245
Conclusions and kecommendations.
2.Our conclusions and recommendations may be summarised
as follows:-
(1) The smaller concession Ports.
The protection of the smaller Concessions múst, as indicated in our first Report
.I.D. Paper 617-E) dovolves upon the
If
Naval Forces. The Navy, however, can only afford protecti in against mob violence. it is a question of dealing with
military forces evacuation will usually
be the only course.
(2) As regards the particular ports, our Conclusions
are as follows:-
(a) Hankow and Kiukiang,
Even if these Concessions are returned to their proper owners, we do not recommend any
plans based on the assumption that they can be defended rainst Chinese Nationalist forces or against anything more than mob violence.
(b) Amoy.
The arrangements for the protection of the Concession of Amoy should be left to the Naval Commander-in-Chief in consultation
ith the Military authorities and the Local Jonsular representative.
(c) Canton.
The problem as to the defence of the Snameen is as set forth in paragraph 10. Its evacuation should be the necessary preliminary to the institution of a bloc'rade. The measures to be taken for the protection of Shameen or for its evacuation, can only be decided in accordance with the situation at the moment and must be left to the men on the spot.
(d) At Chinkiang, the Naval Forces available
are sufficient for the maintenance of order, but in the event of the arrival of Chinese Nationalist troops the Concession might have to re evacuated.
(e) Tientsin. At Tientsin the Naval Forces
are sufficient only for the maintenance of order in times of popular disturbance, and would be in a position of grave danger if exposed to attack by a large organised Chinese force, It is doubtful if they could keep open comunications with the Legation at Pekin in any grave circumstances. In the event of serious trouble threatening, reinforcements can only be obtained from Japan.
16.