239
the force required for the maintenance of onder.
16. We wish to emphasize that it is impossible for Great
Britain to undertake the defence of the Concessions
single-handed. As the dates we have given show, it is
impracticable to transport sufficient Fritish reinforce-
ments before the possible date of arrival of the Chinese
Nationalist Army. Even if it were possibls we should
greatly deprecate isolated action except as the very last
resort as it would inevitably involve us in a war in
'
which in all probability the whole of China rould be
united against us, with disastrous results to our vast
interests throughout the Fast.
17. In these circumstances we attach the first importance
to the organisation of international action. Moreover,
such action must be prompt if Shanghai is to be saved by
military means. As mentioned in our Report of June, 1925
יד
(C.T.D. Paper No.617-B) there is only one nation which
can send large forces to China at short notice, and that
is Japan. Whether Japan's appreciation of the importance
of international solidarity in Chine is sufficiently
strong to induce her to undertake the principal share in
the defence of Shanghai, where British interests predorin-
ate, is a matter on which "e offer no opinion. If, however
an appeal is made to Japan, we recommend that the British
Government should simultaneously offer to send its share
of the international contingent, even though it cannot
arrive until a later stage. We think also that the
French and the United States Governments should also
send their quotas, and, so far as are able to judge from recent tal-grams, they are not unfavourably disposed
in this matter.
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