordingly, so that those who desired to leave might do so before the crisis arose. You further warned me that the situation threatened to become similar to that of 1900, and that the question of the withdrawal of the Legation from Peking might arise at the shortest notice unless the Legation could be defended. Your warnings were given the fullest consideration, and the object of my telegram No. 237 was to make clear to you first that, if the danger you feared materialised His Majesty's Government had no resources available to undertake single-handed the defence of the Peking Legation or even of Tientsin and its communications; and secondly, to give you, in accordance with your request, full discretion at a moment to be chosen by yourself to issue the necessary warnings to British nationals at Peking and Tientsin and to withdraw your Legation from Peking. It was not my intention to urge you to take any immediate step in regard either to the with- drawal of British subjects or of your Legation, or to suggest that any such step should be taken independently by yourself alone. On the contrary, I should imagine that a situation requiring the evacuation of British subjects and the British Legation would equally require the evacuation of foreign nationals and foreign Legations generally. His Majesty's Government realise that they have placed a heavy