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(b.) That the British, American, Japanese and Italian Senior Naval Officers
informally agreed to recommend :---
(1.) The destruction of the Wusung Forts. (2.) The destruction of the Yangtse Fort.
(3.) The bombardment of the Hankow Arsenal,
We have also a telegram from Sir Miles Lampson, No. 714, dated the 15th April (Appendix II) indicating that the British, French, American and Japanese Ministers at Peking (the two latter of whom declare that they were not authorised to agree to anything) considered that the first and most obvious thing to do was to destroy the Hankow and Canton Arsenals which might conceivably be quite sufficient alone to achieve our purpose. If that failed the destruction of the Wusung Forts and possibly the cutting off of supplies and men for the South from crossing the Yangtse ought to prove effective.
We have also seen a telegram* from Mr. Teichman at Hankow stating that the Cantonese are very uneasy about an economic blockade by the withdrawal of shipping which would stop their surtax revenues as well as cut them off from Shanghai.
5. A telegram* from the Acting British Consul-General at Canton, No. 27, dated the 17th April, suggests that there is no use in attacking General Chiang Kai shek, who is taking strong action against the Communists at Canton. The Acting Consul-General thinks that reprisals taken in another part of China from where the original trouble arises are worse than useless, and that such sanctions as the shelling of military objectives, and military occupation or blockade should be taken at the spot immediately after the outrage has occurred. He even objects to the air reconnaissance of the Dane Island and Bogue Forts, which would be greatly resented at Canton. At the same time there is a certain amount of information to confirm the view we expressed in our Interim Report (Paper No. C.O.S. 80), that the places originally designated as sanctions are changing hands. Thus, Sir Miles Lampson, in telegram* No. 727 of the 18th April, reports on the authority of the Japanese Military Attaché, just returned from the Front, that Canton troops are evacuating Nanking. Rear-Admiral (Yangtse) in telegram* also dated the 18th April, No. 540, reports that at Chinkiang the North Forts on Silver Island were flying the Northern flag yesterday, but that Silver Island itself flew the Southern flag.
6. In the circumstances described in the two preceding paragraphs we are convinced that it is useless for us to continue advising the adoption of particular sanctions which become out of date before they can receive the approval of the men on the spot and the Powers concerned. For example, in view of the telegram from the Acting Consul-General at Canton, referred to above, we feel bound to drop for the moment and in present conditions the idea of destroying the Dane Island and Bogue Forts as a sanction; although for reasons unconnected with sanctions, which are described later in this Report, we are continuing to study the operation. We are impressed by the views of the Acting Consul-General at Canton as to the principles on which sanctions should be taken. If, for example, a bombardment of the Nanking Forts could have been undertaken very shortly after the outrages, the It is too late to undertake this desired object would probably have been achieved. sanction in cold blood, and, unless there is some change of system, the sanctions we recommend may always prove too late before they can be put into operation.
7. In the circumstances we strongly recommend the best course will be to give the Naval Commander-in-Chief (who is in close touch with the British Minister at Peking through the Consul-General at Shanghai) a free hand to take action of a retaliatory character against the Cantonese whenever and wherever they give him the opportunity by taking the first step. Already the Naval Commander-in-Chief has authority to reply to fire directed against ships under his orders. We recommend that his powers should be extended and that he should have authority, not only to reply to fire directed against any ship flying the British flag, but in such an eventuality to counter attack the offending forces with all the power at his disposal. For example, if any ship carrying the British flag is fired at by the Wusung Forts, the Commander-in-Chief should have authority to use all the forces at his disposal to destroy those Forts.
8. We also recommend that the Naval Commander-in-Chief should be authorised to draw from the Shanghai Defence Force such forces as he may require
* Not printed
and as the General Officer Commanding can spare for such operations as raids by landing parties to destroy Chinese forts.
9. We are convinced that it is only by giving a free hand to the men on the spot to take prompt retaliatory action with the forces at their disposal that the present situation can be met. We recommend, therefore, that the necessary powers should he conveyed by the Admiralty and War Office respectively to the Naval Commander- in-Chief and the General Officer Commanding the Shanghai Defence Force, and by the Foreign Office to the British Minister at Peking, and at the same time that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should invite the Powers associated with us in the Nanking demands to give similar instructions to their respective senior naval officers and diplomatic representatives in China. We further recommend that these orders should remain in force until satisfaction is given by the Cantonese Government for the Nanking outrages.
10. Our attention has been called to a telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong, dated the 14th April (Appendix III), regarding the likelihood of trouble at Hong Kong (more especially on the 1st May), fomented up by the Communists at Hong Kong, in which event retaliatory action against the Bogue Forts is suggested. Although, as mentioned above, we have for the present dropped the idea of destroying these forts as a sanction for the Nanking affair, we think it desirable to continue our study of the feasibility of this operation with a view to having ready a cut and dried plan which could be put in force at short notice, either as an act of retaliation for enemy action at Hong Kong, or in more favourable circumstances as a sanction in itself, or as an indispensable preliminary to the destruction of the Canton arsenal as a sanction. At present, however, the Reports at our disposal are not sufficiently detailed to enable us to say whether this is a feasible military opera- tion with the available forces. We are calling for further Reports on the subject. We recommend that the Senior Naval Officer should be authorised, before any attack on the forts is made and at such moment as he may deem appropriate to reconnoitre and photograph them from the air.
11. Our conclusions and recommendations may be summarised as follows:- (a.) In view of the rapid changes in the situation in China and of the difficulty in securing agreement by all the British and international authorities concerned in any particular sanction, there should be a change of system. The attempt to prescribe sanctions from home should be abandoned, and the Admiralty should be empowered to authorise the Naval Com- mander-in-Chief not only to reply to fire directed against His Majesty's ships, but whenever fire is directed against any ship flying the British flag to take retaliatory action against the offender with all the forces at his disposal, and, if necessary, to land parties for the purpose of completing the destruction of forts or guns guilty of such action. For this purpose the Naval Commander-in-Chief should be authorised to draw on the Shanghai Defence Force for any troops he may require and which the General-Officer-Commanding can spare. The War Office should be empowered to give the necessary authority to the General-Officer- Commanding.
(b.) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should notify these dispositions to the British Minister at Peking, and should take such steps as he may deem appropriate to invite corresponding instructions to their respec- tive Senior Naval Officers from the other Powers concerned with us in the Nanking demands.
(c.) The above arrangement should remain in force as a means of exercising continuous pressure until the Cantonese Government have given satisfaction to the Nanking demands.
(d) For the moment the proposed destruction of the Dane Island and Bogue Forts should be dropped as a measure of sanction for the outrages at Nanking, but the question should be studied and a plan should be prepared for adoption in case of enemy activity at Hong Kong, or, if circumstances should later on render this course desirable, either as a sanction or as a preliminary to the destruction of the Canton arsenal. At present, however, we are not in a position to advise definitely whether the operation is advisable.
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