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APPENDIX (A).
Copy of a Minute from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
Sir M. Hankey.
I BEG that you will at once lay before the Chiefs of Staff Committee -
1. The attached memorandum on Sir Miles Lampson's telegram No. 642. 2. Draft telegram to Sir M. Lampson.
3. Draft telegram to Tokyo and Washington.
There is a certain inconsistency between the wording of 2 and 3 which can be adjusted when policy is finally decided, and when we know exactly what share we can contribute to an effective defence of Tientsin.
For the information of the Chiefs of Staff I should say that I fully recognise that I must cut my cloak according to the cloth available, and that I cannot pursue a policy to which our forces are unequal. But I share to the full Sir Miles Lampson's apprehensions as to the results of a policy of evacuation. Its adoption may well-
(a) precipitate the very crisis which we dread and
(b) lead directly to the overthrow of Chang Tso-lin and the Bolshevisation of all
China.
It must-
(c) gravely affect our prestige in the East,
(d) do irreparable injury to material British interests.
In these circumstances I feel bound to ask-
(i.) what is the maximum contribution which we can make to the defence of the
Legations and/or Tientsin,
(ii) upon what conditions as regards the co-operation of other Powers we can
make it.
It will then be for the Cabinet to decide whether it is willing to make this effort on the prescribed terms.
(Initialled)
April 10, 1927.
Enclosure No. 1 to Appendix (A).
Memorandum.
A. C.
When the question of Tientsin was first examined by the Chiefs of Staff in January last, their view was that the troops at present there were sufficient only for the maintenance of order in times of popular disturbance and would be in a position of grave danger if exposed to attack by a large organised Chinese force; it was doubtful if they could keep open communication with the Peking Legation in any grave circumstances; and in the event of serious trouble threatening, reinforcements could only be obtained from Japan; our naval forces could not co-operate, as Tientsin cannot be reached by water.
These views were put to Sir M. Lampson in our telegram No. 25 of the 13th January.
Accordingly, when we announced to Sir M. Lampson in our telegram No. 39 of the 17th January, that His Majesty's Government had decided that Shanghai must be held at any cost, we added that Tientsin must be primarily Japan's care.
About the end of March Sir M. Lampson began to become uneasy about the possible reaction at Tientsin if the Southern successes continued, and he summoned the Colonel Commandant from Tientsin to discuss the question. After seeing the Colonel Commandant, he reported in his telegram No. 542 of the 28th March that he thought one more battalion at Tientsin was immediately necessary, from which 150 men
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could be detached to strengthen the Legation guard, which would also be provided in addition with a junior officer and twenty gunners.
To this telegram we replied in our telegram No. 226 of the 30th March that the considered opinion of our military advisers was that the despatch of a single additional British battalion to 'Tientsin would not suffice to meet any serious eventuality. We also instructed Sir M. Lampson to explain the situation to his Japanese colleague and Bay that we relied on the Japanese Government for the provision of adequate protection for the foreign interests at Tientsin and to ask him to urge his Government to take whatever additional measures were necessary to that end.
In his telegram No. 597 of the 1st April Sir M. Lampson reported the views of the Japanese Government as follows:-
The Japanese were strengthening their troops at Tientsin by three or four companies in May next. This they considered to be quite sufficient to cope with mob violence. The Japanese Minister thought it quite inadequate, and was accordingly recommending his Government to be prepared to send down troops at once from Manchuria if serious trouble arose.
On the 3rd April Sir John Tilley reported the Minister for Foreign Affairs as saying that the Japanese were in a position to reinforce Tientsin if necessary, but that he refused to be nervous about either Tientsin or Peking.
Sir M. Lampson already, in his telegram No. 591 of the 1st April, stated his strong opinion that, whatever the Japanese reply might be, we should not bank on Japan; unless His Majesty's Government were prepared themselves to take precautions in advance and if necessary alone, he requested authority to warn British nationals accordingly so that those who wished might get out before the crisis arose; he recom- mended that one infantry brigade should be at once despatched to Tientsin and that the Legation guard should be doubled and gunners provided.
He added that the situation threatened to become similar to that of 1900, and that
if the arrangements made under the 1901 protocol for the defence of the Legation were not carried out the question of the withdrawal of the Legation might arise at short notice.
It was in these circumstances that the Chiefs of Staff again considered the question of Tientsin, and after discussion by the Cabinet our telegram to Peking No. 237 of the 4th April was sent. It is that telegram which has drawn from Sir M. Lampson the telegram now under consideration (No. 634 of 7th April).
Sir M. Lampson's telegram No. 591 caused us some alarm and the question he raised was considered on the assumption that the worst which he thought might happen, would happen, namely, that a situation similar to that of 1900 might arise. ("We are faced with a situation and anti-foreign movement that threatens to become very similar to that of 1900.") The conclusion which His Majesty's Government reached and which was communicated to Sir M. Lampson in our telegram No. 237 was briefly (a) that the defence of Peking and even the defence of Tientsin and its commu- nications would demand more troops than we alone could supply; (b), this being so, he must be prepared to evacuate both Peking and Tientsin if the worst happened, and he was given discretion to issue any warnings and to take any steps that he might think necessary without any further reference home.
This telegram of ours has somewhat alarmed Sir M. Lampson, and he seems to be somewhat surprised that we have taken him at his word and have considered the situation on the assumption that the worst will happen. He is obviously most reluctant to take the responsibility either of ordering the evacuation of Peking or the evacuation of British subjects from Tientsin.
There are several contingencies involved. These are: (a) the evacuation of British subjects from Peking and district; (b) the evacuation of the British Legation from Peking; (c) the evacuation of British subjects from Tientsin, both from within and from without the Concession; (d) the question whether such evacuation shall be carried out by us independently or as part of a general evacuation of all or most foreigners.
It would be best to take Sir M. Lampson's points seriatim. He very rightly asks us to look at the question in all its bearings as part of our general policy in China.
1. Sir M. Lampson's description of the desired object of His Majesty's Government in paragraph 2 of his telegram is accurate.
2. Failing the achievement of the desired object in the manner proposed, he sees three possible alternatives, namely, (a) coercion of the south; (b) total abandon- ment of our own interests in China or in whatever part of China the southern party
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