ruined or on the way to ruin.
In the second place, my
228
hope is that if the Canton Government realised that we should
resort to it rather than make a complete surrender of our
policy of reform and reconsideration of Treaties at the
bidding of Sovie t-inspired politicians, our diplomacy might
be greatly strengthened. At present the tactical advantages enjoyed by the Soviet-Canton policy (if that be indeed the policy of the Southern Government) are so great that I
do not see what is to prevent them driving us out of
every settlement in turn by a judicious combination of
strikes, false promises and mob violence. But if we make
it clear to them that we shall not acquiesce in any illegal
fait accompli, that no number of successful mob attacks
will either provoke us into sanguinary and futile operations
on land, or induce us to accept a complete surrender of
our treaty rights; that at whatever cost to our selves we
should, in the last resort, maintai maritime pressure upon
the aggressors, I think the hands of our Foreign Minister
might be greatly strengthened,
All the belligerent Chinese provinces want money, and they want it badly. They cannot get enough from Russia;
no I suppose can they raise an internal loan. Indeed
there are two things which they have not got, and cannot
obtain from the Soviets. One is money; the other is
sea power. And if we can (of course, without making overt or unnecessary threats) make them understand that the
Chinese question is not to be settled by moh violence, however well directed, by attacks on particular settlements, however successful, I think the offorts of our diplomatic
agents would be greatly aided. At any rate, this is a line
of action which might be worth considering if and when our present policy seems likely to suffer shipwreck.
Whittinghame,
January 11th, 1927.
4.
A.J.B.